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# **HOW CLASS SHAPES GENDER INEQUALITY AT HOME**

**Three essays on the gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist  
contexts**



# **HOW CLASS SHAPES GENDER INEQUALITY AT HOME**

## **Three essays on the gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist contexts**

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*To Gio and Lilia*



## Summary

Recent growth in economic inequality and class divides across Western countries has been shown to significantly impact intra-family gender relations and inequalities. Although Eastern European countries have faced a comparable growth of economic inequalities and a complete re-drawing of class relations following the collapse of state socialism, the category of class has been conspicuously absent from the analysis of changing family and gender relations in that region. In this thesis, I address this gap by investigating whether and how class — in both a structural/material and a cultural sense — has shaped gender inequalities in the division of unpaid work in the context of post-socialist transformations. I conduct three studies using the 1994, 2002, and 2012 waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) from Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia, as well as primary interview data I collected in Russia in 2017.

In Study 1, I analyse how the gender division of domestic labour changed across different classes in 1994-2002 vs. 2002-2012 periods. I show that the lack of overall societal movement towards greater equality in the six countries analysed was due to idiosyncratic trends among different classes, and, especially, to significant setbacks in gender equality experienced by lower-class households in the early years of post-socialist transformations, which they only managed to offset during the 2000s. In Study 2, I theorise and empirically demonstrate how an interactional-level mechanism of double accountability to sex and class categories — undergirded by the perception of gender contracts evolved in the post-socialist period as profoundly classed — shapes negotiations about, and performance of, domestic labour and childcare among Russian middle-class dual earner heterosexual couples. Middle-class men are accountable not only as breadwinners, but also as carers; while middle-class women, in addition to their caring roles, are accountable for their career and sex appeal. In Study 3, I explore changes in the Russian population's views on the gender division of labour between 1994 and 2012, moving beyond the unidimensional traditional vs. egalitarian conceptualization of gender ideology. My findings evidence highly class-specific gender ideology trajectories. While lower-class women and men slightly increased their support for separate spheres, among the more educated and affluent of both genders, 're-traditionalisation' instead entailed increased endorsement of both joint-breadwinning and gender-essentialist views of women's caring roles, at the expense of support for the housewife/male-breadwinner model and, more recently, for egalitarianism.

As the findings of these three studies demonstrate, the analytical category of class, while still not widely used, is essential for making sense of changes in the practices and ideologies of the gendered division of unpaid work in post-socialist contexts. This thesis is a call to bring class squarely into post-socialist family and gender sociology.



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## 1. Class and changing gender relations in families: Post-socialist East vs. West

Russia and Hungary were the first countries in which Zewa, the global hygiene brand, launched its recent #CareWellLiveWellTogether campaign for more gender-equal sharing of household chores and care.<sup>1</sup> While one could argue that this campaign can be considered a response to the persisting problem of women's double burden of paid and unpaid work, which both of these countries have inherited from their socialist past, it is at the same time highly unlikely that a commercial brand would launch a campaign completely at odds with the aspirations of its consumers. This campaign, indeed, has been widely approved in popular parenting blogs<sup>2</sup>, and the most widely read family and child therapist in Russia, Lyudmila Petranovskaya (Danilova, 2020), has become its ambassador.

The campaign's imagery of contemporary Russian and Hungarian middle-class families seeking a more gender-equal division of labour at home, however, stands in stark contrast to the 'anti-gender' and 'traditional family values' discourses and policies of contemporary Russian and Hungarian governments, and the alleged 'second wave of re-traditionalisation' in wider post-socialist Eastern Europe<sup>3</sup> (Bluhm et al., 2021; Sorainen et al., 2017). How can we make sense of these contradictory developments? As Bluhm et al. (2021, p.23) argue, this requires asking 'questions about intersectionality and how gender and class are mutually related to one another in post-socialist countries where the economic and social upheavals of the transition period fundamentally changed the social structures, while the legacies of socialist modernization were still (partly) traceable'. So far, however, these questions have occupied a very marginal place in the rather large volume of scholarship on the transformation of gender relations in post-socialist period (for most recent examples, see Attwood et al., 2018; Bluhm et al., 2021; Gradskova & Morell, 2018). As I argue in this thesis, the category of class — while still not widely used — has actually become pivotal for making sense of the changes in intra-family gender relations in post-socialist Eastern European countries.

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Recent decades, and especially the aftermath of the 2008 Great Recession, have been marked by an increase in sociological studies emphasizing the importance of class perspectives

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<sup>1</sup> English-language information about the Hungarian campaign, #GondoskodniEgyüttJó, can be found at <https://adage.com/creativity/work/essity-unfair-race/957681>, and about the Russian campaign, #ХорошоТамГдеЗабоятсяВместе, at <https://rodnva.moscow/project/21>

<sup>2</sup> As I do not speak Hungarian, it is difficult for me to estimate how much traction this campaign has received in the Hungarian blogosphere.

<sup>3</sup> In this introductory paper, I choose to refer to the countries covered in my empirical studies as Eastern European, following the approach recently adopted, for example, by Bluhm et al. (2021), whose volume *Gender and Power in Eastern Europe* focuses on countries covering the territory from the former GDR in the West, to Russia in the East. (For a similar approach, see Fodor & Balogh, 2010). I use this term not to designate a geographical area, but rather the six former state-socialist countries that my empirical analyses focus on, i.e. Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia. In hindsight, this term also seems more appropriate than 'Central and Eastern Europe' (CEE), which I used in the publication of **Study 1**, since CEE does not always include Russia. I choose to use the term 'post-socialist' for these countries to indicate their shared state-socialist past and — with the exception of Slovenia — their location in the former Soviet sphere of influence. At the same time, it is important to note that I use the term 'post-socialist' here only to refer to the former state-socialist countries in Eastern Europe.

for understanding changing intra-family gender relations and inequalities (Coontz, 2016; Cooper & Pugh, 2020; Ferree, 2010; Few-Demo & Allen, 2020; Furstenberg, 2019; Hill, 2012; Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020). These studies have analysed both how family gender ideologies and practices vary across the class spectrum, and how families in their daily lives interpret, experience, and cope with growing economic inequality and insecurity, as well as their gendered effects (Cooper & Pugh, 2020). This emerging research focuses on growing inequality and insecurity as ‘dynamic processes, reverberating not only economically but also culturally and emotionally in family life’ (Cooper & Pugh, 2020, p. 273), and goes hand-in-hand with an increased interest in analysing class and its effects, not only in a material sense, but also culturally. These so-called ‘cultural approaches’ to class (Crompton, 2006; Holgersson, 2017; Skeggs, 1997) have significantly expanded our ability to understand how class and intra-family gender processes can be related. The joint effects of these processes have been shown to range from increased participation by both middle-class mothers and fathers in increasingly intensifying parenting as a class-reproduction strategy (Dotti Sani & Treas, 2016), to the disengagement of precariously employed working-class men from housework to protect their masculine identities (Sassler & Miller, 2017), among many others (for recent reviews, see Cooper & Pugh, 2020; Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020).

While frequently being presented as dealing with international trends, this body of scholarship usually does not include any references<sup>4</sup> to the experience of Eastern European countries. At first sight, this comes as a surprise, given that in these countries economic inequality has radically increased, and the processes of class formation triggered by it have arguably reshaped normative ideas about masculinity and femininity and actual gender relations — within families and beyond — since the end of the 1980s (Gapova, 2002; Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002). Upon closer examination of the relevant empirical studies emanating from the post-socialist region, the reasons for this gap, however, become more apparent. First, locally produced scholarship has generally avoided using class as an analytical lens. Perceptions of the category of class by many home-grown post-socialist social scientists as ‘ideologically loaded’ (Tikhonova, 2020, p.26) have resulted in a widespread suspicion of it, which has only recently been called into question (Cepić, 2019; Iarskaia-Smirnova & Romanov, 2012; Morris, 2017; Ost, 2015a). But it is the cultural approaches to class, in particular, that have been notably absent from sociological studies of everyday life in post-socialist contexts (for exceptions, see Cepić, 2019; Salmenniemi, 2012). Second, the most influential studies on changes in gender relations in post-socialist contexts produced by ‘Western’ scholars, which did manage to reach an international audience of

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<sup>4</sup> In her review of research on gender in families for the period 2000-2010 for *Journal of Marriage and Family*, Ferree (2010) discusses only two studies that deal with change in post-socialist countries: Gal, S., & Kligman, G. (2000). *The politics of gender after socialism: A comparative-historical essay*. Princeton University Press; and Haney, L., & Pollard, L. (Eds.). (2004). *Families of a new world: Gender, politics, and state development in a global context*. Routledge. Reviews of family research conducted in 2020 and published in *JMF* (Cooper & Pugh, 2020; Few-Demo & Allen, 2020; Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020) include no references to studies on the region.

family and gender sociologists (e.g. Gal & Kligman, 2000b reviewed in Ferree, 2010), took a very macro-level perspective on change, often staying at the level of policy and political discourse analysis, and focusing primarily on issues of ‘re-traditionalisation’ (Watson, 1993). Third, due to this widespread focus on ‘re-traditionalisation’, the gender revolution<sup>5</sup> framework that is most often applied to studies of change in gender ideologies and gender relations in the West (England, 2010; Hochschild, 2012; Sullivan et al., 2018) has rarely been applied in post-socialist contexts (but see Ashwin & Isupova, 2018; Chernova, 2019). Finally, another very likely reason for the lack of post-socialist perspectives in the current sociological debates on growing class divides and intra-family gender relations is the semi-peripheral position of the region in global sociological knowledge production (Blagojević, 2009). Relevant scholarship from the region, which is gradually starting to appear (e.g. Redlová, 2012; Rotkirch, Tkach & Zdravomyslova, 2012; Humer & Hrzniak, 2015; Lipasova, 2016), usually gets published in the area-studies or national journals, or country-focused edited volumes.

This lack of dialogue between Western and Eastern European/post-socialist family and gender scholarships is doubly problematic. First, it clearly impedes the efforts to make sense of changing gender relations and drivers of inequalities in this domain in post-socialist contexts. If, in the West, class has been shown to so powerfully shape gender relations and ideologies in families (Hill, 2012), we may be better off not discarding this analytical category, but rather trying to understand how class works (differently) in this region (for a similar argument, see Cepić, 2019). This seems especially necessary if we take into account the fact that recent empirical qualitative studies, indeed, suggest that the practices and ideologies of post-socialist families are becoming increasingly classed (e.g. Cheresheva, 2019; Lipasova, 2016; Rotkirch et al., 2012; Slezakova, 2019).

Second, the lack of dialogue perpetuates a long-standing problem in family sociology, which Myra Max Ferree identified as a failure to recognise that ‘family interactions reflect wider but nationally and historically specific shifts in the material conditions of production and reproduction and related expectations about self and society’ (Ferree, 2010, p. 422). As a result, it limits our understanding of the implications of growing class inequalities for intra-family gender relations beyond a narrow spectrum of Western countries. Given both its recent and ongoing processes of class formation (Crăciun & Lipan, 2020; Lawler, 2012; Saar & Trumm, 2017), post-socialist Eastern Europe provides an excellent — and in many ways unparalleled — chance to

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<sup>5</sup>The ‘gender revolution’ is a term widely used by feminist sociologists to refer to massive changes in the gender systems of (primarily Western) countries that started around the 1960s. These changes included dramatic increases in women’s employment rates, women’s enrolment in higher education, women’s participation in previously male-dominated professions, greater political representation of women, and improved anti-discrimination legislation, among others (England, 2010). These significant improvements in gender equality in the public sphere are frequently dubbed as the ‘first half’ of the gender revolution. The ‘second half’ commonly refers to changes in practices and ideologies related to the gender division of unpaid work. The ‘second half’ of the gender revolution has been widely perceived as ‘stalled’ (England, 2010; Hochschild, 2012), or at the very least ‘slow’ (Sullivan et al., 2018), since increases in men’s involvement in housework and childcare have been relatively limited in comparison with women’s increased engagement in paid work. The gender-revolution framework is also applied for the purpose of explaining changes in gender-role attitudes (Thébaud & Pedulla, 2016; van Egmond et al., 2010)

study how intersections of class and intra-family gender inequalities emerge and evolve. As Steph Lawler (2012, p.258) argues in her conclusion to the edited volume on class in contemporary Russia, in stark contrast to the West, ‘this represents an opportunity to study class formations before they have become deeply naturalised’.

In this thesis, I bring these two — heretofore separate — bodies of research into conversation, and I address the identified gaps by empirically focusing on changes in ideologies and practices of the gender division of unpaid work in Russia and wider post-socialist Europe, while using class as my analytical lens. **The overall research objective of this thesis is to investigate whether and how class — in both a structural/material and a cultural sense<sup>6</sup> — has shaped gender inequalities in the division of unpaid work within the context of post-socialist transformations.**

My focus on the gender division of unpaid work as a key dimension of intra-family gender relations follows a well-established tradition in feminist family sociology that views ‘the distribution of household labour [...] as a proxy for gender inequality and power in family’ (Adams, 2018, p.361).<sup>7</sup> The highly unequal division of unpaid work remains one of the main forms of gender inequality globally, despite women’s increasing participation in paid work (UN Women, 2019). And post-socialist countries are no exception in this sense. Some studies even pointed to a more ‘severe domestic inequality’ in that region than in the West (Aassve, Fuochi, & Mencarini, 2014; Aboim, 2010, p.197.; Treas & Tai, 2012), despite a much longer history of women’s mass participation in the labour force. The determinants of such persistently unequal gender division of unpaid work in the region remain poorly understood (Fuwa, 2004; Mikucka, 2009) and require further investigation, with a special focus on the symbolic dimensions of unpaid work and the role of ideologies (Ashwin & Isupova, 2018; Rudd, 2000).

Against this backdrop, I address the following related sets of questions in the individual papers comprising this thesis:

1. How has the gender division of domestic labour (operationalized as men’s relative involvement in routine housework) changed in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)<sup>8</sup> in the post-socialist period? What has been the role of class (operationalized as respondents’ education and household income) in shaping the gender division of domestic labour in CEE in the post-socialist period? [**Study 1**]

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<sup>6</sup> See Section 2.3.4 for a detailed discussion of my terminological choices.

<sup>7</sup> Exploring other dimensions of gendered power in post-socialist families from a class perspective also represents a promising field for investigation. For example, research on changing money management in contemporary Russian families (Guseva & Ibragimova, 2021; Ibragimova & Guseva, 2017) found class to be an important determinant of how couples manage their budgets. In particular, Russia’s (upper-)middle class families have been shown to have the most gender-unequal money-management arrangements, with men controlling all or most of the family budget. It was, however, beyond the scope of this thesis to address these other dimensions of gendered power.

<sup>8</sup> Here, I use ‘Central and Eastern Europe’, since this is the term that was used in the publication that addressed this research question. For the same reason, in Section 5.1, where I summarise the findings of **Study 1**, I also refer to CEE countries. In the rest of the introductory paper, I use the term ‘Eastern European’ for the reasons discussed above.

2. How do processes of accountability to sex and class categories<sup>9</sup> shape negotiations about, and the performance of, domestic labour and childcare among Russian middle-class dual-earner heterosexual couples? [**Study 2**]
3. To what extent can one speak about the re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies in Russia in the 2000s? Whether and how have the effects of gender and class as their determinants changed over time? Could Russian millennials be considered more traditionalist than the previous generations? [**Study 3**]

My geographic focus on Russia in two out of three studies comprising this thesis has been motivated by both practical and methodological considerations. First, my own inability to conduct in-depth literature reviews and interviews in any Eastern European language other than Russian inevitably limited my empirical choices. Second, given that Russia exhibits the most extreme growth of income inequality in the region (Heyns, 2005), I also argue that it can serve as a sort of revelatory case (Yin, 2018), highlighting class-related gendered processes and effects that might be less visible in less unequal post-socialist contexts. Thus, I do not treat my Russia-specific findings as representative of the entire region; but I also do not want to downplay any of the obviously common cross-country trends related to the growing significance of class in shaping various aspects of family life in the region. For this reason, given my exclusive focus on the Russian context in **Study 2** and **Study 3**, in Section 3 below, I provide a detailed overview of empirical studies on the topic from a wider range of post-socialist countries, highlighting the above-mentioned common trends.

Having outlined the rationale, objectives, and research questions of this thesis, in the subsequent sections of the introductory paper I intend to: outline its overarching theoretical framework (Section 2); provide an extended review of existing research on intra-family gender inequality and class in post-socialist countries (Section 3); discuss in greater depth my methodological choices (Section 4); and, finally, present brief overviews of the publications (Table 1 and Section 5) and discuss my findings, in the context of wider research on changing intra-family gender inequalities and class in post-socialist contexts and beyond (Section 6).

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<sup>9</sup>As stated in **Study 3**, I use these terms as initially proposed in the theories of ‘doing gender’ (West & Zimmermann, 1987, 2009) and ‘doing class’ (West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002). West and Fenstermaker (1995) initially proposed a more general term ‘doing difference’ to refer to interactional-level accountability to sex, class, and/or race categories. Here, however, I build on Yodanis’ (2002) development of their theory that concerned specifically class accountability, and I, therefore, use the term ‘doing class’ throughout this thesis.

In social interactions, people are held accountable to sex category and thereby ‘do gender’. Accountability could be conceptualized as ‘a three-part interactional system that produces gender’, which involves ‘orientation of one’s thoughts, perception, and behaviour to the societal ideals and local expectations associated with sex category’, assessment of one’s own and other people’s behaviour in relation to these expectations, and holding others responsible for accomplishment of gender through enforcement of interactional consequences for (non-)compliance (Hollander, 2013, pp. 9–10). Similar to and along with gender, class is also ‘done’. Accountability to class category (West & Fenstermaker, 1995) or to so-called social-class role (‘behaviours, tastes, and values that are socially defined as appropriate and expected of individuals of a particular socioeconomic position’) (Yodanis, 2002, pp. 325–326) leads people to produce certain representations of themselves. Class is ‘done’ through the presentation of symbols (tastes, values, and activities) of specific social-class roles.

**Table 1: Research questions, datasets and methods**

Title of the study	Research questions	Data & Methods	Contribution	Dimension of gender division of unpaid work	Class: Conceptualisation and operationalization	Key findings and conclusions
<p><b>I. Gender Division of Domestic Labour in Post-Socialist Europe (1994–2012): Test of Class Gradients Hypothesis</b></p>	<p>How has the gender division of domestic labour (GDDL) changed in CEE in the post-socialist period?</p> <p>What has been the role of class in shaping GDDL in CEE in the post-socialist period?</p>	<p>International Social Survey Programme 'Family and changing gender roles' 1994, 2002, 2012</p> <p>Countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Slovenia</p> <p>Descriptive analysis OLS</p>	<p>First, the study traces the development of inequality in GDDL in several post-socialist CEE countries over time. It compares and contrasts changes in the early post-socialist period (1994-2002) with changes in the later period (2002-2012).</p> <p>Second, I use the analytical category of class to understand the persistence of inequality in GDDL. I show that the lack of overall societal movement towards greater equality was due to idiosyncratic trends among different classes in both of the periods examined. Thus, the study contributes new evidence and further develops class perspectives on the post-socialist gender-re-traditionalisation debate.</p>	<p>Men's relative involvement in routine housework</p>	<p>Household income</p> <p>Respondent's educational level</p>	<p>Trajectories of net change in GDDL were quite diverse among the countries analysed. A hypothesized increase in inequality in GDDL in 1994-2002 followed by a decrease in 2002-2012, however, was a rather typical trajectory for lower-class households across most of the analysed countries.</p> <p>An increased positive effect of education on equality in GDDL was observed both at the regional level and across most of the countries. In 1994-2002, the gradient increased, primarily due to the increased inequality in GDDL among the less educated. In 2002-2012, the persistence of the educational gradient in several countries was, on the contrary, related to the relatively faster change towards greater equality among the highly educated.</p> <p>The increased positive effect of household income on equality in GDDL was confirmed in relation to the 1994-2002 period across most of the countries. The widening of the income gradient was related primarily to increased inequality in GDDL among the poor. In 2002-2012, the gradient disappeared, as the trend for the poor reversed.</p>

**Table 1: Research questions, datasets and methods (continued)**

Title of the study	Research questions	Data & Methods	Contribution	Dimension of gender division of unpaid work	Class: Conceptualisation and operationalization	Key findings and conclusions
<p><b>II. Doing Gender with Class: Gender Division of Unpaid Work in Russian Middle-Class Dual-Earner Heterosexual Households</b></p>	<p>How do processes of accountability to sex and class categories shape negotiations about performance of domestic labour and childcare among Russian middle-class dual-earner heterosexual couples?</p>	<p>Semi-structured in-depth individual interviews with 27 partners of middle-class dual-earner heterosexual couples with co-resident children, and data from structured questionnaires completed after the interviews. All data collected in St. Petersburg in 2017.</p> <p>Country: Russia</p> <p>Problem-centred interviews</p> <p>Thematic analysis</p>	<p>First, this study is the first one to propose the mechanism of double accountability to sex and class categories as a possible explanation for the positive relation between class and the level of gender equality in the division of unpaid work recently observed in Russia. It also further develops the analytical concept of 'gender contract' suggesting that it could serve as terms of <i>both</i> gender and class accountability.</p> <p>Second, the empirical analysis presented here questions whether in post-socialist contexts the narrowing of the gender gap in unpaid work should necessarily be considered a sign of increasing gender egalitarianism among middle classes. Concomitantly, it shows that a narrow conceptualization of unpaid work (e.g. not accounting for women's aesthetic labour, highly valued in post-socialist Russia) may prevent us from seeing how gender inequality could morph, depending on a couple's class (aspirations).</p>	<p>Partners' gender ideologies, as well as couple negotiations about and performance of housework, childcare, household management, and organisation of leisure.</p>	<p>'Objective' class characteristics used during sampling: Education</p> <p>Analysis: Class as a process of drawing material and symbolic boundaries and hierarchies.</p>	<p>Interviewees in this study perceived various gender contracts that have evolved in post-socialist Russia as profoundly classed: 'working mother' contract – as typical for lower classes; housewife/breadwinner – for upper classes; and 'career woman' – for middle classes. Their resulting understandings of middle-class-(in)appropriate ways of doing masculinity and femininity influenced the division of both paid and unpaid work in their families. Men were accountable not only as breadwinners, but also as carers; while women, in addition to their caring roles, were accountable for their career and sex appeal. This double gender and class accountability often resulted in more equal—while not necessarily more egalitarian—gender division of housework and childcare.</p>

**Table 1: Research questions, datasets and methods (continued)**

Title of the study	Research questions	Data & Methods	Contribution	Dimension of gender division of unpaid work	Class: Conceptualisation and operationalization	Key findings and conclusions
<p><b>III. Back to 'traditional' family values? Trends in gender ideologies in Russia, 1994-2012</b></p>	<p>To what extent can one speak about the re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies in Russia in the 2000s? Whether and how have the effects of gender and class as their determinants changed over time? Could Russian millennials be considered more traditionalist than the previous generations?</p>	<p>International Social Survey Programme 'Family and changing gender roles' 1994, 2002, 2012 Country: Russia Descriptive analysis Multivariate logistic regression</p>	<p>First, the study proposes an innovative approach to the conceptualisation of gender ideology in a post-socialist context. Moving beyond the traditional vs. egalitarian conceptualisation, I argue that it is essential to include a third type of gender ideology in an analysis. In part a result of the socialist ideological legacy, this ideology represents a combination of beliefs in joint breadwinning with gender essentialising views on women's caring roles, and can be dubbed 'traditional (double burden)'. Second, I provide the first quantitative test of the argument about the potentially increased role of class as a determinant of gender ideologies in Russia. Finally, the study is also the first to highlight how gender and generation intersect as determinants of Russian gender ideologies.</p>	<p>Gender ideologies: - traditional (separate spheres) - egalitarian - 'traditional (double burden)'</p>	<p>Respondent's income Respondent's level of education</p>	<p>In 1994-2012, a sort of re-traditionalisation can be observed. However, the trends were very class specific. Furthermore, this re-traditionalisation did not primarily entail the strengthening of the separate-spheres ideology. Among the highly educated and affluent of both genders, there was a continuing increase in support for the 'traditional (double burden)' ideology, at the expense of support for the separate spheres, and, more recently, for egalitarianism. Among lower-class women and men, attitudes were more stable, although the appeal of separate spheres showed a slightly upward trend. The trends among men and women with comparable levels of education and income were quite similar. However, women from higher classes remain by far the strongest supporters of egalitarianism. Slightly higher support for separate spheres in comparison with previous generations was observed among millennial men only.</p>

## **2. Theoretical framework**

In this section, I first introduce my broader theoretical approach to family, gender, and class, a discussion of which was, for the most part, beyond the scope of the publications. My intention here is to highlight more clearly conceptual links between the individual studies comprising this thesis. Following this, I zoom in on the key variables and theoretical frameworks used in my empirical studies.

### **2.1 Theoretical signposting: Family and gender**


In this thesis, I join a well-established, but still developing tradition of feminist approaches to family sociology, and the wider interdisciplinary field of family studies (Allen & Jaramillo-Sierra, 2015; Allen, Lloyd, & Few, 2009; Ferree, 1990, 2010; Few-Demo & Allen, 2020; Risman, 2004; Walker, 2009). While recognizing the diversity in feminist theorizing of families (Allen, 2016; Budig, 2004), I build the theoretical and empirical work presented in this thesis upon key principles, now widely shared within this field, which have been developed as a critique to functionalist approaches to the family (Ferree, 2010; Walker, 2009).

First, I conceptualise families not as just sets of personal relationships disconnected from macrostructures, but rather as institutions integrated within broader political, economic, and civil society contexts. This principle, as explained in the introduction, was behind my very rationale for conducting this research with a focus on post-socialist contexts. Second, I recognise families as institutional sites of power relations, with gender relations central among those relations. I therefore conceptualise families as sites of construction, reproduction, and possible transformation of gender relations, which are at the same time interconnected with other gendered institutions both materially and culturally. Concomitantly, I view change in intra-family gender relations as reflecting ‘wider but nationally and historically specific shifts in the material conditions of production and reproduction and related expectations about self and society’ (Ferree, 2010, p. 422) Third, I view gender relations within the family as profoundly interconnected with other forms of social inequality, including class, which my thesis focuses on specifically.

In order to facilitate the application of these principles in this thesis, I was guided by gender as a social structure approach (Risman, 2004, 2017) in my theoretical framing and research design. This approach is considered to be best suited for studying gender inequality in families today (Adams, 2018). This theory conceives of gender as a system of social stratifications, and views it not as the property of an individual, but as a structure operating recursively across individual- (gendered identities), interactional- (gendered cultural meaning and expectations), and macro-levels (gender-specific institutional constraints) of social reality (Risman, 2004). This approach enables one to think of individual gendering activities as situated within larger,

historically specific, political, demographic, and economic structures that have their own gender practices and meanings (Ferree, 2010). Figure 1 illustrates what such analyses of intra-family gender relations could potentially focus on at each of the levels, when using this approach.

**Figure 1: Gender as a social structure in the family**



Source: Scarborough and Risman (2017, p. 9)

More recently, Risman (2017, p.210) has also pointed out the need to differentiate between material and cultural dimensions at each level of the gender structure: ‘At the individual level, culture is internalized into gendered selves. At the interactional level, we must study the meanings and stereotypes that each of us experiences in every social encounter. At the macro level, we must pay attention to ideology as a cultural justification for gender inequality.’ Within this approach — which I share in this thesis — culture is, thus, understood not as individualised and dehistoricised personal attitudes, but rather ‘as a powerful force operating at all levels, but one that is locally specific and contested’ (Ferree, 2010, p.426). Attention to cultural discourse at the macro-level provides background for understanding interactional-level accountability in more context-sensitive ways (Ferree, 2010).

Finally — and central for my analytical framework — this approach recognises that gender interacts with other inequalities. Gender structures vary by class (Ferree, 2010; Risman, 2004).

Each of the three studies comprising this thesis incorporates analyses at all three levels of gender structure, placing individual and interactional-level explanations of cross-class differences in the gender division of unpaid work in the wider cultural and material context of post-socialist transformations. Empirically, **Study 1** has the strongest focus on individual and interactional levels, but considers them within the context of several post-socialist countries. **Study 2** spans all

three levels, with a particular focus on the links between interactional- (gender and class accountability) and macro-level cultural dimensions (classed gender contracts) in the context of one specific country, i.e. Russia. And, finally, **Study 3** focuses on the macro-level, i.e. cultural expectations related to the gender division of unpaid work and the changing prevalence of these expectations across different classes in the same country as **Study 2**.

## **2.2 Theoretical signposting: Family and class**

Although, as discussed above, it is widely recognised that gender structures vary by class, the class perspective has, until now, rarely been central for studying intra-family gender relations (Hill, 2012). Nevertheless, there is a growing scholarship that has theorised class, either directly in relation to gendered intra-family processes (Crompton, 2006; Duncan, 2005; Hill, 2012; Skeggs, 1997; Williams, 2010, 2012), or in ways that — as I argue in my **Study 2** — are highly relevant for understanding the workings of class in this domain (Holgerson, 2017; West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002). In this section, I provide a brief overview of the specific ways that this scholarship has informed my own conceptualisation of class in this thesis.

First, I recognise that focusing on class as a category belonging to the sphere of production only is not enough for making sense of intra-family processes. Home and relations with intimate others are also highly important sites of class production and performance (Collins, 1992; Lawler, 2012; McDowell, 2013; Skeggs, 1997). Second, taking into account that families are characterised ‘by cultural and normative practices that themselves serve to maintain differentiation from other classes and to reproduce class inequalities’ (Crompton, 2006, p. 662; Williams, 2010, 2012), class analysis of intra-family relations cannot be limited to structural/material aspects only. Third, thinking about class as more than a structural/material position requires (stronger) focus on class inequalities as embedded at the level of individual identities (Holgerson, 2017; Skeggs, 1997; Williams, 2010, 2012), as well as in cultural expectations operating at the interactional level (Fenstermaker & West, 2002; West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002). When conceptualised in this way, class can no longer be treated in empirical work only as a gradational category (Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005); the focus should also be on the relationality of class, and on how class is produced and performed/‘done’ in everyday family life. (I further elaborate this argument in **Study 2**.) Capturing the latter empirically implies focusing on how people draw material and symbolic boundaries and hierarchies (Lamont, 1992, 2000), as well as on their emotions and morals (Duncan, 2005; Sayer, 2005; Skeggs, 1997). As has been demonstrated, ‘people experience class in relation to others partly via moral and immoral sentiments, such as benevolence, respect, compassion, pride and envy, contempt and shame’ (Sayer, 2005, p. 3). And, last, local context is crucial for understanding class performances. Gendered and classed social and moral frameworks structuring class performances (e.g. ‘classed gender contracts’ in **Study 2**)

are historically and geographically articulated (Crompton, 2006; Duncan, 2005; Skeggs, 1997).

Given the above, following Crompton's (2006) 'positive pluralist' approach to class analysis in empirical work on families, I do not operate with one specific definition of class throughout the thesis. I employ both gradational (**Study 1** and **Study 3**) and relational (**Study 2**) definitions and focus on both material and cultural dimensions of class. It is also important to note that I mainly consider members of a single family as belonging to the same class (as does, for example, Hill (2012)), recognising class reproduction as a whole-family process (Crompton, 2006). However, I also acknowledge (**Study 1** and **Study 2**) that discrepancies between partners' class locations could be potentially relevant for the gender division of unpaid work (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Streib, 2015).

### **2.3 Sociological theories of unpaid work: Where does class come in?**

Below, I will first provide the definition of unpaid work used in this thesis, followed by a brief overview of the most commonly used theoretical approaches for explaining the gender division of unpaid work. I then zoom in on a relatively recent set of theoretical approaches foregrounding a class perspective on the division of unpaid work.

#### ***2.3.1 Definition of unpaid work***

In this thesis, by 'unpaid work' I refer primarily to domestic work/housework and childcare/parenting, as family sociologists commonly do (Sullivan, 2018). The gender division of unpaid work is understood as the division of such work between partners in mixed-sex households.

In conceptualising and operationalizing unpaid work, I follow Warren's (2011) call to investigate the phenomenon of gender division of unpaid work more 'holistically'. Such an approach implies recognising the multidimensionality of the concept of 'unpaid work', and in addition to describing domestic and care practices (who does what) (as I do in **Study 1**), also analysing relationships (for, from and with whom unpaid work is done), negotiations (how it is decided who is doing what), and meanings (views about the task; feelings about doing unpaid work; feelings about the division of unpaid work; views on the fit between unpaid work and the rest of life; and the moral meaning of unpaid work). In **Study 2** and **Study 3**, I focus on the negotiations and meanings of unpaid work. And it is in this light that my focus on gender ideology as a dependent variable in **Study 3** should be interpreted, in the context of this entire thesis.

Finally, it is important to note that I do analytically distinguish housework and childcare, recognising that different processes may underpin the gender division of domestic and care tasks (Sullivan, 2013). For example, as I show in **Study 2**, while the men that were interviewed

envisioned an ideal middle-class gender contract mostly as dual earner/dual carer/outsourced housework, their female partners were content with a gender-equal division of earning, childcare, and housework. However, given that a number of theories have been shown to successfully account for gendered inequality in both housework and childcare (Deutsch & Gaunt, 2020), and that these types of unpaid work often co-occur in families (Offer & Schneider, 2011), I do not differentiate between the two when it is not analytically pertinent.

### ***2.3.2 Accounting for change in the gender division of unpaid work over time***

Research consistently shows that women still do more unpaid work than men all around the world (Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020; UN Women, 2019). The question of whether the gender division of unpaid work is actually becoming more equal, however, remains open to debate.

In the West, two dominant frameworks for understanding the change have been foregrounded. First, some scholars argue that in recent decades the gender revolution has stalled, as trends towards higher levels of gender equality in labour markets and the educational system have not been matched by similar trends in the personal realm of heterosexual households (England, 2010). Hochschild (2012), in her famous qualitative study of American dual-earner families, introduced the term ‘stalled revolution at home’ to refer to this phenomenon. A number of quantitative studies have also observed a stall in the move towards egalitarianism at the attitudinal level (Cotter et al., 2011; van Egmond et al., 2010). England (2010) explains this phenomenon by suggesting that due to the cultural and institutional devaluation of traditionally ‘female’ activities, e.g. homemaking, men have had few incentives to move into those domains. Furthermore, as she argues, while the cultural and institutional logic of individualism has recently promoted gender egalitarianism in access to education and jobs, due to the competing logic of gender essentialism very few women and almost no men have so far committed themselves to undoing gender differentiation in household roles and activities.

At the same time, several recent cross-national quantitative studies suggest that, at least across high-income countries, one can still observe a movement — even if incremental and slow — toward greater gender equality in the division of unpaid work (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Geist & Cohen, 2011; Hook, 2010; Sullivan et al., 2018). This is often interpreted as an expression of ‘*the movement toward a world culture of greater gender equality*’ (Geist & Cohen, 2011, p.842; Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Esping-Andresen (2016) even predicts that this increasing gender egalitarianism across Western countries — both at the level of individual families and at the policy level — would eventually lead to ‘family revival’, i.e. greater marital stability and rising fertility, as has recently been observed in Scandinavian countries.

### 2.3.4 Theories of unpaid work: (Classless) foundations

A vast scholarship has tried to explain why women still do the majority of unpaid work at home (for reviews, see Coltrane, 2000; Davis & Wills, 2014; Drobnič & Ruppner, 2015; Lachance-Grzela & Bouchard, 2010; Treas & Drobnič, 2010). However, class as an analytical category has been mostly absent from these theoretical and empirical endeavours. The most recent volume by Deutsch and Gaunt (2020) is a vivid example of this.

It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a detailed review of these theories, as I don't directly test and/or try to elaborate them further in any of my papers. But these theories do provide an important window for understanding how and why class, as well, may come to play a role in shaping the intra-family division of unpaid work. Therefore, I briefly review them before turning to a discussion of the relevant theoretical and empirical work on class.

Five theoretical approaches to the gender division of unpaid work are commonly distinguished (see, for example, Deutsch & Gaunt, 2020). These approaches can be mapped against the individual, interactional and macro-levels of gender as a social structure (as Hook (2010) has done). At the individual level, the *time availability* theory posits that individuals' allocation of time for housework and childcare (although evidence in relation to the latter is more mixed) is a residual of their time spent in employment (e.g. Aassve et al., 2014; Evertsson, 2014; Geist, 2005; Hook, 2006; Treas & Tai, 2016). Another individual-level explanation, *gender ideology*, focuses on how individuals' beliefs about appropriate roles for women and men (acquired during the socialisation process) shape their behaviour and the eventual distribution of housework and childcare between partners. The key argument is that there is an inverse relationship between traditional gender attitudes and equality in the division of housework (e.g. Aassve, Fuochi, & Mencarini, 2014; Aboim, 2010) and childcare (e.g. Deutsch, Lussier, & Servis, 1993; Gaunt, 2006). At the interactional level, *relative resources* theory argues that couples divide unpaid work according to the resources they contribute (most empirical analysis to date has focused on income). The greater the partner's contribution, the less unpaid work s/he will do (e.g. Aassve et al., 2014; Davis & Greenstein, 2004; Fahlén, 2016; Geist, 2005; Knudsen & Wærness, 2008). Relative resources theory has been shown to have much lower explanatory potential for childcare than for housework (Deutsch et al., 1993; Kan & Gershuny, 2010; Mannino & Deutsch, 2007). Another interactional-level theory, '*doing gender*'<sup>10</sup>, asserts that gender is 'done' in social

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<sup>10</sup> Some scholars subsume 'gender ideology' theory and the 'doing gender' approach under the so-called 'gender display' approach (e.g. Drobnič & Ruppner, 2015; Geist & Ruppner, 2018, p.247), arguing that 'attitudes related to gender often stand in as a measure of broader ideology, and, implicitly, a proneness to "do" gender'. Others, however, prefer to treat these two theoretical approaches as analytically distinct (e.g. Deutsch & Gaunt, 2020), emphasising empirically encountered contradictions between egalitarian individual-level gender ideologies and non-egalitarian practices ('doing gender') shaped by interactional-level accountability to macro-level cultural scripts of masculinity and femininity. Although in this section I follow the latter approach, in this thesis in general I find myself in closer proximity to the former.

In particular, I do not treat gender ideology as a result of the socialization process only, but rather see it as a dynamic structure that is also closely connected — even if in contradictory ways — with macro-level cultural gender norms (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Gender ideology as conceptualized in **Study 3** captures 'current cultural conceptions of conduct becoming to or compatible with the "essential natures" of a woman or a man' (West & Zimmerman, 2009), which are central to the processes of accountability (see Section 2.3.4 for further elaboration of this argument). My interest in the variation of gender ideologies across classes is, thus,

interactions within which women and men are always held accountable to gendered norms (West & Zimmerman, 1987). The household — where men and women negotiate about and perform housework and care work — remains one of the key arenas for the accomplishment of gender (Risman, 2004, 2018; West & Zimmermann, 1987). Finally, more recently researchers have also started examining how *national contexts*, i.e. policies (e.g. availability and length of parental leaves (Hook, 2006)) and cultural norms (e.g. average level of gender egalitarianism in a country (Fahlen, 2016)), shape the ways couples share unpaid work.

While it is not my goal to test these explanatory frameworks further here, there are two important take-aways from this theorizing for my thesis. First is the emphasis on the connection between the macro-level and the individual and couple-level processes shaping the gender division of unpaid work in families, which is in line with the understanding of gender as a social structure (Section 2.1). As discussed in the following section, this connection is also important for understanding the workings of class in relation to unpaid work.

Second is the distinction between structural/material vs. cultural explanatory factors offered by these theories (as conceptualised by Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005). Given that Gerstel and Sarkisian's (2005) proposal to divide theories of unpaid work in this way is reminiscent of Risman's (2017) argument about the need to differentiate between the material and cultural dimension at each level of the gender structure, further in the text I will refer to this distinction as *structural/material vs. cultural*.

'[S]tructural factors are typically understood as an array of material and objective constraints and opportunities external to individuals.' (Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005, p.241) The key assumption of structural theories is that the redistribution of unpaid work between women and men within families is related to growing similarities between their patterns of engagement in paid work, and that the remaining inequalities at home can be explained by the remaining dissimilarities in these patterns. Relative resources and time availability, as well as policy-related theories of unpaid work broadly belong to the structural type of explanation.<sup>11</sup>

Cultural explanations stress the role of values and ideologies in explaining variations in the division of unpaid work (Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005). They focus in particular on the meanings attached to paid and unpaid work. Gender ideology and 'doing gender' theory, as well as macro-level approaches focusing on societal norms, fall into this category.

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primarily about understanding the class-specific standards for appropriate masculinity and femininity that people in various class locations find themselves accountable to.

<sup>11</sup> In the context of this thesis, it is important to note that a rather vast scholarship concerned with the effects of labour market and family policies on the gender division of paid and unpaid work (Esping-Andersen, 2016; Hook, 2006, 2010; Prince Cooke & Baxter, 2010; Sullivan, 2013) has either completely disregarded, or only tangentially dealt with, the experiences of post-socialist countries. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that many of these studies (e.g. Cooke & Baxter, 2010; Sullivan, 2013) use for analytical purposes some sort of variation on Esping-Andersen's welfare regimes typology (Esping-Andersen, 1990) which never included (post-)socialist countries. Another reason, however, seems to be related to the fact that (post-)socialist countries' experiences (e.g. high levels of women's full-time employment and extensive public provision of childcare) do not neatly fit into the explanatory framework offered by those studies. As it turns out, nearly universal women's full-time employment and affordable childcare may be not sufficient preconditions for more equal gender division of unpaid work (for a similar argument, see Drobnič, 2020). In Section 3 below, I return to a discussion of why cultural approaches to the gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist regions have so far been found more pertinent than structural ones.

Attention to cultural explanations has been growing in recent decades, given the fact that women's increased participation in the labour market has not radically redrawn the distribution of unpaid work in the household, and that it's precisely the 'second half' of the gender revolution that appears particularly stalled (England, 2010; Risman, 2018; Deutsch & Gaunt, 2020). As 'gender still trumps the structural variables of time and economic dependency when it comes to housework and care work' (Risman, 2018, p. 19), there is a clear need to look beyond structural/material — paid work-centred — explanations. The importance of cultural factors has also been foregrounded in studies aiming to explain persisting cross-country differences in the ways provision of unpaid care is organised (Pfau-Effinger, 2010). Recent research on the relative importance of structural/material (i.e. country-level women's labour force participation) vs. cultural factors (i.e. macro-level gender ideology) of gender inequality in the division of housework across 25 countries has, indeed, revealed the vanishing effect of the former, and the increasing importance of the latter, between 2002 and 2012 (Mandel & Lazarus, 2021).

As I will argue in the subsequent section, the distinction between structural/material and cultural factors is heuristically valuable for conceptualising the role of class in shaping the gender division of unpaid work. In addition, I will also discuss why cultural explanations — recognized as increasingly more pertinent in the scholarship on the gender division of unpaid work — are also important for understanding the role of class in this domain.

### ***2.3.5 Gender division of unpaid work across classes: Theoretical and empirical considerations***

The question of whether and how the gender division of unpaid work within families varies across classes has been increasingly drawing researchers' attention in the recent years (see Cooper & Pugh, 2020; Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020; Treas, 2010). The findings of these studies, indeed, reveal an 'intersectional story' (Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020, p. 440) of how gender along with class<sup>12</sup> shape intra-family division of unpaid work in complex ways. In what follows, I discuss how class has been theorised in this body of research, using the structural/material vs. cultural approaches distinction. Given my focus on the importance of context, it is important to note that the research reviewed below focused almost exclusively on US and — in only few cases — on a limited number of other high-income countries.

In research on housework, class has most frequently been conceptualized as a structural/material factor and operationalized as income. Differences in the time spent on domestic labour by women and men from lower and higher-income households are explained mainly by differing outsourcing opportunities and differing access to time-saving technology (e.g. Gershuny, 2000; Gupta et al., 2010; Heisig, 2011; Schneider & Hastings, 2017). As the outsourcing of housework is considered to be arranged and to be taken advantage of mainly by

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<sup>12</sup> As well as race and sexuality, among other axes of inequality that this thesis does not directly focus on.

women, these studies have primarily analysed class gradients in housework hours among women rather than the resulting levels of gender inequality in the division of housework across classes. The role that outsourcing has on within-household gender inequality is still being debated (see Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020).

Cultural approaches to class in research on housework, however, have also not been uncommon. A number of studies<sup>13</sup>, indeed, have looked at the role of education — conceptualised as attitudes, values, and ideologies — in shaping women’s and men’s housework time. Higher levels of education have been shown to be associated with a more egalitarian gender division of housework, as less-educated women tend to spend more time doing housework than highly-educated women, whereas highly-educated men perform more housework than less-educated men (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hook, 2010; Miller & Carlson, 2016).

In research on childcare and parenting, structural/material perspectives on class have been critically scrutinised and questioned. Research shows that parental employment does not sufficiently explain gender gaps in childcare (Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005). Moreover, the positive educational gradient in parenting investment clearly indicates that education should not be considered merely as human capital, but rather ‘as a pipeline for new ideas about parenting’ (Dotti Sani & Treas, 2016, p. 1083). The positive income gradient in mothers’ and fathers’ time investment (Schneider et al., 2018) also suggests that outsourcing is unlikely to be a central mechanism for explaining the gender division of childcare.

Cultural approaches to class have, on the contrary, been gaining prominence in recent years. The theoretical framework of intensified parenting (Hays, 1998; Lareau, 2003) linking social class to childrearing values has been highly generative for thinking about class-stratified practices (see Cooper & Pugh, 2020; Nomaguchi & Milkie, 2020). Studies across a number of Western countries consistently suggest that more affluent and better educated parents of both genders spend more time on childcare than mothers and fathers from lower-income households and with less education (Altintas, 2016; Craig & Mullan, 2011; Dotti Sani & Treas, 2016; Schneider et al., 2018; Sullivan, 2010). There has been, however, very little empirical research looking at resulting gender gaps in parenting across different classes (Negraia et al., 2018). And the findings of existing studies appear contradictory, with some suggesting greater (Craig & Mullan, 2011) and others lesser (Negraia et al., 2018; Schneider et al., 2018) relative gender equality in the division of childcare among the highly educated and affluent, in comparison with other classes.

In contrast to education and income, occupational class has not been extensively theorised or empirically researched recently as a factor shaping the gender division of unpaid work. This

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<sup>13</sup> It is important to note, however, that in contrast to the above-discussed quantitative papers focusing on income as a proxy of class, these studies do not commonly use ‘class’ as a term. It is, however, quite obvious that they could be classified as employing the so-called cultural approach to class.

could be attributed in part to the seminal paper of Wright et al. (1992), which demonstrated the insignificance of occupational class for the gender division of housework in dual-earner families in a range of high-income countries. Moreover, it has also been argued that defining individuals' class position in terms of their employment characteristics makes it impossible to separate the role of employment conditions from class differences (Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005). And, although from the cultural perspective it is important to recognise that the characteristics of working-class jobs may result in people with such jobs putting a greater emphasis on their family life than people in more rewarding jobs, and that this in turn could shape family-related behaviours (Crompton, 2006, p. 664-666; Williams, 2010), these effects are likely to be captured by educational variables, too. For the above reasons, I primarily use education and income as proxies for class in this thesis.

The above-reviewed studies also provide a glimpse into which macro-level processes may contribute to shaping cross-class gender gaps in the division of unpaid work. The studies adopting structural/material perspectives have paid particular attention to the levels of economic development (linked to the availability of technology) and to how societal income inequality determines outsourcing availability (e.g. Heisig, 2011; Schneider & Hastings, 2017). A forthcoming study by Lightman and Kevins (n.d.) shows that greater family-policy expenditure is associated with smaller gender gaps in time spent on housework — but not childcare — especially among lower income households, which they attribute to the increased ability of such households to outsource menial work. Studies employing the cultural approach have also considered the role of income inequality in shaping parental anxieties and childcare strategies (Schneider et al., 2018), as well as the growing appeal of normative egalitarianism in intimate relationships (Carlson, Miller, & Sassler, 2018).

As I am concerned about both practices and ideologies of gender division of unpaid work in this thesis, it is also important to note that not all studies find them completely congruent (as the above-provided review may suggest). Some point to a discrepancy between the 'spoken egalitarianism' of middle-classes and the 'lived egalitarianism' of working classes (Shows & Gerstel, 2009; Usdansky, 2011; Williams, 2010). Accounting for these potential discrepancies clearly requires the combination of structural/material and cultural approaches in the analysis.

Finally, in terms of changes over time, so far only a small number of studies in the West have investigated a question of whether gender revolution has actually been a cross-class phenomenon. And they have not provided a definitive answer. Some have argued that gender revolution has been slower in reaching lower classes (Cherlin, 2014). Others, however, have shown that less educated men have in recent years caught up with more highly educated men in terms of their time contribution to domestic labour (Sullivan, 2010), and that gender gaps in housework have narrowed also among lower classes (Carlson et al., 2018). Evidence is also emerging that an intensification of parenting can also be observed now among lower classes (see

Cooper & Pugh, 2020). Related changes in gender gaps in parenting time across classes, however, remain for the most part unaddressed. Some tentative findings suggest that gender inequality at the top may actually be growing faster than at the bottom, despite men's increasing participation, as higher-class mothers face the mounting ideological pressures of intensive parenting ideology (Negraia et al., 2018; Schneider et al., 2018).

Overall, cultural frameworks for explaining variations and changes in the gender division of unpaid work across classes are in need of further elaboration and testing (Geist & Ruppner, 2018; Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005; Sullivan, 2010). In particular, the role of cultural factors operating at the interactional (Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005) and macro/discursive (Sullivan, 2010) levels warrant further investigation. Moreover, the understanding of the latter is further limited by the fact that, as mentioned above, current theorising and empirical work on the role of class in shaping the gender division of unpaid work so far has come almost exclusively from a very narrow set of Western —mainly Anglo-Saxon — countries. As I have already discussed in the introduction, addressing these theoretical and empirical gaps formed an important part of the rationale for my research endeavours. In the next section I provide an overview of what we know so far about class and the gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist contexts.

### **3. Setting the scene: Gender division of unpaid work and class in post-socialist contexts**

In the last thirty years, a substantial body of literature focusing on the gendered impacts of post-socialist transformations has appeared (for most recent examples, see Attwood et al., 2018; Bluhm et al., 2021; Gradszkova & Morell, 2018). A significant portion of this scholarship has focused on the ways these transformations have affected the gender division of unpaid work within families, as well as related gender norms. I start this section with a brief review of this literature. This is followed by a section on the conceptualisation of class in post-socialist social sciences; and, subsequently, by a discussion of — still very limited — empirical scholarship on the relationship between class and intra-family gender relations in post-socialist contexts. Taking into account that each of the articles already contains substantive background information, some parts of this section may appear repetitive. But in contrast to the articles, I focus below on the region-wide — rather than Russia-specific — trends.

#### **3.1 Gender division of unpaid work in (post-)socialist contexts**

##### ***3.1.1 State socialism: ‘Working mother’ as hegemonic gender contract***

The Soviet — and broader state-socialist — project created a distinctive gender order, within which the so-called ‘working mother’ gender contract<sup>14</sup> ( Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002) — which implied that equal participation of men and women in the labour market, combined with women’s primary responsibility for care- and domestic work — prevailed (Ashwin, 2006; Corrin, 1992; Einhorn, 1993; Gal & Kligman, 2000b, 2000a; Kay, 2002; Saxonberg, 2014). A number of macro-level structural/material and cultural factors accounted for this. On the one hand, ‘the woman question’ was proclaimed to have been solved under state socialism, as women were included in production. Women’s employment rates varied across socialist countries (it was higher in the Soviet Russia and East Germany than in Poland and Hungary), but it was consistently higher than in Western countries at the time (Roth & Walker, 2019). On the other hand, state-socialist countries were much less efficient in changing the gender division of unpaid work within families. Although childcare was to a large extent socialised through a system of public nurseries and kindergartens, women still faced a double burden of paid work and unpaid domestic and care work. Women’s role as childbearer was promoted over their role as workers, and the gender-essentialist discourse of women’s ‘natural role’ as mothers became particularly strong in the late socialist period, due to concerns over growing divorce rates and falling fertility

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<sup>14</sup> ‘Gender contract’ is a concept that was initially developed by Scandinavian feminist scholars to refer to ‘unspoken rules, mutual obligations and rights which define the relations between women and men, between genders and generations, and finally between the areas of production and reproduction’ in specific socio-historical contexts (Hirdman 1996; Rantalaiho 1997, p. 25). This concept has been widely adopted by gender scholars working on the post-socialist region (e.g. Bonfiglioli, 2015; Saxonberg, 2014; Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002), and was, thus, both theoretically and heuristically useful for this thesis.

in some countries of the region. At the same time, men's family roles were hardly a concern for the state, and public and policy discourse rarely focused on their contribution to domestic work and childcare, although this varied somewhat across countries, with, for example, policy makers in Bulgaria paying stronger attention to questions of domestic gender equality than in Hungary (Cheresheva, 2019). The very limited comparative time-use data suggests that — despite their much higher rates of full-time employment — the average time women in state-socialist countries spent on housework was, indeed, either equal or even higher than the average time spent on housework by women in Western countries, as were the absolute gender gaps in time spent on housework<sup>15</sup> (see Table 1 in Altintas & Sullivan, 2016). Qualitative studies also confirm men's marginalised domestic roles and low involvement in childcare during the state-socialist period (Ashwin & Lytkina, 2004; Nešporová, 2016; Reimann, 2016).

Given the widely accepted idea of the hegemony of the working-mother gender contract, research about potential class-related differences in the gender division of unpaid work during the state-socialist period seems to have been extremely limited. As I discuss in **Study 1**, in one Polish study from the 1970s that I was able to identify, the partners' educational level was shown to be an important factor in men's contribution to domestic labour, and couples with higher education had the most egalitarian gender division of domestic labour (Lobodzinska, 1977). This suggests that education — as a determinant of the gender division of unpaid work — may have played a similar role in state-socialist contexts, as it does in contemporary Western contexts. Akhtyrskyi (2017), on the contrary, argues that among parts of the highly educated intelligentsia class in the Soviet Union, anti-Soviet sentiments and the rejection of Soviet gender policies resulted in a greater propensity to endorse the 'traditional' housewife/male breadwinner gender contract.<sup>16</sup>

### ***3.1.2 Post-socialist period: 'Re-traditionalisation' or pluralisation of gender contracts?***

In the early post-socialist period, the most prevalent view in the scholarship was that gender inequality in the division of unpaid work was further exacerbated after the collapse of state socialism. This was attributed to the impact of a range of macro-level structural/material factors, including women's mass withdrawal from the labour market, increasing labour demands on those women who did not withdraw, and the state's retrenchment from the provision of childcare and social benefits (Ashwin, 2006, 2010; Haney, 2002; Pine, 2002; Pollert, 2003). Some scholars also argued that ideological factors, i.e. calls for 're-traditionalisation' coming from the new political

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<sup>15</sup> It is interesting to note, however, that in the GDR, in comparison with West Germany, gender inequality in the division of domestic labour was shown to be lower due to men's greater involvement in it (Roehler & Huinink, 2010). It is reasonable to assume that this could have been related to the peculiarity of West Germany's conservative gender regime at the time.

<sup>16</sup> It is curious to note that at the 10<sup>th</sup> European Feminist Research Conference in 2018, before I came across Akhtyrskyi's argument while working on this concluding paper of my thesis, in 2020, I heard a very similar point as a comment to my presentation of **Study 2**. The comment, however, concerned the situation in Czechoslovakia under state socialism. As that commentator (who was born and grew up in Czechoslovakia) argued, for old bourgeois families, maintaining 'traditional' male breadwinner gender contracts was a form of resistance to the state-socialist regime and a way to mark their class position.

leaders, could have impacted gender attitudes and gender relations and led to more gender unequal division of unpaid work (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2002; Takacs, 2013; Watson, 1993).

A small number of qualitative studies carried out during the 1990s, however, questioned this universalising account of change, by showing how actual gender divisions of unpaid work, as well as related normative expectations, started diverging across class lines. In Russia, Temkina and Rotkirch (2002) observed a sort of pluralisation of gender contracts, with the ‘housewife/male breadwinner’, ‘supported woman’, and ‘career woman’ contracts acquiring legitimacy and gaining prevalence among middle- and upper classes. Kovacs and Varadi (2000, pp. 82–83) in their ethnographic study in Hungary noticed similar patterns of change. They identified three gender contracts: ‘male breadwinner/female consumption specialist’ among elites; ‘sharing “partnership” between spouses’ among the upwardly mobile; ‘hostility between men and women’ combined with the presumption that women may be better off raising children without men, prevalent among the working class.

In the 2000s, research addressing further impacts of the transformations on the gender division of unpaid work in the region was virtually absent (Klenner & Leiber, 2010). As I discuss in **Study 1**, in that period, the developments in terms of structural/material factors that were thought to underpin the increase of inequality in the division of unpaid work in the first post-socialist decade nevertheless significantly slowed, or even decreased (e.g. women’s labour force participation rates increased, as did public spending on family benefits and childcare). At the same time, in terms of cultural factors, it was the period when many countries of the region saw the beginnings of the so-called second wave of re-traditionalisation in family and gender policies and discourses (Bluhm et al., 2021). Due to the sheer lack of empirical research on the topic, it is difficult to evaluate whether and how the aforementioned processes have been reflected at the level of individual families (a gap partially addressed by **Study 1** and **Study 3**).

In terms of the relative role of specific determinants of the gender division of unpaid work, cross-sectional comparative studies reveal the lower explanatory potential of structural/material explanations in the post-socialist contexts in comparison with the those of the West (Fuwa, 2004; Mikucka, 2009). Despite persistently high relative employment rates among women, Eastern European countries usually appear to be characterised by more ‘severe domestic inequality’ than Western countries (Aassve et al., 2014; Aboim, 2010, p.197; Treas & Tai, 2012). Eastern Europeans are also shown to hold comparatively less egalitarian views on gender roles in families when compared with Westerners (Edlund & Oun, 2016; Knight & Brinton, 2017; Salin et al., 2018). Given the above, most recent theorising on the persistently high gender inequality in the division of unpaid work in a range of post-socialist countries emphasises the importance of analysing cultural factors operating at various levels of the gender structure (Ashwin & Isupova, 2018; Hofäcker et al., 2013; Riebling et al., 2016). Precisely this reasoning motivates my relatively stronger analytical focus on cultural factors within this thesis.

A nascent body of qualitative scholarship (reviewed in Section 3.3) also suggests that class is becoming an increasingly important factor in shaping both practices and norms when it comes to the gender division of unpaid work in contemporary post-socialist families. For this reason, it must be accounted for analytically, if we are to understand recent patterns of change in this domain. Before discussing this empirical scholarship, which served as an important point of analytical departure for me, a more general brief note on the conceptualization of class in post-socialist social sciences is due.

### **3.2 Lived experience of class in post-socialist contexts**

The place of class in the sociological analysis of everyday lives — outside relations of production and/or politics — in post-socialist contexts was for a long time very marginal (Cepić, 2019; Crăciun & Lipan, 2020; Morris, 2017).<sup>17</sup> Empirical research on families was no exception (see, for example, Robila's (2004) seminal volume on families in Eastern Europe).

Recently, however, sociologists and anthropologists working on the region have started to focus increasingly on issues of class identity formation and emerging class cultures (Cepić, 2019; Manolova, 2020; Morris, 2016; Rivkin-Fish, 2009; Salmenniemi, 2012; Schröder, 2008). This scholarship views class as an important, but ‘uncertain and emergent aspect of local social interaction’ (Patico, 2015, p. 28). Recognising the ambivalence of emerging post-socialist class subjectivities and class relations, it stresses the importance of analysing everyday material and symbolic boundary work (Lamont, 1992, 2000) for understanding their production (Cepić, 2019; Manolova, 2020; Salmenniemi, 2012).

These conceptual developments have also been an impetus for increasing analytical focus on class in research on families and intra-family gender relations in the region.

### **3.3 Class and family in contemporary post-socialist contexts**

Recent empirical studies suggest that class currently represents an important factor shaping a whole range of family practices and norms in post-socialist countries. Key themes explored in this literature have much in common with those addressed in Western family scholarship (as reviewed in Chapter 2), and include involved fatherhood, intensive motherhood, and domestic and care work outsourcing.

The emerging phenomenon of ‘involved fatherhood’ — which represents a stark contrast to men’s ‘domestic marginalization’ (Ashwin & Lytkina, 2004) during the state-socialist period — has attracted increasing attention from researchers across the countries of the region (Avdeeva, 2012; Dimova, 2010; Lipasova, 2016, 2017; Nešporová, 2016, 2019; Reimann, 2016; Rozhdestvenskaya, 2021; Suwada, 2017; Švab & Humer, 2013; Takács, 2020). Notably, while

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<sup>17</sup> For a discussion of the reasons for the invisibility of class in post-socialist social research, see Ost (2015a, 2015b).

explicitly recognising their samples as being middle-class (see, especially, Nešporová, 2019; Reimann, 2016; Suwada, 2014; Takács, 2020), none of these authors except Lipasova (2016, 2017) analysed the phenomenon of involved fatherhood using class as an analytical category. Lipasova (2016, 2017), who did her research both with urban middle-class fathers and with working-class and ‘potential middle-class’ fathers in the Russian provinces, found that paternal aspirations about, and actual involvement in, childcare varied between these groups, with only urban middle-class fathers embracing new models of involved parenthood (at least at the attitudinal level). In a similar vein, in her study of Russian elites (which did not specifically focus on parenting), Schimpfössl (2018, pp. 127–128) also noted the development of a sort of Western-style bourgeois masculinity among Russian elites, premised on the idea that ‘good fathers provide but are also concerned about maintaining a warm and loving relationship with their children’.

Scholarship on various aspects of intensive mothering — a phenomenon that some relate to neoliberal developments in post-socialist societies (Isupova, 2018) — has also recently begun to appear across the countries of the region (Avdeeva, 2020; Cheresheva, 2019; Isupova, 2018; Shpakovskaya, 2015; Temkina & Zdravomyslova, 2018). Empirically, these studies also focus exclusively on the middle classes. However, in this literature it appears more common (than in case of involved fatherhood) to explicitly link new motherhood practices to processes of middle-class identity construction.

Finally, the emergence of paid domestic and care-work services — which were either non-existent or had an extremely marginal role during state-socialist period — has also received the increasing attention of family sociologists from across the region in recent years (Humer & Hrnjak, 2015; Redlová, 2012; Rotkirch et al., 2012; Tkach & Hrnjak, 2016; Zdravomyslova, 2010). These studies have focused on how growing economic inequality and the outsourcing of unpaid work have become recursively linked, with the latter being both a result, and also contributing to, the further perpetuation of class inequalities. Although none of these studies explicitly focused on the implications of outsourcing used by middle- and upper-class families for their division of unpaid work, findings in Slovenia, Czechia, and Russia (Humer & Hrnjak, 2015; Redlová, 2012; Rotkirch et al., 2012) indicate that when domestic workers and nannies are hired, they take over that part of unpaid work carried out primarily by women.

While focusing on the clearly gendered and classed aspects of contemporary family life in post-socialist contexts, these studies do not directly address the issues of cross-class differences in the gender division of unpaid work. Only a few recent studies have looked at the embracing of gender egalitarianism by post-socialist middle classes and elites (Cheresheva, 2019; Csurgó & Kristóf, 2018; Dimova, 2010). In contrast to findings from the 1990s that indicated increased endorsement of housewife/male breadwinner gender contract among more educated and affluent classes (Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002; Kovacs & Varadi, 2000) (reviewed in Section 3.1), it appears that over the 2000s, support for gender egalitarianism has become a kind of strategy for class

distinction. These findings about the emerging link between gender egalitarianism and middle- and upper-class positions in post-socialist contexts resonates with the recent findings of Deutsch and Gaunt (2020), which show that in non-Western contexts (i.e. Honduras and Bhutan in their case), gender egalitarian ideas are lauded by respondents as a sign of their modern and educated attitudes.

Overall, despite these important recent developments in the scholarship on family gender relations and class in post-socialist contexts, given the exclusively qualitative and cross-sectional nature of the studies reviewed, it is still difficult to make sense of the dynamics of intra-family gender inequality and the place of class. And this is precisely the empirical gap that this thesis aims to fill.

In conclusion, it is important to note that in terms of conceptual approaches to class, the scholarship reviewed above has mainly used a ‘performative and interactionalist lens’ (Morris, 2017, p.5). It has treated class not in a deterministic way, but rather has focused on understanding the ways in which evolving gender and class relations and meanings have co-shaped each other within the context of post-socialist transformations. This is an approach broadly shared within this thesis. In the following section, I elaborate further on my methodological choices.

## 4. Methodology and data

This section has two objectives. First, I discuss the *epistemological* and *methodological* aspects of this thesis that have not been covered in the individual papers. In taking this approach, I follow those who distinguish between methods (as techniques of data collection and analysis); and methodology (as ‘a coherent set of ideas about the philosophy, methods, and data that underlie the research process and the production of knowledge’) (Harding, 1988; McCall, 2005, p. 1774).

Secondly, I describe the rationale for choosing ISSP as my main quantitative source, and also provide further details on the choice of site and actual process of qualitative data collection. I discuss, as well, some additional aspects concerning operationalization of the main variables (gender division of unpaid work and class) not covered in the publications. I do not repeat the discussion of *methods* that each of the papers already contains.

### 4.1 Epistemology

Building on, and aiming to contribute to, feminist family sociology and feminist approaches to class, I also find it important to reflect on my epistemological stance, which was not explicitly discussed in any of the papers. I locate this project within the tradition of feminist standpoint epistemology (Haraway, 1988; Sprague, 2016, 2018; Sprague & Kobryniewicz, 2006). One of the central tenets of standpoint epistemology is the recognition of the social situatedness of the knower: ‘We need to see knowers as people who are located in specific positions in social relations, organizing inequalities by race, class, gender, and nation, with all that implies for conflicting material interests, access to interpretive frameworks, and admission to effective participation in dominant discourses.’ (Sprague, 2016, p.51) By recognizing and reflecting on her or his situatedness and her or his choice of research methods, a researcher can then ‘obtain a partially objective knowledge, that is, a knowledge of the specific part of reality that she or he can “see” from the position in which she or he is materially discursively located in time, space, body and historical power relations’ (Haraway, 1988 in Lykke, 2010, p.5).

The need for reflexivity is usually discussed in the context of qualitative research, particularly in relation to the interactions between researchers and participants. And in Section 4.4 below, I do discuss my positionality during my fieldwork in Russia, and the way it influenced the data collection process. However, the need for reflexivity is not bound to a specific method. Even when it comes to quantitative research, ‘each of us should ask ourselves questions about the connection between our personal biographies and material interests and the questions we pursue and the arguments we find compelling’ (Sprague, 2018, p.141). As such, I provide below an account of my situatedness in relation to the topic of this thesis.

#### 4.1.1 Autobiographical detour

My interest in family life in post-socialist context is intimately linked with my own childhood and adolescence experiences. I was born in Russia on the day when ‘Perestroika’ was announced. As an only child, I was raised under the watchful eyes of my two parents and four grandparents (all six of whom I was very lucky to have in my life well into my adolescence). Growing up as a keen observer of three couples during the times when Russia was going through the economic and social crises of the 1990s, I learnt early on how families could be massively impacted by processes far beyond the control of their members. From the loss of jobs and life savings, reduction of pensions, and worries about buying staple foods, to new career opportunities and everyday comforts — I still remember my mum’s excitement about the new automatic washing machine which put a stop to weekend-long manual laundering — the post-socialist transition as witnessed by my young self was about radical changes, including the re-drawing of the division of labour between and among my parents and grandparents. Having acquainted myself with feminist theory during my undergraduate studies in psychology, and developing this knowledge further during a master’s degree at CEU (yet another post-socialist country in my biography), I have learnt to make sense of those experiences using the category of gender.

I have been much slower, however, to apply a ‘class lens’ to reflect on that experience. Having attended a ‘reputable’ public school and a public university in the 1990s and early 2000s — when higher education in Russia was still mostly free — I was surrounded by people who came from social and intellectual backgrounds very similar to mine. Most belonged either to technical or creative intelligentsia. Moreover, we all came from either dual-earner families or families with a single working mother (extremely common both in socialist and post-socialist times). And although there were some signs of growing differences in economic means among my classmates, they were still minor in comparison with what they would become twenty years on.

The sharpening of my ‘class lens’ eventually occurred over the course of several years preceding the start of this PhD. Meeting my partner (who was born in Milan into a family of established entrepreneurs) and his relatives acquainted me with a variety of other ways to organize family life and gender relations — from extensive use of paid domestic- and care workers, to choosing to be a stay-at-home mom. Although these arrangements felt (and still feel) very foreign to me, both for cultural, and also material reasons, knowledge of them has made me much more aware of the geographic and class situatedness of my own family experiences and normative ideas. My research interest in gender and class was later solidified by working for Oxfam’s global campaign *Even It Up* (Seery & Arendar, 2014), in which we searched for ways to make sense of the connections between growing income and wealth inequalities and gender inequalities around the world (Ukhova, 2015). While my work in Oxfam was clearly an impetus for this PhD project, it also significantly reduced my sensitivity to context (a malady that is

almost always inevitable when one works for international organisations at the global level). It took me some time at the beginning of this PhD to realise that the post-socialist context was actually one of the most important analytical dimensions of this thesis and an essential part of the research ‘problem’ itself, as I articulated in the introduction.

While working on this thesis I have grappled with how my personal post-socialist history, and more than a decade of experience as part of an international, highly educated and relatively economically secure heterosexual couple, in which both partners are openly committed to feminist principles, have influenced the theoretical framing, scope and interpretations of this analysis. My decision to include primary qualitative data collection (**Study 2**) as part of the project — rather than limiting myself only to secondary survey data analysis — was one of the ways for me to confront this issue. And it was, indeed, during the qualitative fieldwork that I realised how my methodological nationalism (which could probably be attributed both to my own belonging to an ‘ethnic majority’ and the limitations of the quantitative data I operated with) glossed over ‘race’/‘ethnicity’ as a potentially important analytical dimension for a project of this type. I have also tried to question my assumptions by widely presenting my work in progress both to gender and family sociologists, and to regional studies scholars. These exchanges drew my attention to the importance of context (which grew progressively between **Study 1** and **Study 3**), and also led me to focus more on the role of ideologies (Ukhova, 2018) than I had initially planned. The most obvious way in which my own background limited the scope of this thesis was my focus on Russia, which was driven first of all by my language capacities. But I also recognise that coming from a country that dominated the Second World for its entire period of existence, I have to an extent reproduced this form of domination in the very design of this project, by zooming in on Russia and choosing not to explore further the country differences identified in **Study 1**.

Overall, it is, of course, impossible to give a precise estimation of how much my positionality has shaped this PhD project, except by stating that it clearly has — and probably well beyond what I am aware of. My goal in this section, however, was not to account for my experience and then move on to ‘objectively’ present my findings. Rather, my hope is that these biographical considerations will enable the reader to understand the broader context of this project and its findings, as well as its ‘blind spots’.

#### **4.2 Intersectionality as methodology**

Focusing on both class and gender as my main analytical categories in this study, I employ intersectionality as a methodology, as defined by McCall (2005). Intersectionality is ‘the relationships among multiple dimensions and modalities of social relations and subject formations’ (McCall, 2005, p. 1772). The complex interplay between these categories can be

explored using one of the following three approaches: intra-categorical, intercategorical, or anticategorical analyses (Few-Demo & Allen, 2020; McCall, 2005). The anticategorical analysis is primarily concerned with the deconstruction of categories themselves. This approach was not analytically relevant for the research objective of this thesis. The intra-categorical and the intercategorical approaches, on the contrary, informed the design of the qualitative and the quantitative parts of this thesis, respectively.

The intra-categorical approach ‘interrogates the boundary-making and boundary-defining process itself’ (McCall, 2005, p. 1773), and usually focuses on how a single social group is located within a specific social setting or how specific symbolic representations (e.g., ideologies, values) may influence identity construction processes within this group. As Ferree (2010, p.430) argues, ‘studies of even privileged White men and middle-class masculinity are intersectional to the extent that they ask questions about how structural changes in class and gender relations have encouraged men and women to embrace different forms of family...’ This is the type of analysis I conducted in **Study 2**, in which I focused on the processes of gender and class accountability as shaping the gender division of unpaid work among Russian middle class couples.

The intercategorical approach is comparative, but also context-sensitive, and pays attention to disparities and inequalities among differently socially located groups. This approach informed both **Study 1** and **Study 3** designs, which compared and contrasted the developments of practices and ideologies of gender division of unpaid work among groups with different levels of education and income.

The analysis presented in this thesis is also intersectional, because it focuses on gendered and classed experiences and ideologies, while paying close attention to their socio-historical context. As feminist methodologists Hesse-Biber and Griffin (2019, p. 75) argue, ‘frequently, analyses that incorporate race, class, and gender differences ignore the diversity among women with regard to their particular geographical/cultural placement across the globe’. Avoiding the latter pitfall is one of the central objectives of this thesis. And it is precisely the geographical and cultural placement of the women and men I interviewed (as well as ISSP survey respondents) within post-socialist contexts that represents one of its key analytical dimensions.

### **4.3 Numbers and words**

‘Understanding the nuanced picture and increasing our knowledge of the mechanisms that reproduce gender inequalities in production and reproduction requires both quantitative and qualitative research.’ (Scott, 2010, p. 225)

My use of both quantitative and qualitative methods in different parts of this thesis is a reflection of both my epistemological stance and my theoretical ideas about class. Firstly, I share the position of a growing number of feminist researchers<sup>18</sup> who recognise the value of both quantitative and qualitative methods of inquiry, while openly accepting the limitations of both (Hesse-Biber & Griffin, 2019; Scott, 2010; Sprague, 2018). In the context of family sociology, while quantitative methods allow us to capture important group differences and, thus, enhance our understanding of complex social phenomena, it is only through the use of intensive interviews and observations, paying close attention to meanings and processes, that we can make sense of why these differences emerge and persist (Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020). The use of quantitative methods in **Study 1** and **Study 3** allow me to construct an important macro-level picture of class differences in both practices and ideologies related to gender division of unpaid work. At the same time, it was only **Study 2**, with its focus on women's and men's gendered and classed imagery and the related processes of accountability, that allowed me to tap into the potential mechanism underlying the relationship between the class and gender division of unpaid work. The use of both types of methods was also a way to place the experiences of the women and men I interviewed for **Study 2** in a broader historical and socio-political context (**Study 1** and **Study 3**), and to ensure that I was sufficiently attentive to personal meanings without losing sight of broader social and cultural dimensions (cf. Smart, 2007). It could be argued that to some extent, at least, it allowed me to make sense of the connections between various levels of gender and class structures in terms of their impact on the actual gender division of unpaid work in my interviewees' families.

My research questions and conceptualisations of class as both a structural and a cultural phenomenon reflected in everyday practices also called for the use of both quantitative and qualitative methods. On the one hand, I clearly needed data comparable over time, which only surveys could provide. At the same time, it necessitated a move beyond what the surveys could capture—i.e., meanings that people attach both to their actual and/or aspired 'class' positions and family practices.

Finally, another factor that motivated me to include quantitative analyses into this thesis project was related to the state of feminist research in the CEE region. Quantitative studies in the sociology of gender are nearly absent, but they are essential for advancing feminist causes in the region (Law & Sikora, 2018).

#### **4.4 Data**

In the papers, I draw on two sources of data. Quantitative data comes from the 1994, 2002, and

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<sup>18</sup>One of the most interesting conferences I attended in the course of my PhD studies was an event on feminist approaches to quantitative research methods organised by fellow PhD students from LSE and UCL in September 2017. As a result of that event, a new network of feminist researchers (<https://femquant.squarespace.com/events>) was founded with the aim of developing a critical and reflexive approach to the use of quantitative and mixed methods. The network has significantly expanded its membership in the recent years, which indicates a growing interest and commitment to the use of these methods within the feminist community.

2012 waves of International Social Survey Program (ISSP Research Group, 2016). Qualitative data comes from 27 individual problem-centred interviews (PCI) (Witzel & Reiter, 2012) that I conducted myself in Saint Petersburg in 2017. Below, I discuss the rationale for using ISSP data (the implications of its limitations for the research design are discussed in **Study 1** and **Study 3**). This is followed by a detailed discussion of the process of interview data collection, which was not included in the original article due to word limitations.

#### ***4.4.1 Quantitative data: ISSP***

ISSP is the only survey that could be used for answering the research questions posed in **Study 1** and **Study 3**. First, it is a unique cross-country survey that includes questions on unpaid work practices (though only housework-related questions were consistently included in all three waves) in post-socialist countries, and it covers both the 1990s and 2000s. While the Generations and Gender Survey (Gauthier et al., 2018) includes a similar, and even somewhat wider, range of questions on practices, it only started in mid-2000s. Secondly, ISSP is the only survey that over the years has consistently asked the question about shared breadwinning, which was essential for the construction of my dependent variable, i.e., gender ideology, in **Study 3**. The World Values Survey (WVS, 2015) and European Values Survey (EVS, 2015) did not include this question in more recent waves.

#### ***4.4.2 Qualitative data collection: Method, site and researcher's positionality***

The qualitative interview data for **Study 2** was collected through individual problem-centred interviews (PCI) (Witzel & Reiter, 2012), with 27 members of 14 dual-earner heterosexual couples with co-resident children in Saint Petersburg, Russia in 2017.

The rationale for focusing on Saint Petersburg was related to the peculiar combination of comparatively high levels of economic inequality in the city, and the contradictory nature of the local gender culture (Duncan, 2005). It is the second largest city in Russia. The level of economic inequality in the city is higher than the Russian average, although somewhat lower than in Moscow. In 2016, while nationwide gini coefficient averaged 0.414, in Saint Petersburg it equalled 0.416, and in Moscow 0.421.<sup>19</sup> When compared with the rest of the country, the city has a larger proportion of the population that adheres to liberal political values, which was reflected in the comparatively higher share of votes given to liberal candidates in the 2018 presidential elections. But it is also more politically polarized than other cities, with the most famous champion of 'traditional values', Vitaly Milonov, originally coming from the city parliament. In comparison with the rest of the country, Saint Petersburg, thus, is a place with relatively more pronounced class inequalities, where the population also has had larger exposure to the competing

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<sup>19</sup>Data from Russian State Statistics Agency <https://rosstat.gov.ru/folder/13723>

'Western' discourse of gender equality and the discourse of traditional (family) values. Saint Petersburg remains what Berman (1982, p. 176) once called '*the clearest realization of the Russian mode of modernisation*'. As the stronger association between the class and gender division of unpaid work discussed above is a relatively recent phenomenon in Russia, one might expect that this association would be more tangible in Saint Petersburg, and this makes the city a potentially good site for studying the mechanisms underlying this relation.

I began interviews with a convenience sample recruited through the most widely used social network platform in Russia, vk.com. I posted the following announcement and asked my friends and acquaintances to share it with their own networks:

*If:*

- *you live in Saint Petersburg;*
- *you are between 25 and 45 y.o.;*
- *you have a permanent partner that you reside together with;*
- *you both have higher education and are both currently employed;*
- *you have a child who is younger than 18 y.o.;*
- *you and your partner are ready to share your experience of combining work and household duties;*

*I would be happy to meet with you for an interview in a place convenient for you.'*

As the network tracks how many people view your posts, I know that it reached 5400 users.

I also indicated in my post that I would reward participation in interviews with 1000 RUB, which at that moment equalled approximately 15 euro. I made the decision to pay participants primarily on ethical grounds. Asking full-time employed people with children to dedicate 1,5-2 hours of their time to talking about unpaid work, and not compensate them for it, seemed ethically dubious to me. I was also hoping that this would attract lower-income respondents, although this eventually turned out not to be the case.

Using the social network for recruitment was a way to facilitate trust in a context where personal connections are highly important (Ledeneva, 1998). For the same reason, I made the decision to first focus on a highly educated subsample, which I had easier access to due to my own class position. People started contacting me almost immediately, and a particularly large part of this subsample came from an advertisement of the study posted in the group of one of the famous foreign language schools. At a later stage of my fieldwork, using another advertisement on vk.com (that advertisement was viewed 1,600 times), this time supplemented also by snowball sampling, with the help of friends and interviewees that had access to people working in industry and services sector, I started reaching out to couples with lower levels of education. I had a significant number of contacts with the latter group, which, however, didn't eventually result in an interview. A particular challenge in the case of the lower-educated group was getting the

agreement of *both* partners to be interviewed. Although early on in my fieldwork I had doubts about my ability to recruit men in general, I was positively surprised by the willingness of many highly-educated men to participate in the study; nevertheless, I still faced challenges with men from lower class subsample. It should be noted that with the exception of just one couple, I was always contacted first by female partners, who then, more or less successfully, tried to recruit their male partners to participate in the study.

I conducted interviews myself in Russian, and a freelance assistant transcribed them. The interviews lasted between 58 and 175 minutes (average length was 105 minutes). I met interviewees in the places that they suggested themselves, including their flats, offices, and cafes. A number of times I was invited to stay over for dinner, so I could collect additional observational data. The method I used was the ‘problem-centred interview’ (PCI) (Witzel & Reiter, 2012). The problem-centred interview technique helps to position an interviewee as an expert. Knowledge is thus co-created during the interview, with the interviewer and interviewee becoming co-researchers and collaborators in making meaning of the interviewees’ experiences, in the best tradition of feminist approaches to interviewing (Hesse-Biber & Griffin, 2019). My first question usually triggered very extensive narrative — an important condition for analysis at the interactional level (West & Zimmerman, 2009) — which I then followed up with specific questions from the interview guide. Comparative questions, in which I asked respondents to reflect on how similar or different they are in their division of unpaid work to/from their parental families and friends, were particularly useful for understanding how respondents differentiated themselves materially and culturally from others. In addition, short survey questionnaires asking the interviewees to estimate their own and their partner’s contribution to various housework and childcare tasks, which I asked them to fill out at the end of each interview, were helpful for making sense of intra-couple dynamics. For example, obvious discrepancies in couples’ estimations of their time distributions were often an indicator of tensions that they more or less explicitly brought up during the interviews.

As a married Russian woman who was born and raised in Saint Petersburg, I was perceived by my respondents as a cultural insider. My non-adherence to emphasised femininity (Connell, 1987) norms prevalent in Russia (e.g. long hair; make-up; heels; etc.) appeared to have additional positive disruptive effect in interview situations with men. I was surprised at how many of them were eager to engage in in-depth, and often very emotional, discussions of difficulties and doubts about their roles in the families, and their relations with their partners. It should be noted, however, that the rapport that I was able to establish with female respondents was still stronger, and interviews with women, on average, lasted somewhat longer than those with men. But, overall, I found that the ways my respondents interpreted my professional background and my class played a larger role in the interview situation than my gender. Many of interviewees knew that I had done my undergraduate degree in psychology in Saint Petersburg (since this is written

on my page on the vk.com social network), and I often had a feeling they perceived the interview as a chance to discuss their family problems, which were quite numerous. Indeed, one of the interviewed couples actually went through a divorce in 2016, and later reunited, and 5 more couples reported serious difficulties in their relationship. The few instances in which the fact of my residence abroad appeared important were when highly educated respondents, who themselves had travelled or lived abroad, brought up the issue of gender relations in the ‘West’ and Russia’s recent ‘conservative turn’. The interviewees’ willingness to discuss their economic situation, and what I later termed as ‘social mobility aspirations’ (my respondents extensively discussed their life plans, which included everything from buying flats to their immigration plans) during the coding, may have been caused by how they ‘read’ my own class. Recent research on class habitus of Russian youth from working and middle classes (Vanke et al., 2017), however, suggests that a desire for social mobility represents a key element of the habitus of the latter group. As reflected in the text of the **Study 2**, my eventual sample could be characterized as (aspiring) middle class.

#### **4.5 Additional notes on operationalization of the main measures**

Although it is beyond the scope of this section to discuss in detail the operationalization of the main measures (done in the individual papers), two further points regarding my methodological choices should be made.

First, my goal was to investigate the phenomenon of the gender division of unpaid work as ‘holistically’ as possible (Warren, 2011). A more ‘holistic’ approach implies moving beyond describing domestic and care *practices* (who does what) and, instead, focusing in addition on *relationships* (for, from, and with whom unpaid work is done), *negotiations* (how it is decided who is doing what), and *meanings* (views about the task; feelings about the doing of unpaid work; feelings about the division of unpaid work; views on the fit between unpaid work and the rest of life; and the moral meaning of unpaid work) (Warren, 2011). Although in my choice of the dependent variables I was, unfortunately, often driven by data constraints (as discussed above), in focusing on both practices and ideologies, as well in deciding to opt for collecting primary qualitative data, I tried to achieve this goal *across* the three studies. While **Study 1** analysed only a very limited range of practices — the dependent variable is an index of men’s relative involvement in three routine housework tasks (i.e. cooking, shopping and doing laundry) — in **Study 2** I was able to focus on all four dimensions of unpaid work. The focus on the moral significance of domestic and childcare work, as well as on negotiations about its division within couples, was actually a determining factor in my ability to understand the mechanism of gender and class accountability theorised in that paper. Finally, in **Study 3** my focus on gender ideologies

was essentially a continuation of my focus on the meanings of unpaid work and their relation to class.

My second clarification point concerns the choices regarding the operationalization of class, which were not explicitly discussed in the individual papers. In **Study 1** and **Study 3**, I use education and income as proxies of class, building on an established tradition in quantitative sociological studies on the gender division of unpaid work (e.g. Cooke, 2011; Gupta et al., 2010). This choice also appeared as the most context-appropriate, given that income and education — especially, higher education as a marker of state-socialist intelligentsia — are considered to be the key factors in class differentiation in post-socialist Eastern European countries (Gagyi & Éber, 2015; Schröder, 2008). My choice of sampling criteria, i.e. education, in **Study 2** follows the same logic.

It is also important to note that in my approach to operationalizing class, I was guided by the recognition that the processes of class formation in post-socialist countries are still ongoing. My analytical focus on top vs. bottom differences (higher vs. lower education; top income quintile vs. bottom income quintile) in relation to practices and ideologies of the gender division of unpaid work in the models used in **Study 1** and **Study 3** was a way to get a sense of the (dynamic) social distance between classes rather than to establish specific class characteristics and should be interpreted as such.

In relation to the above, my operationalization of class in **Study 2** is aligned with an approach taken in so-called ‘class cultures’ studies, which ‘are not looking for class consciousness, but rather *classed* consciousness in which the recognition of social divisions — or rather social distance — is embedded in practice’ (Bottero, 2004, p. 933). This approach has also informed my eventual focus on ‘symbolic boundaries’ (‘the types of lines that individuals draw when they categorize people’ (Lamont, 1992, p.1)) during the analysis of the interview data.

#### **4.6 Sequencing and integration of the studies**

Before moving to a discussion of the findings of the three studies, a final note on the relation between them is due. Although the three papers comprising this thesis represent stand-alone research endeavours, it should be noted that their design and findings did inform each other, and thus could be considered complementary (Hesse-Biber, 2016). The analytical focus of **Study 2** on the potential mechanism underlying the positive relation between class and gender equality in Russia stemmed from the country-specific empirical findings of **Study 1**. I found the comparatively large and growing class gradients in the levels of gender inequality in the division of domestic labour in post-socialist Russia particularly puzzling. The findings of **Study 2** indicating the potential class specificity of the preferred gender contracts then led me to a further — quantitative — exploration of this assumption in **Study 3**, which aimed to determine to what

extent ideologies actually vary across classes. Some of the results from **Study 3**, indeed, provided a triangulation for my qualitative findings in **Study 2**, i.e., that gender egalitarianism is, indeed, much more likely to be endorsed by women with more education and higher income.

## 5. Overview of studies

In the following sections, I present summaries of the individual studies comprising this cumulative thesis. Presenting an analysis of how ideologies and practices of the gender division of unpaid work have changed in Russia and a range of other post-socialist countries over the period of post-socialist transformations, and what role class has played in re-shaping them, these papers jointly address the research objective of this thesis. Focusing on both material and cultural aspects of class, each study empirically tests hypotheses about the (changing) relation between the class and gender division of unpaid work in those contexts. Additionally, each study focuses on a distinct (set of) dimension(s) of the gender division of unpaid work.

### 5.1 Gender division of domestic labour in post-socialist Europe (1994–2012): Test of class gradients hypothesis [Study 1]

#### 5.1.1 Rationale & research questions

A number of recent cross-sectional comparative studies on the gender division of domestic labour (GDDL) single out post-socialist CEE<sup>20</sup> as a region where, after accounting for individual- and interactional-level factors, there appears to be more ‘severe domestic inequality’ than in Western countries (Aassve et al., 2014; Aboim, 2010, p. 197; Treas & Tai, 2012). However, the development of this phenomenon over time, and, hence, its socio-historical causes, remain under-researched (Klenner & Leiber, 2010). Has the stalled socialist gender revolution (Lapidus, 1978) persisted in the post-socialist period? Or has there been a move towards greater equality in GDDL, as suggested by aggregate level analyses that have focused on the first post-socialist decade (Crompton et al., 2005; Saxonberg, 2014)? Or, rather, has there been a neo-traditionalist turn, as predicted by some commentators (Watson, 1993)? Taking into account that models based on individual- and interactional-level determinants of GDDL commonly applied in Western contexts (e.g. relative resources, gender ideology) often have a significantly poorer fit in the CEE (Fuwa, 2004; Mikucka, 2009), there is also a clear need for additional theoretical frameworks to understand those changes. Given the region’s recent history of unprecedented growth of economic and social inequalities, focusing analysis on so-called class gradients (education and income-related) in men’s and women’s contribution to domestic labour (Gupta et al., 2010; Heisig, 2011; Schneider & Hastings, 2017) and their change over time (Sullivan, 2010), would appear to be highly pertinent for understanding changes in GDDL. So far, however, this has not been done.

Addressing the above empirical and theoretical gaps, in **Study 1** I start my empirical exploration of changes in GDDL in the context of post-socialist transformations and focus specifically on the changing relation between household’s class and gender inequality in this

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<sup>20</sup> In this section, I use the same terminology, as in the published paper that this section summarises.

domain. The study covers the 1994-2012 period and uses data from six post-socialist CEE countries, i.e. Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia. In the absence of time use data in the 1994 wave, I operationalize GDDL as men's relative involvement in routine housework tasks (as done by Crompton et al., 2005). Class is captured by household income, as well as the respondent's level of education. Year x Income and Year x Education interactions are used in the models to account for the changing effects of class over time. In the models, I also control for a standard set of individual- and interactional-level determinants of GDDL, i.e. relative resources, time availability, and individual gender ideology.

### ***5.1.2 Findings***

Trajectories of net change in GDDL were quite diverse among the analysed countries. A hypothesized increase in inequality in GDDL in 1994-2002, followed by a decrease in 2002-2012, was a fairly typical trajectory for lower-class households across most of the countries analysed.

The increased positive effect of education on equality in GDDL was observed both at the regional level and across most of the countries. In 1994-2002, the gradient increased primarily due to increased inequality in GDDL among the lower educated. In 2002-2012, the persistence of the educational gradient in several countries, on the contrary, was related to the relatively faster change towards greater equality among the highly educated, as was suggested in the Western contexts (Sullivan, 2010).

The increased positive effect of household income on equality in GDDL was confirmed in relation to the 1994-2002 period across most of the countries. The widening of the income gradient was driven primarily by increased inequality in GDDL among poor families. In 2002-2012, the gradient disappeared, as the trend for the poor reversed.

### ***5.1.3 Contribution***

First, the study traces the development of inequality in GDDL in several post-socialist CEE countries over time, considering both region-wide and country-specific trends. It compares and contrasts changes in the early post-socialist period (1994-2002) with changes in the later period (2002-2012). Second, this is the first study to employ the analytical category of class for quantitatively analysing GDDL in the region. As the results suggest, this approach has significant explanatory power. I demonstrate that class did and does matter for how heterosexual couples in post-socialist contexts divide domestic labour at different points of post-socialist transition. By focusing separately on income and education as independent variables, I also show that the effects of class are actually multidimensional. The distinctive effects of these variables at different points in time indicate the importance of differentiating between the structural/material and cultural dimensions of class as affecting the gender division of unpaid work. Concomitantly, I demonstrate that the lack of overall societal movement towards greater equality was due to

idiosyncratic trends among different classes in both of the periods considered. This lack of progress was primarily related to significant setbacks in gender equality among lower-class households during the period of market transition in the 1990s, which they only managed to offset during the 2000s. Thus, the study contributes new evidence to, and further develops class perspective on, the post-socialist gender re-traditionalisation debate.

Finally, the study also reveals some limitations of theorizing class in relation to GDDL as currently done in the Western contexts. My findings highlight the importance of considering changes in GDDL among lower classes, not only as a result of ‘catching up’ with trends emanating from higher classes (Sullivan, 2010), but also as a consequence of their greater vulnerability to impacts of socio-economic crises that may lead to increases in the share of unpaid work carried out by women. This study also provides empirical evidence that household income may have a positive effect on relative gender equality in the division of domestic labour (cf. Heisig, 2011). It also demonstrates, however, that this effect may be a temporary phenomenon.

#### ***5.1.4 A note on Russia-specific findings***

It was beyond the scope (and word limit) of the publication to discuss in detail country-specific findings. Given that the other two studies are concerned only with Russia, however, I find it important to discuss below some of the specifics of the Russian case revealed by the analysis. In Russia, inequality in GDDL decreased especially noticeably among lower and higher classes during 1994-2002. While it is likely that among higher classes this trend was related to early access to timesaving technology and various outsourcing opportunities, the decrease among the lower classes is quite puzzling, given that in the other countries the trajectory for the lower classes was the opposite. It is possible that this is related to the relatively larger decision-making power of Russian women within families (Ashwin & Lytkina, 2004), and, especially, their almost full control of the family budget, especially in lower class families (Guseva & Ibragimova, 2021; Ibragimova & Guseva, 2017). In the 2000s — again, somewhat in contrast to the rest of the analysed CEE countries — there was a clear rollback in terms of domestic gender equality, which was particularly strong among the lower classes. This was likely related to Russia’s comparatively early onset of the so-called ‘conservative turn’ in gender and family policies and politics (Makarychev & Medvedev, 2015; Sorainen et al., 2017). Educational-gradient inequality in GDDL in Russia was historically largest in 1994; it then narrowed in 1994-2002, but subsequently started increasing again in the 2000s. Income gradient was not observed in 1994, but then increased throughout both of the decades analysed. The continuous increase in 2002-2012 also makes the Russian case stand out in the region. This could probably be attributed to Russia’s significantly higher income inequality and faster development of the paid-domestic work and care sector, fuelled by large-scale labour migration from the former Soviet republics in the 2000s. Overall, the class gradient (income and education combined) of inequality in GDDL in Russia in

2012 was the largest in the region. This finding is important to take into account in contextualizing the results of **Study 2**. Finally, it is also important to note that gender ideology, which in this study was conceptualised using the unidimensional ‘egalitarian vs. traditional’ framework (critiqued in **Study 3**), had no effect on GDDL in Russia. However, in this sense the country was fairly similar to the others.

## **5.2 Doing gender with class: Gender division of unpaid work in Russian middle-class dual-earner heterosexual households [Study 2]**

### **5.2.1 Rationale & research questions**

International research has demonstrated that the level of gender equality in the division of both housework and childcare is positively related to class<sup>21</sup> (Cooke, 2011; Craig & Mullan, 2011; Gøsta Esping-Andersen, 2009; Evertsson et al., 2009; Gupta et al., 2010; Heisig, 2011; Sayer et al., 2004; Sullivan, 2010; Sullivan et al., 2014). A number of recent qualitative studies (Lipasova, 2016, 2017), and the results of my own **Study 1**, tentatively suggest that this relation can also be observed in Russia.

The mechanisms underlying this relationship, however, remain poorly understood. So far the studies focusing on this relation have primarily treated class as the structural position of individual partners that influences their absolute and/or relative shares of housework and care via their time availability, and ability to bargain and/or outsource. At the same time, the role of changing gender ideologies and their relation to class in the domain of unpaid work remains undertheorised and warrants further investigation (Geist & Ruppner, 2018; Sullivan, 2010).

In this paper, relying empirically on 27 individual problem-centred interviews (PCI) (Witzel & Reiter, 2012) with partners of Russian middle-class dual-earner heterosexual couples with co-resident children, conducted in Saint Petersburg in 2017, I address this gap by theorizing and empirically analysing the potential mechanism underlying this relation. Taking a cultural approach to class (as defined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.4), I argue that gender division of housework and care may be shaped by processes of accountability, not only to sex category (‘doing gender’) (Hollander, 2013; West & Zimmerman, 2009; West & Zimmermann, 1987), but also to class category (‘doing class’) (West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002). In particular, I propose that ‘gender contracts’ (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2019; Hirdman, 1996; Rantalaiho, 1997; Sa’ar, 2009) should be conceptualised as terms of *both* gender and class accountability, and empirically demonstrate that they are perceived as profoundly classed in the context of post-socialist Russia. I then show that the resulting understandings of middle-class-(in)appropriate ways of doing

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<sup>21</sup> Class is a multidimensional concept. However, to date, quantitative scholarship concerned with class in relation to housework and childcare has primarily focused on partners’ education and income as proxies of class. See, for example, Cooke’s *Gender-class equality in political economies* (2011).

masculinity and femininity influences the actual division of unpaid work in Russian (aspiring) middle-class families.

### **5.2.2 Findings**

My interviewees perceived various gender contracts that have evolved in post-socialist Russia as profoundly classed. The ‘working mother’ contract (Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002), which included a woman carrying the triple burden of paid work, housework, and childcare together with a man completely disengaged from any sort of household activities, and frequently not working for pay, either, was associated with the lower classes and constructed as unmodern, representing the legacy of the socialist past. The housewife/breadwinner contract (Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002) was identified as the contract of the upper classes and perceived as relatively uncommon. The career-oriented woman contract (Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002) was perceived as the contract of the (aspiring) middle classes. Career women’s engagement in paid work was constructed in almost exclusively positive terms, as something ‘career women’ derived satisfaction from, in contrast to ‘working mothers’. ‘Career women’ were also depicted as morally superior to housewives, precisely because of their paid work. Unpaid work arrangements under this contract, according to my interviewees, could vary from those resembling ‘working mothers’, to full outsourcing, to gender-equal sharing. It was only the latter two, however, that they constructed as modern.

My respondents’ resulting understandings of middle-class-(in)appropriate ways of doing masculinity and femininity influenced the division of work in their families. In both paid and unpaid work domains, my interviewees held themselves, each other, and others directly involved in their families’ reproductive work (primarily grandparents) accountable not only to sex category (West & Zimmermann, 1987), but also to actual or aspired class category (middle-class) (West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002). Men were accountable not only as breadwinners, but also as carers; while women, in addition to their caring roles, were accountable for their career and sex appeal. This double gender-and-class accountability often resulted in more equal — while not necessarily more egalitarian — gender division of housework and care.

### **5.2.3 Contribution**

This is the first study to propose the mechanism of double accountability to sex and class categories as a possible explanation for the positive relation between class and the level of gender equality in the division of unpaid work recently observed in Russia. This study also further develops the analytical concept of ‘gender contract’, suggesting that it could serve as terms of *both* gender and class accountability.

By empirically showing why and how unpaid work in Russian (aspiring) middle-class couples gets redistributed, this study also argues that the narrowing of the gender gap in unpaid work among higher classes may not necessarily be a sign of increasing gender egalitarianism.

First, in highly unequal and marketised societies like contemporary Russia, where unpaid work has much lower value than paid work (Utrata, 2011, 2015), a more equal gender division in housework could be an intermediate strategy used by those who, due to their class position/aspirations, perceive it as a source of respectability, but are not (yet) able to outsource. Second, it shows that a narrow conceptualization of unpaid work may prevent us from seeing how gender inequality could morph, depending on a couple's class (aspirations). Taking into consideration that different types of unpaid work have different symbolic value in class production (Collins, 1992), other types of unpaid work, e.g., women's aesthetic labour, may be considered as relatively more important than their ability to perform housework, and time for the former could be secured at the expense of the latter.

### **5.3 Back to 'traditional' family values? Trends in gender ideologies in Russia, 1994-2012** **[Study 3]**

#### ***5.3.1 Rationale & research questions***

Studies of individual-level gender ideologies in Russia provide a contradictory picture of changes. Some allege re-traditionalisation (e.g. Klüsener et al., 2019; Kosova, 2018; Nechaeva, 2017), while others note increasing egalitarianism, at the same time recognizing the persistence of the socialist ideological legacy, whereby joint breadwinning is prized, yet women are still considered primarily responsible for care- and domestic work (e.g. Ashwin & Isupova, 2018; Gurko, 2019; White, 2005). Some researchers have also suggested that the dominant attitudes and preferred modes of gender division in labour may increasingly differ between classes (Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002; Zdravomyslova & Temkina, 2007) and across generations (Gurko 2019; Klüsener et al. 2019; White 2005).

My goal in this paper is to address this gap by further testing the argument about the alleged re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies among the Russian population. To this end, I provide a quantitative analysis of changes in Russian women's and men's views regarding the ideal way to divide care work and breadwinning in the early post-socialist period (1994-2002) and during the subsequent decade (2002-2012), drawing on three waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles (ISSP Research Group 2016). In contrast to previous quantitative studies on the topic, rather than relying on a unidimensional traditional vs. egalitarian conceptualization of gender ideology, I analyse three ideological orientations: (1) separate spheres, (2) egalitarian, and (3) 'traditional (double burden)', with the latter capturing combined beliefs in joint breadwinning and women's primary responsibility for unpaid care- and domestic work. I also focus on the effects of education and income on gender ideologies, as well as on the ideological variations across different generations. I use multinomial logistic regression as my method of analysis. This article addresses the following research

questions: To what extent can one speak about the re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies in Russia in the 2000s? Whether and how have the effects of gender and class as their determinants changed over time? Could Russian millennials be considered more traditionalist than the previous generations?

### **5.3.2 Findings**

In the 2000s one could, indeed, observe a sort of re-traditionalisation of attitudes towards the gender division of labour. However, the processes were very class specific. Furthermore, this re-traditionalisation did not primarily entail the strengthening of the ‘separate spheres’ ideology — as is usually implied in the quantitative studies relying on the unidimensional framework (Klüsener et al. 2019; Kosova 2018; Nechaeva 2017). Among highly educated and affluent women and men, we witnessed a continuing increase in support for the ‘traditional (double burden)’ ideology, combined with the complete abandonment of the separate sphere ideal. Both trends, however, were already visible in the 1990s. What was different in the 2000s was the substantially decreased likelihood of support for egalitarianism among this class. Among lower-class women and men, attitudes were more stable in the period I studied, although the appeal of separate spheres to this class was on a slightly upward trend in both decades.

The trends among men and women with comparable levels of education and income were rather similar; based on this data, therefore, it is not possible to speak about gender convergence or divergence, as suggested by other studies (Gurko 2019; Nechaeva 2017). However, women from the higher classes remain by far the strongest supporters of egalitarianism in Russia (cf. Fodor & Balogh 2010).

Generational differences in the likelihood of support for each of the ideologies were minor. Slightly higher support for separate spheres in comparison with previous generations (pointed out in previous studies Klüsener et al. 2019) was observed only among millennial men.

### **5.3.3 Contribution**

First, the study proposes an innovative approach to the conceptualisation of gender ideology in a post-socialist context. Moving beyond the traditional vs. egalitarian conceptualisation, I argue that it is essential to include a third type of gender ideology in the analysis. Being partly the result of the socialist ideological legacy, this ideology represents a combination of beliefs in joint breadwinning with gender-essentialising views on women’s caring roles, and could be dubbed ‘traditional (double burden)’.

Second, I provide the first quantitative test of the argument concerning the potentially increased role of class as a determinant of gender ideologies in Russia. I demonstrate that the likelihood of endorsing a particular gender ideology, and, in particular, the change in this likelihood over the post-socialist period, have been related to class.

Finally, my study is also the first to highlight how gender and generation intersect as determinants of Russians' gender ideologies. It highlights the gender-specificity of the recent argument about greater gender traditionalism among Russian millennials.

## 6. Conclusions

The overall research objective of this thesis was to investigate whether and how class — in both a structural/material and a cultural sense — has shaped gender inequalities in the division of unpaid work in the context of post-socialist transformations. The three papers comprising this thesis addressed separate sets of research questions. In Section 5, I have already discussed findings and contributions of the individual papers. Below, I point out crosscutting themes that have emerged from these studies and discuss the overall contributions of this thesis, its limitations, and delineate areas where further research is needed. I conclude with some remarks regarding the practical application of my findings.

### 6.1 Overarching findings and contributions

This is the first study to systematically analyse changes in practices and ideologies of the gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist contexts from a class perspective. Although the emergence of intensive motherhood, involved fatherhood, and the outsourcing of domestic- and care work in post-socialist countries has already begun to be analysed through a class lens (e.g. Cheresheva, 2019; Lipasova, 2016; Rotkirch et al., 2012; Shpakovskaya, 2015; Slezakova, 2019), this research is the first to focus on the relation between intra-family *gender inequality* in the division of unpaid work and class. It is also the first study to comparatively analyse the trends over two decades of post-socialist transformations, thus filling an important empirical gap that emerged due to lack of research on the topic in the 2000s (Klenner & Leiber, 2010).

The key overarching findings of the three studies directly related to the overall objective of this thesis can be summarised as follows:

- In the contemporary post-socialist Eastern European countries analysed in this thesis, class has shaped practices and ideologies of the gender division of unpaid work.
- Currently,<sup>22</sup> higher education has significant positive effect on gender equality in the division of domestic labour across most of the countries analysed (except Slovenia), and its effect has significantly increased over the post-socialist period in most of the countries analysed (except Slovenia and Russia; in the latter case, however, it was already significant in 1994). Household income, on the contrary, currently has a comparable positive effect only in Russia. In the other countries analysed, a positive income gradient was observed only in 2002 (**Study 1**).
- Among the countries analysed, Russia has the largest overall class gradient in the level of gender inequality in the division of domestic labour, with less educated and less affluent

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<sup>22</sup> It should, of course, be recognized that I refer here to the most recent data points in my empirical studies, i.e., 2012 in **Study 1** and **3**, and 2017 in **Study 3**.

families having a significantly greater gender-unequal division of domestic labour (**Study 1**).

- In Russia, the likelihood of endorsing gender egalitarianism is strongly associated with gender and class, with highly educated and affluent women by far the strongest supporters of this ideology currently (**Study 3**).
- Looking beyond the individual level of gender ideology, the positive association between class and the level of gender equality in the division of unpaid work in Russia might be explained by two related factors operating at the macro- and interactional level of intersecting gender and class social structures. At the macro, cultural level, one observes a strong association between specific gender contracts evolved in the post-socialist period ('working mother', 'career woman', 'housewife/male breadwinner') and lower-, middle- and upper-class positions, respectively. Drawing on this macro-level frame, at the interactional level, when negotiating about and actually performing unpaid work, women and men keep each other accountable not only to a sex category, but also to actual or aspired class category. In the case of my middle-class interviewees from Saint Petersburg, this double gender-and-class accountability meant that men were accountable not only as breadwinners, but also as carers, while women were accountable for their careers and sex appeal, in addition to their caring roles (**Study 2**).
- Finally, the *trajectories* of change in both practices and ideologies of the gender division of unpaid work across different classes have been idiosyncratic. 'Re-traditionalisation' has been a very class-specific story. Across the countries analysed in **Study 1** (except Russia), a predicted initial increase in gender inequality in the division of domestic labour during the 1990s, followed by a decrease in the subsequent decade, was a much more typical trajectory for lower-class households than for the rest. Analysis of ideological changes in Russia between 1994 and 2012 (**Study 3**) has also shown that while the housewife/male breadwinner model has gained some support among lower classes, for middle classes, 're-traditionalisation' has rather entailed an abandonment of the Western-middle-class-inspired desire for separate spheres (very common for this class in 1994). Instead, the Russian middle classes have recently overwhelmingly re-embraced 'traditional (double burden)' ideology, i.e., a combination of beliefs in shared breadwinning, with gender essentialist views of women's caring roles.

Along with filling these empirical gaps, this study also makes five theoretical contributions to post-socialist sociological scholarship on family gender relations, and to broader sociological literature concerned with changing class and family gender relations.

First, it asserts the importance of introducing class as an analytical category for studying intra-family gender relations in post-socialist contexts. Currently, most sociologists in the region

are either dismissive of class as an analytic category (see Ost, 2015b), or would argue — as the famous Russian stratification scholar Natalia Tikhonova (2020a, p. 26) recently did — that:

For now, we're only dealing with forming classes, in which class belonging is intuitively sensed rather than is being reflected upon. Only very gradually will these [classes] transform from 'classes in themselves' to 'classes for themselves'. At the same time, their increasing social reproduction will soon make the specifics not only of their position — but also of their worldviews, identities, interests and behavioural patterns stemming from the above — much more visible. And it is at the moment that the class model of analysis will become an optimal instrument for studying the social structure of Russian society.

However, as Temkina and Rotkirch (2002) predicted twenty years ago, and as the results of my research clearly indicate, when it comes to intra-family gender relations, class differences in worldviews, identities, and behavioural patterns have already become empirically palpable in the analysed post-socialist countries. So it is time to bring class squarely into post-socialist family and gender sociology.

Second, this study demonstrates the importance of using both cultural and structural/material approaches to class in conjunction with one another (Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005). On the one hand, my findings clearly provide further support to the scholarship foregrounding the cultural approach to understanding gender inequality in the division of unpaid work in post-socialist contexts (Ashwin & Isupova, 2018; Rudd, 2000). By showing the relatively greater importance of education (vs. household income) in structuring gender inequality in the division of domestic labour (**Study 1**), by highlighting how gender contracts have become profoundly classed in the public imaginary, and how this structures interactional-level accountability in negotiations about the division of unpaid work (**Study 2**), and, finally, by demonstrating how highly class-specific patterns of change in gender ideologies have been (**Study 3**), I show how thinking class from a cultural perspective is essential for making sense of change in intra-family gender relations in the countries analysed. On the other hand, my findings also show the importance of accounting for the materiality of evolving post-socialist class relations and related opportunities and constraints that families living in these contexts experience on a daily basis. In Russia, at least, such structural/material factors as household income and outsourcing play a fairly significant role in structuring gender inequality in this domain (**Study 1 & 2**). Furthermore, by showing the distinctive effects of household income and education on gender inequality in the division of domestic labour (**Study 1**), this study also contributes to the literature on the incongruence of class dimensions in post-socialist contexts (Dimova, 2010; Tikhonova, 2020b).

The third contribution of this thesis consists in the fact that it critically assesses the role of the emerging post-socialist middle class as an agent of change in intra-family gender relations. Echoing the findings of sociologists working in other post-socialist countries (Cheresheva, 2019;

Csurgó & Kristóf, 2018; Dimova, 2010; Slezakova, 2019), my findings show that for the contemporary Russian middle class, gender and family relations are also becoming an arena for constructing class distinction. However, while in the West middle classes have often been portrayed as pioneers of a more gender-egalitarian division of unpaid work (e.g., Esping-Andersen, 2009; Evertsson et al., 2009; Sayer et al., 2004; Sullivan, 2010; Sullivan, Billari, & Altintas, 2014), my findings from the contemporary Russian context suggest a more complex picture of the normative orientations and practices of the post-socialist emerging middle class in this domain. On the one hand, as I discovered, some Russian middle-class women and men do, indeed, construct class distinction through the endorsement of gender-egalitarian norms and practices within their families (**Study 2 & 3**). This finding contributes further evidence to the recently advanced argument that egalitarian relationships can serve as moral claims to middle-class status and to being modern in contexts that are otherwise not characterised by the prevalence of egalitarian gender norms at the macro level (see Cheresheva, 2019; Csurgó & Kristóf, 2018; Dimova, 2010 specifically on post-socialist countries; Deutsch, Gaunt, & Richards, 2020). At the same time, as I also show in **Study 2**, the relatively equal division of domestic and care work in Russian middle-class families may not necessarily be a sign of gender egalitarianism. In many cases, it does not represent a normative ideal, but is rather an intermediate strategy until outsourcing becomes financially tenable. Alternatively, unpaid work may get redistributed in order to ‘free up’ time for middle-class women’s aesthetic labour. In highly unequal and marketised societies like contemporary Russia, where unpaid work has a much lower value than paid work (Utrata, 2011, 2015), where women’s appearance serves as an important class marker (Porteous, 2017), where governments promote neo-conservative family and gender policies, and feminist discourse still occupies a fairly marginal place at the macro cultural level (Bluhm et al., 2021), the seemingly gender-equal division of unpaid work among middle-class families should only cautiously be interpreted as a sign of their relatively greater gender egalitarianism. Whether my findings can be extrapolated to the middle classes in Western contexts remains a question for future empirical investigation.

Fourth, this thesis responds to the call to further elaborate cultural frameworks for explaining variations in the gender division of unpaid work across classes (Geist & Ruppner, 2018; Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005; Sullivan, 2010). Building on the theories of ‘doing gender’ (West & Zimmerman, 2009; West & Zimmermann, 1987) and ‘doing class’ (West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002), I theorised in **Study 3** a mechanism of *double accountability* to sex and class categories that organised the ways my Russian interviewees negotiated and actually performed unpaid work within their families. Recognising the crucial role that the post-socialist context played in structuring the ways my interviewees did gender and class (for a similar argument, see Cheresheva, 2019), I also proposed a further elaboration of the concept of the gender contract (Hirdman, 1996; Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002) which I dubbed

‘classed gender contract’. As I have suggested, this concept analytically captures contextually specific terms for *both* gender- and class accountability operating at the macro, cultural level.

Finally, this thesis reveals further limitations of the post-socialist ‘re-traditionalisation’ thesis (e.g. Bluhm et al., 2021; Watson, 1993). In particular, by highlighting the idiosyncratic trajectories of change — in both practices (**Study 1**) and ideologies (**Study 3**) of the gender division of unpaid work — across different classes in several post-socialist countries, it provides further support for the argument of the pertinence of the class lens for understanding the phenomenon of post-socialist ‘re-traditionalisation’ (e.g. Kalb, 2018). Furthermore (although not directly related to the main objective), this thesis also provides an empirically-grounded critique of the unidimensional — traditional vs. modern — conceptualisation of gender ideology (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Although this conceptual framework still dominates empirical studies testing the post-socialist ‘re-traditionalisation’ thesis, I argue that it is too simplistic for making sense of intra-family gender relations in post-socialist contexts, given their ideological legacy of the ‘working mother’ gender contract. I propose a new measure that is able to capture a combination of beliefs in joint breadwinning with gender-essentialising views on women’s caring roles that are characteristic of the majority of the population in contemporary Russia (and most post-socialist countries<sup>23</sup>). In this way, my thesis also contributes to newly emerging literature on the multidimensionality of gender ideologies (Grunow et al., 2018; Scarborough et al., 2019). The experience of post-socialist countries shows with unparalleled clarity the limitations of the unidimensional framework.

## 6.2 Limitations and further research needed

While this research fills important gaps in existing knowledge about class and intra-family gender relations in post-socialist contexts and beyond, it also has inevitable limitations. I discuss them below and suggest some of the ways they might be overcome in future research. It should be noted, however, that I do not repeat the study-specific points that the publications already contain; rather, I focus on broader theoretical and conceptual issues pertaining to the whole thesis.

The impact of increasing economic inequalities and growing class divides on families can be analysed at various levels: from changes in the prevalence of different family forms across different classes, to an analysis of class-specific changes in gendered practices and ideologies (Cooper & Pugh, 2020; Furstenberg, 2019). In this thesis, I focus only on the latter, and, moreover, centre my analysis on one specific family form: dual-earner mixed sex couples. Recent research in Western countries, however, shows that the family structure itself is becoming an increasingly important dimension of stratification (Carlson, 2018; Cooper & Pugh, 2020; Furstenberg, 2019; Hook, 2015). These emerging ‘social-class disparities in family systems’

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<sup>23</sup> Based on author’s calculations using ISSP data

(Furstenberg, 2019, p.333) are likely to be found in the post-socialist context, as well. In Russia, at least (for which I was able to identify relevant data), similar to the US, divorce rates are at present unevenly distributed across the class spectrum. The highly educated in Russia have a significantly lower risk of divorce (Karabchuk, 2017). And it is reasonable to assume that the dual-earner family form is also, correspondingly, more prevalent among more educated classes. Further research focusing on potential class differences in family forms is necessary to establish a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts of growing inequality on intra-family relations in post-socialist contexts.

Another limitation of this research is related to my almost exclusive analytical focus on class differentiation. While my focus was justified by the fact that the processes of class formation are still ongoing in post-socialist societies (as discussed in Section 3.2), this has clearly come at the expense of an analysis of how the practices and ideologies of the gender division of labour I have identified impact the reproduction of classes and class inequalities. Future research should focus on questions of whether the relatively egalitarian domestic practices and norms of the emerging middle classes trickle down; whether these practices and norms lead to relatively greater stability of middle-class marriages and greater investments in children in these families; and whether this eventually solidifies the still very fluid and shifting post-socialist class structures and inequalities. Furthermore, it will be important to explore the power relations that underlie the stratification of families in terms of their patterns of gender division of unpaid work, which I have identified in this thesis. Are the new middle-class families practicing gender equality while exploiting others, such as low-paid migrant women workers, to reach this end?

Furthermore, although the choice to foreground the cultural perspective in examining the relations between the gender division of unpaid work and class was deliberate and theoretically driven (Ashwin & Isupova, 2018; Hofäcker et al., 2013; Riebling et al., 2016), as I argued in Section 3, I recognise that the potential role of such structural/material factors as social and family policies in shaping those relations in the countries analysed remain underexplored as a result of that analytical choice. Building on recent findings by Lightman and Kevins (n.d.) from 29 European countries about the positive effect of family policy expenditure on gender equality in the division of housework, especially among lower income households, it would, for example, be relevant to explore in more depth the findings of my **Study 1** about the increased and subsequently decreased effect of household income on the gender division of housework in the first vs. second post-socialist decade across all the countries analysed except Russia. Given the role of migration policies and their structuring effects on outsourcing opportunities (Estevez-Abe, 2015), future research on class differences in practices and ideologies of the gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist families should also account for those macro-level factors.

One more limitation of this thesis stems from my conceptualisation of unpaid work. I did not explicitly include ‘kin work’ — ‘the unpaid work that relatives do to care for one another’

(Gerstel & Sarkisian, 2005; Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020, p. 429) — in my analysis. Kin work is still rarely included in sociological analyses concerned with the gender division of unpaid work, which much more commonly focus on housework and childcare (Perry-Jenkins & Gerstel, 2020). My quantitative data would not allow me to include it, either. However, as the results of my **Study 2** clearly suggest, class accountability also shapes the extended family's (especially grandparents') participation in domestic and care work. Given the importance of kin work in post-socialist contexts (e.g. Utrata, 2015), in particular that provided by grandparents, future research should more explicitly focus on its classed dimensions.

Finally, several limitations related to my research design and data should also be noted. First, I recognise that this PhD would have further benefitted from an additional qualitative study with less educated and less affluent couples. This would provide a more in-depth understanding of the class disparities in the practices and ideologies identified in the quantitative studies. As I discussed in the methodology section, recruiting this sample was unfortunately unfeasible at the time of my fieldwork. But, echoing Cooper and Pugh (2020, p.290), I would reiterate that 'future research should prioritize approaches that place heterogeneity front and centre as a way to discern the contours of growing inequalities [and] their impacts'.

Second, due to the non-longitudinal nature of my data, it was beyond the scope of this thesis to approach the research question from a life-course perspective (Huinink & Feldhaus, 2009). Given recent findings on the impact on families of such dynamic class-related processes as income volatility and income insecurity (Cooper & Pugh, 2020), it is important for future research to examine how class can (re-)shape the gender division of unpaid work over the life course of the family.

Third, it is important to further explore the *relationship* between practices and ideologies in the gender division of unpaid work at the level of individual couples, and its variation across classes. As empirical research in Russia and the former GDR has shown, this relationship can be rather contradictory, with people's attitudes towards the gender division of labour within families generally appearing more traditional than their actual practices (Lyon, 2007; Roehler & Huinink, 2010).

Fourth, given that the final data point in **Study 1** and **Study 3** is 2012, this research may have underestimated the implications of the 'second wave of re-traditionalisation' that rolled out in Eastern Europe in the later 2000s-2010s (Bluhm et al., 2021). As I also point out in **Study 3**, once the next wave of ISSP on Changing Family and Gender Roles becomes available after 2022, the findings of this thesis could be further qualified.

Finally, as already discussed in Section 4, there are two further limitations that may in part be attributed to my own positionality. First, my exclusive focus on Russia in two out of three papers also represents a limitation. Conducting similar studies in post-socialist countries other than Russia will be a priority for further testing and elaborating the arguments posited in this

thesis. Second, future projects exploring the intersections of class and intra-family gender relations in post-socialist contexts should include ‘race’/ethnicity as an analytical dimension.

### 6.3 Concluding thoughts and practical implications

I admit that this research was not initially conceived as a piece of applied research. Having worked in applied research for several years before, and, intermittently, while working on this PhD, it was rather my theoretical curiosity that drew me into this research in the first place. I wanted to understand how and why class and gender relations in my home country have become entangled in such peculiar ways. As I was working on this thesis and presenting my work to various audiences, however, I have come to better realise its practical application.

First, this knowledge-building exercise will hopefully help feminist activists campaigning on women’s rights and gender equality of families in Eastern Europe. By drawing on practically unutilised quantitative data on gender division in unpaid work covering nearly two decades of post-socialist transformations, and by providing an analysis of changing gendered and classed interests in this domain, my research could help advance feminist causes. Feminist political actors in the post-socialist region are clearly in need of stronger gender-stratification research for their advocacy work (Law & Sikora, 2018). Second, based on my experience of presenting this research to feminist psychotherapists in Russia,<sup>24</sup> I also believe that the results of this research will be of use for this professional group, and, possibly, in other post-socialist countries, as well. Class is a category that only relatively recently has begun to be discussed by psychologists in the West (e.g. Kraus, Park, & Tan, 2017; Kraus & Stephens, 2012), and the debate has not yet reached post-socialist countries.<sup>25</sup> But as my findings show, the lens of class is essential for understanding both the actual structural/material factors shaping the intra-family gender division of labour in post-socialist contexts, and the way women and men make sense of the resulting inequalities permeating their everyday lives. In my post-thesis professional life — which will begin after I finish this sentence — it is this applied feminist work that I hope to engage in further.

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<sup>24</sup> In November 2019, I participated in a podcast *Women Speak* produced by a Saint-Petersburg-based feminist psychotherapist Margarita Spasskaya where, among other things, I discussed the results of my PhD research.

<https://soundcloud.com/femtalksonline/mental-load-polnava-zagruzka>

<sup>25</sup> Based on the author’s personal discussions with, and a series of posts by, Russian feminist psychotherapists, e.g. <https://www.facebook.com/MargaritaSpasskaya/posts/10158160756083828>

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## **Publications**<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Texts of the publications are presented in the format they have been published in the indicated journals. Citation styles, font, and spelling may, therefore, differ from the ones used in the main text of the thesis.



**Study 1: Gender division of domestic labour in post-socialist Europe (1994–2012):  
Test of class gradients hypothesis**

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Article

## Gender Division of Domestic Labor in Post-Socialist Europe (1994–2012): Test of Class Gradients Hypothesis

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### Abstract

This article analyzes changes in the gender division of domestic labor (GDDL) in post-socialist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), an under-researched region characterized by high levels of inequality in GDDL from 1994–2012. Drawing on the literature on class gradients in the contribution of the genders to domestic labor and their change over time, the article answers two questions: How has GDDL (operationalized as men’s relative involvement into routine housework) changed in CEE in the post-socialist period? What has been the role of class (operationalized as respondents’ education and household income) in shaping GDDL in CEE in the post-socialist period? Data for the article comes from the 1994, 2002, and 2012 waves of the International Social Survey Program on Family and Changing Gender Roles from six CEE countries, i.e., Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia. The findings suggest that net of individual and interactional-level factors, inequality in GDDL in the CEE region did not change substantially during the post-socialist period. The analysis also shows, however, that trends of inequality in GDDL among different classes were idiosyncratic, and this underlay the overall lack of movement towards greater equality.

### Keywords

CEE; domestic labor; gender inequality; housework; post-socialism

### Issue

This article is part of the issue “Division of Labour within Families, Work–Life Conflict and Family Policy” edited by Michael Ochsner (FORS Lausanne, Switzerland), Ivett Szalma (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, Hungary/Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary) and Judit Takács (Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence, Hungary/KWI Essen, Germany).

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### 1. Introduction

Domestic labor remains unequally divided between women and men in mixed-sex households in all countries in Europe, further perpetuating gender inequality in access to paid work, political representation, and leisure (Beneria, Berik, & Floro, 2015). Certain regions and countries, however, are particularly notorious for high inequality in the gender division of domestic labor (GDDL) but have received comparatively little attention from researchers. The study focuses on one of such regions, i.e., Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).

In several recent cross-sectional comparative studies on GDDL, CEE comes up as a special case because,

when considering net of individual and couple-level characteristics, there appears to be more “severe domestic inequality” in that region (Aboim, 2010, p. 197) than in Western Europe that such comparisons usually include (Aassve, Fuochi, & Mencarini, 2014; Aboim, 2010; Treas & Tai, 2012). What remains unclear, however, is the development of this phenomenon over time (Klenner & Leiber, 2010). Some studies have recently analyzed changes in GDDL (Altintas & Sullivan, 2016; Geist & Cohen, 2011; Hook, 2006, 2010), but trends in CEE countries have not been specifically considered in any of them. Has the stalled socialist gender revolution (Lapidus, 1978) persisted in the post-socialist period? Or has there been a move towards greater equality in

GDDL, as suggested by aggregate level analyses that have focused on the first post-socialist decade (Crompton, Brockmann, & Lyonette, 2005; Saxonberg, 2014)? Or, rather, has there been a neo-traditionalist turn, as predicted by some commentators (Watson, 1993)? This is the first set of questions motivating this study.

Focusing on GDDL in the CEE region also has an important theoretical implication. Studies on individual- and interactional-level determinants of GDDL demonstrate that models applied to Western countries often have a significantly poorer fit in the CEE (Fuwa, 2004; Mikucka, 2009). For example, such factors of GDDL as time availability and gender role attitudes have been shown to have low explanatory potential in the region (Fuwa, 2004; Mikucka, 2009). Currently evolving research on class gradients (education—and income-related) in men's and women's contribution to domestic labor (Gupta, Evertsson, Grunow, Nermo, & Sayer, 2010; Heisig, 2011; Schneider & Hastings, 2017), and their change over time (see, for example, the changing differences approach in Sullivan, 2010) could provide an additional explanatory perspective relevant for CEE. With its experience of unprecedented growth of economic and social inequalities in the post-socialist period (see Table 1 in the Supplementary File), CEE provides a valuable case for further testing of these theories. In this article, I draw on and aim to contribute to this emerging literature.

To summarize, this article aims to answer the following questions: How has GDDL changed in CEE in the post-socialist period? What has been the role of class in shaping GDDL in CEE in the post-socialist period?

In the next section, I provide an overview of the theories of GDDL. This is followed by a discussion of what we know so far in this respect about changes in CEE. I then discuss the methodology of this study. The following section presents the results of the analysis by first focusing on the regional trends of inequality in GDDL and then on the country-specific ones. The findings suggest that net of individual and interactional-level factors, inequality in GDDL in the CEE region did not change substantially in the post-socialist period. The analysis also shows, however, that trends of inequality in GDDL among different classes were idiosyncratic, and this underlay the overall lack of movement towards greater equality.

## 2. Theoretical Background

### 2.1. Routine Housework as a Cornerstone of Inequality in GDDL

In this study, I analyze GDDL through the lens of gender division of routine housework. Routine housework remains strongly 'feminine-defined' across countries, with women spending most of their domestic labor time on this type of tasks, while men continue focusing on less mundane and time-consuming 'masculine' non-routine housework, such as DYI, garden work, etc. (Kan, Sullivan, & Gershuny, 2011). This segregation of domestic tasks

has been shown to represent the key barrier to further gender convergence in time use and improvements in gender equality in the domestic sphere (Kan et al., 2011).

Changes in GDDL are best investigated with the help of time-use diaries and time-use surveys (Sullivan, Gershuny, & Robinson, 2018). In the absence of time-use data (which is the case in the 1994 wave of ISSP), changes in men's relative involvement in routine housework tasks, however, could serve as a good indicator of changes in inequality in GDDL (Crompton et al., 2005).

### 2.2. Theorizing Inequality in GDDL

Most of the research on GDDL to date has been cross-sectional and focused on four key individual- and interactional-level explanations (Davis & Wills, 2014; Drobnič & Ruppanner, 2015). First, gender ideology acquired through socialization has been shown to influence GDDL, with men and women that hold more egalitarian gender-role attitudes distributing domestic labor more equally (Aassve et al., 2014; Aboim, 2010). Second, several studies have suggested that partners divide domestic labor according to the time they have available from their work outside the household (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Davis & Greenstein, 2004). Third, partners' relative resources (e.g., income) have been shown to play a role in bargaining about the performance of housework, i.e., the greater the relative advantage of a partner is, the less time he or she would spend on such work (Bianchi et al., 2000; Evertsson & Nermo, 2007). Finally, the performance of domestic labor has been theorized as a way of 'doing gender' (Bittman, England, Sayer, Folbre, & Matheson, 2003; West & Zimmermann, 1987). No real consensus in the literature, however, has emerged regarding the relative explanatory potential of these theories (Bianchi & Milkie, 2010). In the CEE context, as indicated above, these theories appear to have quite low explanatory power (Fuwa, 2004; Mikucka, 2009).

A relatively more recent stream of research on GDDL has focused on so-called class gradients (education- and income-related) in men's and women's contribution to domestic labor. Higher levels of education have been shown to be associated with more egalitarian GDDL (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Hook, 2010). The effects are usually interpreted in terms of more egalitarian attitudes, values, and ideologies of higher-educated men and women. Differences in the time spent on domestic labor by women and men from lower and higher-income households are explained mainly by differing outsourcing opportunities and differing access to time-saving technology (Gershuny, 2000; Gupta et al., 2010; Heisig, 2011; Schneider & Hastings, 2017). These studies have primarily analyzed class gradients in housework hours among women rather than differences in GDDL across classes.

Research on changes in GDDL over time has also focused on class gradients in the performance of domestic labor. Sullivan has introduced the term "changing

differences” to refer to “different changes over time in the contributions to family work of those from different socio-economic and demographic subgroups of the population” (Sullivan, 2010, p. 716). In this article, following Sullivan, I will conceptualize the changing role of class in shaping GDDL as changing differences in GDDL by respondents’ education and household income.

In her study, Sullivan (2010) analyzed changing differences in men’s contribution to domestic labor and childcare by men’s education. She demonstrated that, in the UK and US, over time, lower-educated men caught up with higher-educated men in terms of their contribution to domestic labor. Sullivan interpreted changing differences in differently-educated men’s contribution to domestic labor as empirical confirmation of Bourdieu’s account of behavioral social changes as originating in the upper strata of society and over time trickling down the socio-economic spectrum (Bourdieu as cited in Sullivan, 2010).

In contrast to changes in education-related differences, assessing the changing differences in GDDL by household income seems to have been neglected. Drawing on the cross-national and cross-sectional studies reviewed above, it is reasonable to assume that the effect of household income on GDDL could be interpreted in terms of the differing outsourcing opportunities, as well as differing access to time-saving technology for households with different incomes. The levels of overall economic development (Gershuny, 2000) and economic inequality (Heisig, 2011; Schneider & Hastings, 2017) have been shown to moderate those relationships. Significant changes in these macro-level parameters could, thus, be expected to lead to changing differences in men’s and women’s contribution to domestic labor by household income.

Notably, the studies focusing on class gradients in the division of domestic labor and their variations across contexts and time so far have not focused on CEE. With its experience of rapid economic transformation and acute growth of economic and social inequalities in the last 30 years (for an overview of socio-economic trends in CEE, see Table 1 in the Supplementary File), the region represents a good case for this type of analysis.

### 3. Regional Context and Hypotheses

#### 3.1. GDDL in Post-Socialist CEE

The problem of women’s double burden of paid and unpaid work is well-documented in the literature on state-socialist countries (Einhorn, 1993; Gal & Kligman, 2000; Saxonberg, 2014). Although CEE socialist states achieved significant levels of socialization of care (especially, in comparison with their Western neighbors), domestic labor mostly remained a remit of families, and primarily of women within them.

In the first post-socialist decade, a predominant view established in the literature was that unequal GDDL had

persisted or even worsened during the market transition. This increased inequality was attributed to certain macro-level changes in the region, such as women’s mass withdrawal from the labor market, increasing job demands on those women who did not withdraw, and the state’s retrenchment from the provision of care services and social benefits that took place during the 1990s (Ashwin, 2006; Pine, 2002; Pollert, 2003). Among the analyzed countries, the above trends were most visible in Russia (which also experienced the largest recession in that period), and least in Slovenia (see Table 1 in the Supplementary File). Some scholars also argued that calls for ‘re-traditionalization’ coming from the new political leaders could have impacted gender attitudes and gender relations and led to more unequal GDDL (Nikolic-Ristanovic, 2002; Takács, 2013; Watson, 1993). This assumption about increased gender inequalities in the domestic sphere, however, has been underexplored in a comparative quantitative manner.

In the 2000s, there was hardly any research on GDDL in CEE (Klenner & Leiber, 2010). We know, however, that some of the negative macro-level trends that were thought to underpin the increase of inequality in GDDL in the first post-socialist decade significantly slowed or even reversed (see Table 1 in the Supplementary File). Women’s participation in the labor force, public spending on family benefits, and the percentage of children enrolled in pre-school institutions in 2012 were higher than in 2002 in nearly all of the analyzed countries. The Gender Inequality Index shows that, in the 2000s, at least in Russia and Bulgaria, a move towards lower macro-level gender inequality, which has been shown to be related to more equal GDDL (Fuwa, 2004), also accelerated. It is reasonable to assume that all these changes combined with the relatively increased prosperity of the households could have alleviated the burden of domestic labor for CEE households and reduced the extent of gender inequality in its division. This leads me to hypothesis 1:

Net of individual and interactional-level factors, inequality in GDDL in CEE increased during the first post-socialist decade and subsequently decreased during the 2000s.

#### 3.2. Class Divisions in Post-Socialist CEE and Domestic Labor

There is almost no research on the role of education concerning domestic labor in the socialist period. We do know, however, that the ideology of *kulturnost* (‘culturedness’), a principal marker of educated class habitus under socialism (Salmeniemäki, 2012), encompassed a set of values and practices, including patterns of consumption, personal hygiene, etc., which could have impacted volumes of domestic labor and its division. In one Polish study from the 1970s, partners’ education was, indeed, shown to be an important factor of men’s contribution to

domestic labor, and couples with higher education had the most egalitarian GDDL (Lobodzinska, 1977).

Whether education has remained a factor of GDDL in the post-socialist period has not been researched so far. However, a study on attitudinal change in Russia has suggested that educational differences in preferences for male breadwinner/female caregiver model increased during the post-socialist period, with highly educated being increasingly less likely to endorse this model than lower educated (Motiejunaite & Kravchenko, 2008). It is reasonable to assume that under the condition of increased social and economic inequalities the importance of education—as a source of social distinction—has likely increased also concerning actual GDDL.

In contrast to education, income was hardly an important factor of class difference in the socialist period due to highly compressed wage structures. In the post-socialist period, however, when countries of the region have witnessed an unprecedented growth of income inequality, income and economic capital, in general, have become important class markers (Gapova, 2002). While all the analyzed countries witnessed significant relative growth of economic inequality in the post-socialist period (see Table 1 in the Supplementary File), it is important to note that the increase was much more tangible in Russia, Bulgaria, and Poland.

The role of income in organizing and dividing unpaid work in post-socialist CEE has started being discussed in the literature only recently. In the early 2000s in Russia, household income was shown to be strongly associated both with the volume of domestic labor and the level of gender inequality in its division—poorer households did substantially more of their domestic work, and women in such households shouldered a greater relative share of it than women in the richer households (Balabanova, 2005). Studies on outsourcing of domestic labor and care among the new middle classes in Slovenia, Czechia and Russia (Humer & Hrznjak, 2015; Redlová, 2012; Rotkirch, Tkach, & Zdravomyslova, 2012) suggest that when domestic workers and nannies are hired, they take over the part of unpaid work carried out by women.

The above leads me to suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 2a: Over the post-socialist period, the positive effect of education on the level of equality in GDDL has increased.

Hypothesis 2b: Over the post-socialist period, the positive effect of household income on the level of equality in GDDL has increased.

#### 4. Method

Data for this article come from the 1994, 2002, and 2012 waves of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles. The ISSP is a unique repeated cross-sectional survey that allows an-

alyzing changes in GDDL in CEE over the period of interest. A total of six post-socialist European countries participated in all three waves, i.e., Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia.

I restricted the sample to those respondents who had a co-resident partner. Because partner's sex is not reported in ISSP, I treated all couples as mixed-sex. I further limited the age group to 18–65 (prime working age) and excluded those who reported that they or their partner were in education (because I could not reasonably control their workload outside the home) or had a permanent illness or disability (in such households distribution of domestic labor is likely to be strongly affected by the physical condition of the partner—but the number of such households was too small to draw any reliable conclusions about this specific group). Multiple Imputation procedure in SPSS 26 was used to estimate values for missing data, following best practices in the field of family research (Johnson & Young, 2011). Pooled across years and countries, the non-weighted analytical sample size was 11,730 (for country samples see Table 2 in the Supplementary File).

Following the approach used by Kunovich and Kunovich (2008), in the pooled regression, I applied external weights, the goal of which was to equalize the sample sizes across countries within each wave, so that each country would contribute equally to the estimation of slope coefficients. No weights were applied in the country-specific regressions.

#### 4.1. Dependent Variable

I used the index developed by Geist and Cohen (2011) to account for changes in the GDDL. The index is based on answers to three questions about routine daily tasks usually performed by women, i.e., laundry, cooking dinner, and shopping for groceries. Only these three questions were consistently included in all three waves analyzed. Respondents stated which partner and how frequently (always, usually, about equal) they performed the task or whether the task was outsourced/performed by a third person. Following Geist and Cohen (2011), I coded the answers as follows:

- -2 “task is always done by the woman”
- -1 “task is usually done by the woman”
- 0 “task is equally shared” OR “done by a third person/outsourced”
- 1 “task is usually done by the man”
- 2 “task is always done by the man”

I then added values for all three tasks. As a result, I obtained a measure of a degree of male relative involvement in routine housework with possible values ranging from minus 6 (*all tasks performed by the woman*) through 0 (*all tasks equally shared*) to plus 6 (*all tasks performed by the man*). Because in all the country-years, mean values of the index were below 0, in what follows,

I use men's relative involvement in routine housework and the level equality in GDDL as synonymous terms.

#### 4.2. Independent Variables and Controls

The first key variable of interest was the *survey year*. I used year dummies to analyze changes in the prevalence of couples with different patterns of GDDL over time.

Further key independent variables that should have captured the effects of class on GDDL were *household income* and *respondent's level of education*. Household income was measured as the bottom 20% vs. middle 60% vs. top 20% of the country-specific household-size equivalized income distribution (calculated by dividing household income as reported in ISSP by the square root of the household size). Respondent's level of education was measured as low vs. medium vs. high corresponding to ISCED 2011 categories 0–2, 3–4, and 5–6 respectively. Because the 1994 ISSP wave (for all countries) and the 2012 wave (for Russia and Bulgaria) did not include questions on the partner's level of education, I had to use the respondent's education as a proxy of the household's educational level. Where data on both partners' level of education was available, educational homogamy, however, was high (Spearman's coefficient was at least 0.5, but in most country-years exceeded 0.6).

In addition to the above variables, I also included in the models the measures of other individual—and interactional-level factors of GDDL reviewed in the theoretical section. Relative resources were measured by the *woman's share of income*. *Employment statuses of both partners* were used as measures of time availability. I differentiated between those working full-time, part-time, and not working for pay. Respondents who were employed full-time and whose partner also worked full-time were the reference category in the models. Respondent's *gender role attitudes* were captured with an index of gender egalitarianism (Treas & Tai, 2016) composed of answers to five questions about the level of the respondents' agreement with the following statements: 1) A pre-school child is likely to suffer if their mother works; 2) family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job; 3) what most women want is a home and children; 4) being a housewife is as fulfilling as working for pay; and 5) a man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family (Cronbach's alpha = 0.73). In the original survey, the answers to each question were given on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). Thus, the higher values of the index (which ranges from 5 to 25) indicate more gender-egalitarian attitudes.

I controlled for the sex and age of the respondent, as well as for the household size. Controlling for sex of the respondent allowed to account for potential differences in men's and women's reporting of the gap between their own and their partners' contributions to household labor (Lee & Waite, 2005). Information on the presence of children in the household was not available in the 1994 wave,

and, therefore, was not included. Age, age squared, and household size variables, however, should have captured the 'child' effect, at least, to some extent.

#### 4.3. Analytical Strategy

I estimated a series of OLS models. After analyzing the descriptive statistics, I pooled all three waves for all the countries together applying external weights (discussed above) and ran several OLS regressions. My decision to pool the countries together was theoretically driven by Pascall and Kwak's (2010) post-socialist gender regime approach that sees the CEE countries in a homogenized way. I regressed GDDL index on time variables (year dummies), class characteristics (respondent's education and household income dummies), interactions of class characteristics with time variables, and a set of control variables to account for compositional changes in the samples over time, as well as for alternative individual- and interactional-level explanations. In the last pooled model, I also included country dummies to control for potential national differences in the level of inequality in GDDL and for unobservable variables at the national level that could be correlated with IVs and control variables. Also, I ran country-specific regressions (see Tables 5 and 6 in the Supplementary File) to examine whether the effects of time, class, and other variables on GDDL differed substantially among the analyzed countries.

### 5. Results

#### 5.1. Descriptive Statistics

Regional descriptive statistics for the dependent variable are provided in Table 1 (for full regional and country-specific descriptive statistics see Tables 3 and 4 in the Supplementary File). At the regional level, one could observe an increase in men's relative involvement in the performance of routine housework tasks (GDDL index increasing) between 1994 and 2012. This finding is in line with the results of aggregate-level analyses for the 1994–2002 period discussed above (Crompton & Lyonette, 2007; Saxonberg, 2014).

Analysis of group-specific means of GDDL by respondent's education and household income, however, suggests that the patterns and trends of GDDL were different for these groups. While in less-educated households the level of men's relative involvement in routine housework appears to have remained unchanged between 1994 and 2012, in the highly-educated households—in which it was already substantially higher in 1994—it seems to have increased throughout that period, primarily between 1994 and 2002. The aggregate increase in equality in GDDL over the analyzed period, thus, appears to have been primarily driven by highly-educated households. Descriptive statistics also suggest that richer households had more equal GDDL than poorer ones al-

**Table 1.** Descriptive statistics, dependent variable, CEE Region (N = 11,730).

	Min	Max	1994		2002		2012	
			M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Index of GDDL	-6	6	-3.25 <sup>a</sup> [-3.30; -3.19]	1.83	-3.17 [-3.24; -3.10]	2.14	-3.07 [-3.14; -3.00]	2.16
• low educated	-6	6	-3.42 [-3.50; -3.34]	1.90	-3.52 [-3.63; -3.41]	2.14	-3.41 [-3.55; -3.27]	2.18
• highly educated	-6	6	-2.91 [-3.05; -2.77]	1.70	-2.62 [-2.79; -2.44]	2.19	-2.60 [-2.74; -2.46]	2.13
• poor/bottom income quintile	-6	6	-3.39 [-3.51; -3.27]	1.86	-3.61 [-3.76; -3.46]	2.06	-3.33 [-3.49; -3.17]	2.13
• rich/top income quintile	-6	6	-3.08 [-3.19; -2.96]	1.73	-2.80 [-2.95; -2.65]	2.10	-2.87 [-3.03; -2.71]	2.10

Notes: All values are weighted using a combination of external weights and post-stratification weights provided by the ISSP. <sup>a</sup> 95% confidence intervals for dependent variable in brackets.

ready in 1994. The income gradient of inequality in GDDL appears to have further significantly increased during the first post-socialist decade. While high-income households in that period managed to decrease inequality in GDDL, in low-income households the opposite appears to have occurred. By 2012, however, the income gradient appears to have narrowed again due to an increase in men’s relative involvement in routine housework in poorer households and, possibly, some decrease of such involvement in richer ones.

Descriptive statistics do not take into account significant compositional changes, such as education, employment, or breadwinning that can be related to GDDL. Only multivariate analysis, thus, could shed light on trends in GDDL net of individual- and interactional-level factors.

### 5.2. Determinants of GDDL, 1994–2012

Models 1–5 (Table 2) highlight the factors of GDDL at the regional level, with a specific focus on time and class effects. The models have relatively low  $R^2$ , which is in line with what has already been shown in the literature (Fuwa, 2004; Mikucka, 2009)—conventional individual- and interactional-level theories of GDDL have less explanatory power in the CEE region. It is important to note, however, that adding class variables and accounting for the changing effect of these variables over time through the use of interaction terms improves the model’s explanatory power.

Model 1 captures the aggregate change in the levels of inequality in GDDL at the regional level over time. In this model, I use only a basic set of controls (gender, age, age squared, and size of the household), and the results mirror the findings from the descriptive analysis. Men’s relative involvement in routine housework increased between 1994 and 2012. In Model 2, I introduce education and household income variables. Model 2 suggests that the level of education and the level of household income

have a significant positive effect on the level of equality in GDDL in the CEE region.

In Model 3, I add variables accounting for partners’ employment statuses, their relative incomes, and respondents’ gender ideology, which allow me to both account for alternative theoretical explanations and control for compositional changes in my sample over time. Importantly, the effects of education and household income in Model 3 only slightly diminish in comparison with Model 2. Model 3, contrary to Hypothesis 1, suggests that, controlling for individual- and interactional-level characteristics, there were no statistically significant changes in men’s relative involvement in routine housework during the 1990s and the 2000s.

In Model 4, in which I introduce the interactions of education and household income variables with time variables, however, a more complex picture of (the lack of) change emerges. Model 4 clearly shows that changes in GDDL were very class-specific. In line with Hypothesis 2a, the educational gradient, which had already been significant in 1994, significantly increased during the 1990s and remained at that level during the 2000s. Income gradient, which was insignificant in 1994, increased significantly by 2002 but disappeared again during the 2000s. Hypothesis 2b is thus confirmed for the 1994–2002 period but rejected for 2002–2012.

Model 4 also allows understanding which class processes underlay changes in the gradients. Education/income group-specific change is calculated by summing the end of the period year coefficient and that specific group-year interaction term (for a similar approach see Treas, Lui, & Gubernskaya, 2014). In the 1990s, all the other parameters kept constant, lower-educated households experienced a significant decrease in men’s relative involvement in routine housework, while higher-educated ones did not. During the 2000s, the persistence of the educational gradient was related to a different process. In that period, equality increased among all educa-

**Table 2.** Determinants of GDDL, CEE region, 1994–2012 (pooled data, OLS).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	$\beta$	(SE)	B	(SE)	$\beta$	(SE)	$\beta$	(SE)	$\beta$	(SE)
<i>Year (ref. category: 1994)</i>										
2002	0.07	(0.04)	0.05	(0.04)	0.02	(0.04)	-0.36***	(0.11)	-0.34**	(0.11)
2012	0.14**	(0.05)	0.07	(0.05)	0.03	(0.05)	-0.02	(0.12)	-0.02	(0.12)
<i>Education (ref. category: Low Education)</i>										
Medium Education			0.25***	(0.04)	0.21***	(0.04)	0.14*	(0.07)	0.14*	(0.07)
Higher Education			0.63***	(0.06)	0.53***	(0.06)	0.34***	(0.10)	0.34***	(0.10)
Medium Education*2002					0.20*	(0.10)	0.18 <sup>+</sup>	(0.10)	0.18 <sup>+</sup>	(0.10)
Higher Education*2002					0.27 <sup>+</sup>	(0.14)	0.24 <sup>+</sup>	(0.14)	0.24 <sup>+</sup>	(0.14)
Medium Education*2012					0.02	(0.11)	0.02	(0.11)	0.02	(0.11)
Higher Education*2012					0.29*	(0.14)	0.27 <sup>+</sup>	(0.14)	0.27 <sup>+</sup>	(0.14)
<i>Income (ref. category: Low Income)</i>										
Medium household income			0.16**	(0.06)	0.14*	(0.06)	0.04	(0.08)	0.03	(0.10)
High household income			0.22***	(0.07)	0.16*	(0.07)	0.07	(0.11)	0.06	(0.11)
Medium household income*2002					0.27*	(0.12)	0.28*	(0.12)	0.28*	(0.12)
High household income*2002					0.38*	(0.16)	0.39*	(0.16)	0.39*	(0.16)
Medium household income*2012					0.02	(0.14)	0.02	(0.14)	0.02	(0.14)
High household income*2012					-0.10	(0.18)	-0.10	(0.18)	-0.10	(0.18)
<i>Man's employment status (ref. category: full-time)</i>										
Man employed part-time			0.25*	(0.11)	0.25*	(0.11)	0.25*	(0.11)	0.26*	(0.11)
Man not employed			0.18**	(0.06)	0.18***	(0.06)	0.19***	(0.06)	0.16**	(0.06)
<i>Woman's employment status (ref. category: full-time)</i>										
Woman employed part-time			0.03	(0.08)	0.03	(0.08)	0.03	(0.08)	0.05	(0.08)
Woman not employed			-0.31***	(0.05)	-0.31***	(0.05)	-0.31***	(0.05)	-0.33***	(0.05)
Woman's income share bigger			0.34***	(0.05)	0.34***	(0.05)	0.34***	(0.05)	0.33***	(0.05)

**Table 2.** (Cont.) Determinants of GDDL, CEE region, 1994–2012 (pooled data, OLS).

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	$\beta$	(SE)	B	(SE)	$\beta$	(SE)	$\beta$	(SE)	$\beta$	(SE)
Egalitarian gender role attitudes <sup>a</sup>										
Female respondent	-0.61***	(0.04)	-0.61***	(0.04)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.03***	(0.01)	0.02***	(0.01)
Age <sup>a</sup>	-0.04**	(0.01)	-0.06***	(0.01)	-0.63***	(0.04)	-0.63***	(0.04)	-0.63***	(0.04)
Age squared	0.02 <sup>+</sup>	(0.01)	0.05***	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)	-0.08***	(0.01)
Household size <sup>a</sup>	-0.11***	(0.02)	-0.09***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.02)	0.07***	(0.01)	0.07***	(0.02)
					-0.07***	(0.02)	-0.07***	(0.02)	-0.08***	(0.02)
<i>Country (ref. category: Russia)</i>										
Bulgaria									-0.02	(0.06)
Czechia									-0.10	(0.07)
Hungary									0.16*	(0.07)
Poland									0.03	(0.07)
Slovenia									0.26***	(0.07)
Intercept	-2.85***		-3.24***		-3.20***		-3.06***		-3.10***	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.031		0.046		0.063		0.065		0.068	
F for change in R <sup>2</sup>	58.46***		44.55***		34.46***		3.57***		7.77***	

Notes: N = 11,710. All values are weighted using external weights. <sup>a</sup>Age centered at 40, household size centered at 3, gender role attitudes centered at 15. <sup>+</sup>p ≤ 0.1 \*p ≤ 0.05, \*\* p ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* p ≤ 0.001.

tional groups (model with 2002 as a reference category is not shown). But in highly educated households the increase was much steeper than among the rest. All the other parameters kept constant, highly-educated households in 2012 had more equal GDDL than in 1994. For the less educated, the levels of GDDL index in 2012 were not statistically different from 1994.

The appearance of income gradient by 2002 and its subsequent disappearance by 2012 was driven primarily by changes in GDDL in poor households. Between 1994 and 2002, men's relative involvement in routine housework among poorer households decreased. Between 2002 and 2012 (model with 2002 as a reference category is not shown), however, it increased back to the 1994 levels. All other parameters kept constant, richer households did not experience statistically significant changes in GDDL, neither in the 1990s nor in the 2000s, although data suggest that there might have been an increase in inequality among high-income households in the 2000s. These findings suggest that the trajectory of change implied in Hypothesis 1 (initial decrease of equality, followed by a subsequent increase) was characteristic of lower classes only.

In Model 5, I add country dummies. I use Russia, a country where the state-socialist gender regime originated from, as a reference category. The effects of all independent variables and controls are robust to the inclusion of country dummies. Coefficients of only two country dummies, i.e., Slovenia and Hungary, are statistically significantly different from the reference category.

Country-specific regressions (see Tables 5 and 6 in the Supplementary File) show that trajectories of net change in GDDL were quite diverse among the analyzed countries. Only Hungary and Bulgaria experienced a net change in GDDL in line with Hypothesis 1, i.e., an initial overall increase in inequality followed by an overall decrease during the 2000s. In the remaining countries, there was either no change in either decade (as in Czechia); an initial decrease of inequality was followed by a subsequent increase (Poland and Russia); or a decrease was followed by stagnation (Slovenia). Notably, however, by 2012, most of the countries (with the possible exception of Bulgaria and Slovenia) had the same level of inequality in GDDL as in 1994.

Idiosyncratic trends of inequality in GDDL among different classes observed at the regional level, however, characterized developments in all analyzed countries, even if to different extents. In line with Hypothesis 2a, over the post-socialist period, the positive effect of education on the level of men's involvement in routine housework increased in all countries except Russia (where it, nevertheless, remained positive). Only in Slovenia did the effect of education eventually disappear between 2002 and 2012, since lower-educated there caught up with higher-educated. As for household income, during the first post-socialist decade, its importance as a factor of more equal GDDL increased in all countries of the region (except Slovenia), primarily due

to (stronger) decreases in men's involvement in routine housework among the poor. Between 2002 and 2012, however, in all countries except Russia, the income gradient either significantly diminished or even reversed.

## 6. Discussion and Conclusion

My first hypothesis—that, net of individual and interactional-level factors, inequality in GDDL in the CEE countries increased during the first post-socialist decade and subsequently decreased during the 2000s—received confirmation in two countries only. Analysis of trends of inequality for different classes, however, showed that this was a rather typical trajectory for lower-class households across most of the analyzed countries. This finding partially supports a view established in the literature that gender inequalities increased in the early years of post-socialist transition (Ashwin, 2006; Pine, 2002; Pollert, 2003), but points out an often-overlooked class-specificity of this argument.

My hypothesis about the increased positive effect of education on equality in GDDL received confirmation at the regional level and across most of the countries. However, contrary to the theoretical assumption that an increase in educational gradient would be driven by highly-educated embracing more egalitarian patterns of GDDL first (Sullivan, 2010), at least between 1994–2002 across most of CEE this was not the case. In that period, the gradient increased primarily due to increased inequality in GDDL among lower-educated. Only in 2002–2012 was the persistence of educational gradient in several countries, indeed, related to the relatively faster change towards greater equality among highly-educated, as was suggested in the Western contexts (Sullivan, 2010). This finding emphasizes the importance of applying a class lens to the post-socialist re-traditionalization argument, as has been already pointed out by anthropologists working on the region (e.g., Kalb, 2018).

Finally, my hypothesis about the increased positive effect of household income on equality in GDDL was confirmed in relation to the 1994–2002 period across most of the countries. However, contrary to my expectation, an increase in income gradient was driven primarily not by the rich, but rather by the poor experiencing a significant reduction in equality in GDDL. The latter was probably caused by the impact that welfare retrenchment and economic crises had on volumes of unpaid work within poorer households, as was shown in ethnographic studies (e.g., Pine, 2002). Indeed, in the 2000s when the countries entered a period of economic growth and welfare expansion, the trend for the poor also reversed.

The principal limitations of this study stem from the nature of the data used for the analysis. First, the focus of the research was on the relative distribution of the burden of routine housework and equality within the couple rather than on time use. Second, using 1994 as a starting point for analysis of post-socialist transition could have resulted in an underestimation of the extent of changes

in the first post-socialist decade, as by that moment the countries analyzed had already been 'in transition' for 3–5 years. Thirdly, this data does not allow to account for the effects of the 2008–2009 financial crisis, which has been shown to have had some negative gendered impacts in several of the analyzed countries (Szalma & Takács, 2013). Finally, having information on both partners' education would have likely improved the fit of the model, taking into account the impact of educational homogamy on GDDL (Esping-Andersen, 2009).

In conclusion, it is important to note some insights that the experience of post-socialist CEE offers to the wider study of GDDL. First, the findings of this study lend further support to the claims made recently in the scholarship on change in GDDL about the need to consider the extent of stall and progress for different socio-demographic groups (Sullivan et al., 2018). As shown, in CEE, class represents an important explanatory factor which must be accounted for if we are to understand the lack of progress on equality in GDDL in the region in the post-socialist period. This lack of progress was primarily related to significant setbacks in gender equality among the lower-class households during the period of market transition in the 1990s, which they only managed to offset during the 2000s. Second, my findings highlight the importance of considering changes in GDDL among lower classes not only as a result of 'catching up' with trends emanating from higher classes (Sullivan, 2010), but also as a consequence of their greater vulnerability to impacts of socio-economic crises that may lead to increases in shares of unpaid work carried out by women. Finally, this study provides empirical evidence that household income may have a positive effect on relative gender equality in the division of domestic labor (cf. Heisig, 2011). It, however, also demonstrates that this effect may be a temporary phenomenon. Further studies are needed to reveal the exact mechanisms underlying this relation.

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#### Conflict of Interests

The author declares no conflict of interests.

#### Supplementary Material

Supplementary material for this article is available online in the format provided by the author (unedited).

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#### About the Author



**Daria Ukhova** is currently completing a PhD in Sociology at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences, Germany. In her mixed methods dissertation, she explores how class shapes gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist Europe, with a particular focus on Russia. Prior to starting her PhD, Daria worked for a number of years in various research and policy roles at Oxfam and WHO.

Online Supplement Table 1. Socio-economic trends in the selected CEE countries, 1990-2012

	Bulgaria			Czechia			Hungary			Poland			Russia			Slovenia									
	1990	1994	2012	1990	1994	2012	1990	1994	2012	1990	1994	2012	1990	1994	2012	1990	1994	2012							
GDP per capita (thousands \$ per year) <sup>a</sup>	9.3	8.2	10.1	15.8	20.0	18.1	22.3	28.5	15.1	15.0	19.6	22.7	10.3	10.6	15.2	23.2	20.6	13.4	15.6	25.2	18.9	17.8	24.1	28.1	
Female LFPR (%) <sup>b</sup>	55.0	51.9	46.3	47.8	51.7	52.6	51.2	50.1	46.2	42.5	41.3	44.7	55.3	52.4	48.1	48.8	59.5	52.7	52.9	57.0	47.8	51.8	51.1	52.3	
Female-to-male LFPR (%) <sup>b</sup>	87.5	87.0	82.3	81.4	73.2	73.7	73.7	74.0	71.7	72.1	71.9	74.9	76.5	77.4	77.4	75.3	78.0	75.2	80.3	79.9	79.2	78.6	80.2	82.6	
Gross enrolment ratio, pre-primary education (%) <sup>c</sup>	69.3	58.1	72.9	83.2	106.1	86.1	97.4	104.1 <sup>d</sup>	84.8	79.6	80.0	87.2	48.6	42.5	49.1	77.1	75.5	61.3	67.5	76.5	62.2	57.2	73.1	95.1	
Family benefits public spending (% of GDP) <sup>e</sup>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	2.28	1.99	1.76	2.18	N/A	N/A	2.95	3.1	1.65	1.43	1.18	1.24	N/A	1.99	2.07						
UNDP gender inequality index (GII) <sup>f</sup>	N/A	0.37	0.34	0.21	N/A	0.25	N/A	0.13	N/A	0.32	0.29	0.26	N/A	0.26	0.21	0.15	N/A	0.47	0.42	0.30	N/A	0.25	N/A	0.07	
Gini index <sup>g</sup>	22.6	34.2	35.1	36.0	19.7	22.1	27.0	26.1	24.8	33.2	31.2	31.6	24.8	27.1	33.4	34.7	25.9	39.7	39.7	41.6	22.0	21.4	28.2	27.3	

Note: Compiled by the author.

<sup>a</sup> Constant 2011 PPP \$. Source: World Bank International Comparison Program Database. 1994 data for Slovenia is actually from 1995, as the data of GDP per capita in the country is not available for previous years. <sup>b</sup> Source: ILOSTAT. <sup>c</sup> Gross enrollment ratio, pre-primary, both sexes (%) – total enrollment in pre-primary education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the total population of official pre-primary education age. Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. <sup>d</sup> GER can exceed 100% due to the inclusion of over-aged and under-aged students because of early or late school entrance and grade repetition. <sup>e</sup> Source: OECD (2017), Family benefits public spending (Indicator). doi: 10.1787/8e8b3273-en. Source: UNDP HDR. Years for which GII is available are 1995, 2000 and 2012. <sup>f</sup> Source: All the ginis (ALG) data set 2016. 1989 gini index for Hungary is the average of 1989 and 1991 values.

**Online Supplement Table 2. Countries and sample sizes**

	n	1994	2002	2012
Bulgaria	1,680	635	572	473
Czechia	2,200	560	712	928
Hungary	1,569	660	457	452
Poland	1,868	860	598	410
Russia	2,712	1,277	851	584
Slovenia	1,701	607	596	498
N	11,730	4,599	3,786	3,345

Note: Non-weighted sample sizes.

**Online Supplement Table 3. Descriptive statistics, CEE region (N=11,730 respondents)**

			1994		2002		2012	
	Min	Max	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Index of GDDL	-6	6	-3.25 <sup>a</sup> [-3.30, -3.19]	1.83	-3.17 [-3.24, -3.10]	2.14	-3.07 [-3.14, -3.00]	2.16
- low educated	-6	6	-3.42 [-3.50, -3.34]	1.90	-3.52 [-3.63, -3.41]	2.14	-3.41 [-3.55, -3.27]	2.18
- highly educated	-6	6	-2.91 [-3.05, -2.77]	1.70	-2.62 [-2.79, -2.44]	2.19	-2.60 [-2.74, -2.46]	2.13
- poor/bottom income quintile	-6	6	-3.39 [-3.51, -3.27]	1.86	-3.61 [-3.76, -3.46]	2.06	-3.33 [-3.49, -3.17]	2.13
- rich/top income quintile	-6	6	-3.08 [-3.19, -2.96]	1.73	-2.80 [-2.95, -2.65]	2.10	-2.87 [-3.03, -2.71]	2.10
Gender of respondent (0 = male, 1 = female)	0	1	0.50	--	0.51	--	0.51	--
Age of respondent	18	65	42.42	11.76	43.55	11.94	43.62	11.55
Household size	2	6	3.62	1.11	3.48	1.14	3.29	1.11
Rich/Top income quintile (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--
Medium income (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.60	--	0.60	--	0.60	--
Poor/Bottom income quintile (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--
Higher education (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.13	--	0.16	--	0.25	--
Medium education (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.42	--	0.45	--	0.47	--
Low education (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.45	--	0.39	--	0.28	--
Man working full-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.73	--	0.69	--	0.80	--
Man working part-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.03	--	0.03	--	0.02	--
Man not employed (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.24	--	0.28	--	0.18	--
Woman working full-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.59	--	0.53	--	0.60	--
Woman working part-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.06	--	0.05	--	0.06	--
Woman not employed (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.35	--	0.42	--	0.34	--
Woman's income share bigger (0 = man earning more, 1 = woman earning equally or more)	0	1	0.34	--	0.38	--	0.36	--
Gender role attitudes (higher values = more gender-egalitarian attitudes)	5	25	12.06	4.00	13.35	3.91	14.32	4.16

Note: All values are weighted using a combination of external weights and post-stratification weights provided by the ISSP.  
<sup>a</sup> 95% confidence intervals for dependent variable in brackets.

Online Supplement Table 4. Descriptive statistics by country and year (N=11,730 respondents)

	Bulgaria						Czechia						Hungary						Poland						Russia						Slovenia									
	1994		2002		2012		1994		2002		2012		1994		2002		2012		1994		2002		2012		1994		2002		2012											
	Min	Max	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD										
Index of GDPL	-6	6	-3.32	1.83	-3.42	2.37	-2.86	2.10	-3.35	1.77	-3.40	1.90	-3.23	2.06	-3.00	1.95	-3.45	1.95	-3.03	2.52	-3.38	1.97	-3.14	1.96	-3.17	1.89	-3.42	1.62	-2.74	2.40	-3.29	2.30	-3.03	1.75	-2.86	2.13	-2.82	1.97		
Gender of respondent (0 = male, 1 = female)	0	1	0.53	--	0.50	--	0.52	--	0.49	--	0.53	--	0.51	--	0.49	--	0.51	--	0.49	--	0.49	--	0.53	--	0.49	--	0.51	--	0.48	--	0.48	--	0.51	--	0.52	--	0.52	--	0.53	--
Age	18	65	43.45	12.11	45.40	12.00	43.59	12.26	41.43	11.72	43.97	11.99	43.19	11.64	42.01	12.02	41.7	12.31	44.00	11.36	43.49	11.25	43.83	11.09	41.32	10.39	42.48	12.10	40.62	12.60	42.17	11.82	41.70	11.24	45.95	10.64	47.80	10.68		
Household size	2	6	3.65	1.13	3.41	1.11	3.19	1.08	3.38	1.01	3.14	1.03	3.05	0.99	3.53	1.11	3.41	1.17	3.25	1.16	3.97	1.26	3.93	1.22	3.76	1.14	3.53	0.96	3.39	1.06	3.12	1.04	3.65	1.09	3.58	1.07	3.34	1.09		
Rich/Top quintile (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.19	--	0.20	--	0.21	--	0.20	--	0.22	--	0.19	--	0.18	--	0.18	--	0.19	--	0.21	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.18	--	0.21	--	0.21	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--
Medium income (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.60	--	0.60	--	0.59	--	0.60	--	0.59	--	0.59	--	0.61	--	0.60	--	0.59	--	0.60	--	0.61	--	0.60	--	0.60	--	0.59	--	0.59	--	0.60	--	0.60	--	0.60	--	0.60	--
Poor/Bottom quintile (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.21	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.19	--	0.22	--	0.21	--	0.22	--	0.22	--	0.19	--	0.19	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.23	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--	0.20	--
Higher education (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.13	--	0.25	--	0.28	--	0.14	--	0.15	--	0.16	--	0.11	--	0.14	--	0.15	--	0.11	--	0.11	--	0.11	--	0.33	--	0.13	--	0.30	--	0.30	--	0.13	--	0.18	--	0.30	--
Medium education (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.50	--	0.49	--	0.53	--	0.38	--	0.30	--	0.42	--	0.26	--	0.30	--	0.29	--	0.30	--	0.40	--	0.36	--	0.36	--	0.61	--	0.66	--	0.66	--	0.55	--	0.59	--	0.54	--
Low education (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.37	--	0.26	--	0.19	--	0.48	--	0.55	--	0.42	--	0.63	--	0.56	--	0.56	--	0.59	--	0.49	--	0.31	--	0.27	--	0.26	--	0.04	--	0.04	--	0.32	--	0.23	--	0.16	--
Man working full-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.65	--	0.52	--	0.79	--	0.89	--	0.80	--	0.86	--	0.73	--	0.72	--	0.74	--	0.64	--	0.64	--	0.87	--	0.73	--	0.79	--	0.79	--	0.83	--	0.72	--	0.66	--	0.69	--
Man working part-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.04	--	0.05	--	0.01	--	0.01	--	0.02	--	0.02	--	0.01	--	0.04	--	0.02	--	0.04	--	0.02	--	0.06	--	0.10	--	0.04	--	0.04	--	0.03	--	0.01	--	0.02	--	0.01	--
Man not employed (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.31	--	0.43	--	0.20	--	0.10	--	0.18	--	0.12	--	0.26	--	0.24	--	0.24	--	0.32	--	0.34	--	0.34	--	0.07	--	0.17	--	0.14	--	0.14	--	0.27	--	0.32	--	0.30	--
Woman working full-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.52	--	0.47	--	0.61	--	0.82	--	0.59	--	0.64	--	0.54	--	0.54	--	0.54	--	0.48	--	0.47	--	0.63	--	0.54	--	0.51	--	0.55	--	0.65	--	0.65	--	0.59	--	0.59	--
Woman working part-time (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.04	--	0.04	--	0.03	--	0.05	--	0.03	--	0.06	--	0.02	--	0.04	--	0.04	--	0.06	--	0.06	--	0.14	--	0.13	--	0.13	--	0.07	--	0.07	--	0.03	--	0.03	--	0.03	--
Woman not employed (0 = no, 1 = yes)	0	1	0.44	--	0.49	--	0.36	--	0.13	--	0.38	--	0.30	--	0.44	--	0.41	--	0.42	--	0.46	--	0.47	--	0.23	--	0.33	--	0.36	--	0.38	--	0.32	--	0.32	--	0.38	--	0.38	--
Woman's income share bigger (0 = man earning more; 1 = woman earning equally or more)	0	1	0.45	--	0.36	--	0.34	--	0.24	--	0.32	--	0.35	--	0.29	--	0.36	--	0.32	--	0.45	--	0.36	--	0.33	--	0.25	--	0.40	--	0.34	--	0.40	--	0.40	--	0.48	--	0.48	--
Gender role attitudes (higher values = more gender egalitarian views)	5	25	11.12	4.40	12.94	3.78	13.78	3.55	13.80	3.83	13.65	4.07	15.03	4.22	11.17	3.89	12.67	3.95	13.02	4.10	12.35	3.84	14.00	3.95	15.25	3.86	10.60	3.19	12.43	3.50	12.54	3.76	13.30	3.78	14.46	3.77	16.49	4.12		

Note: All values are weighted using post-stratification weights provided by ISSP.

#### GDDL—Country-Specific Patterns and Trends, 1994–2012

In Online Supplement Table 5, I provide estimations of time- and class-related effects on the level of equality in GDDL from country-specific regressions. I also include estimations of the other theoretically-relevant variables and controls. With minor exceptions, the effects of the latter were comparable across all the considered countries.

By breaking down the sample, I lose some statistical power, which should be taken into account when interpreting the statistical significance of the effects. To compensate for this and to simplify the interpretation of the country-specific effects, I include coefficients from the pooled regional model.

Online Supplement Table 6 includes information on net societal change in inequality in GDDL and on change among three major classes at the regional level and in each of the analyzed countries.



Online Supplement Table 5. Determinants of gender division of domestic labor, CEE countries, 1994-2012 (OLS) (continued)

	CEE		Bulgaria		Czechia		Hungary		Poland		Russia		Slovenia	
	Model 1	Model 2												
Egalitarian gender role attitudes <sup>a</sup>	0.03*** (0.01)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.05*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)	0.04** (0.01)
Female respondent	-0.63*** (0.04)	-0.63*** (0.04)	-0.89*** (0.10)	-0.89*** (0.10)	-0.59*** (0.08)	-0.59*** (0.08)	-0.62*** (0.11)	-0.62*** (0.11)	-0.49*** (0.09)	-0.49*** (0.09)	-0.48*** (0.10)	-0.48*** (0.10)	-0.69*** (0.10)	-0.69*** (0.10)
Age <sup>a</sup>	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.08*** (0.01)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.07* (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.03)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.04 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	-0.14*** (0.04)	-0.14*** (0.04)
Age squared	0.07*** (0.01)	0.07*** (0.02)	0.07 (0.03)	0.07 (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.15*** (0.04)	0.09* (0.05)	0.09* (0.05)	0.02 (0.04)	0.02 (0.04)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.03)	0.14 (0.04)	0.14 (0.04)
Household size <sup>a</sup>	-0.07*** (0.02)	-0.08*** (0.02)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.14** (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.12* (0.06)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)	-0.06 (0.05)	-0.07 (0.05)
Intercept	-3.20*** (0.063)	-3.06*** (0.065)	-3.17*** (0.108)	-2.99*** (0.114)	-3.42*** (0.070)	-3.37*** (0.077)	-2.90*** (0.058)	-2.53*** (0.063)	-3.41*** (0.093)	-3.08*** (0.095)	-3.54*** (0.050)	-3.72*** (0.057)	-2.70*** (0.076)	-2.76*** (0.078)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	11,710	11,710	1,680	1,680	2,200	2,200	1,569	1,569	1,868	1,868	2,712	2,712	1,701	1,701
N														

Notes: Models 1 and 2 have the same specifications as pooled Models 3 and 4 respectively. <sup>a</sup>Age centred at 40, household size centred at 3, gender role attitudes centred at 15. \* p ≤ 0.05, \*\* p ≤ 0.01, \*\*\* p ≤ 0.001.

Online Supplement Table 6. Net and class-specific change in GDDL, 1994-2012

CEE Region	Net societal change					
	1994-2002 <sup>a</sup>	2002-2012 <sup>b</sup>	1994-2002 <sup>c</sup>	2002-2012 <sup>d</sup>	1994-2002 <sup>e</sup>	2002-2012 <sup>f</sup>
	Low educated, low-income (bottom 20%) households	Medium educated, middle-income (middle 60%) households	Highly educated, high-income (top 20%) households			
	0.02	0.01	-0.36***	0.34**	0.12	-0.10
Bulgaria <sup>e</sup>	-0.22 <sup>†</sup>	0.45***	-0.82**	0.83**	-0.06	0.29
Czechia <sup>e</sup>	0.04	0.01	-0.25	0.40 <sup>†</sup>	0.05	0.08
Hungary <sup>e</sup>	-0.57***	0.55***	-0.92**	0.69 <sup>†</sup>	-0.34	0.37
Poland <sup>e</sup>	0.24 <sup>*</sup>	-0.38**	-0.14	0.05	0.44 <sup>*</sup>	-0.55 <sup>*</sup>
Russia <sup>e</sup>	0.48***	-0.57***	0.87**	-0.88 <sup>†</sup>	0.30 <sup>*</sup>	-0.44**
Slovenia <sup>e</sup>	0.21 <sup>†</sup>	-0.03	0.09	0.56	0.13	-0.05


Notes: <sup>a</sup> Change=[Year 2002] from a full model without education\*year and income\*year interaction terms and with 1994 as omitted year reference category <sup>b</sup> Change=[Year 2012] from a full model without education\*year and income\*year interaction terms with 2002 as omitted year reference category (model not shown). <sup>c</sup> Change=[Year 2002 + educational level\*2002 + income level\*2002] from a full model with education\*year and income\*year interaction terms and with 1994 as omitted year reference category. <sup>d</sup> Change=[Year 2012 + educational level\*2012 + income level\*2012] from a full model with education\*year and income\*year interaction terms and with 2012 as omitted year reference category.

<sup>†</sup>p ≤ 0.1 <sup>\*</sup>p ≤ 0.05, <sup>\*\*</sup>p ≤ 0.01, <sup>\*\*\*</sup>p ≤ 0.001

**Study 2: Doing gender with class: Gender division of unpaid work in Russian middle-class dual-earner heterosexual households**

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Original Article

# Doing Gender with Class: Gender Division of Unpaid Work in Russian Middle-Class Dual Earner Heterosexual Households

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## Abstract

This article is concerned with examining the relation between gender division of unpaid work and class. Drawing on in-depth interviews with middle-class dual earner heterosexual couples conducted in Russia, I show how the gender division of housework and care could be shaped by processes of accountability not only to sex category (“doing gender”) but also to class category (“doing class”). I discuss how my interviewees perceived various gender contracts that have evolved in post-socialist Russia as profoundly classed. I further show how their resulting understandings of middle-class (in)appropriate ways of doing masculinity and femininity influenced the division of work in their families. Men were not only accountable as breadwinners but also as carers; while women, in addition to their caring roles, were accountable for their career and sex appeal. In several couples, this double gender and class accountability underpinned their comparatively more equal—although not necessarily more egalitarian—gender division of housework and care.

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**Keywords**

Russia, gender contract, class, gender division of labor, housework, childcare, doing gender, doing class

**Doing Gender with Class: Gender Division of Unpaid Work in Russian Middle-Class Dual Earner Heterosexual Households**

International research has demonstrated that the level of gender equality in the division of both housework and childcare is positively related to class. Higher educated men and women share housework more equally (Cooke, 2011; Esping-Andersen, 2009; Evertsson et al., 2009). Women with higher earnings and from higher income households “buy themselves out” of housework (Gupta, Evertsson, Grunow, Nermo, & Sayer, 2010; Heisig, 2011). Both higher educated men and higher educated women spend more time with their children (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Sayer, Gauthier, & Furstenberg, 2004; Sullivan, 2010; Sullivan, Billari, & Altintas, 2014). And although higher educated mothers—similarly to women from other classes—provide significantly more care than equally educated fathers (Esping-Andersen, 2009; Sayer et al., 2004), there is evidence suggesting that the education gap in fathers’ contribution to childcare is growing (Sullivan, 2010) and that the gender gap in routine childcare among higher educated parents is narrowing (Craig & Mullan, 2011).

To date, studies focusing on these observed relations between class and gender division of unpaid work have primarily treated class as a structural position of individual partners that influences their absolute and/or relative shares of housework and care via their time availability, ability to bargain, and/or outsource. At the same time, the role of changing gender ideologies and their relation with class in the domain of unpaid work remains undertheorized and warrants further investigation (Geist & Ruppner, 2018; Sullivan, 2010).

In this article, I aim to address this theoretical gap by focusing on the related processes of accountability to sex (Hollander, 2013; West & Zimmerman, 1987, 2009) and class (West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002) categories as shaping negotiations about and performance of unpaid work among Russian middle-class dual earner heterosexual couples. In the following sections I draw on in-depth interview data to demonstrate how my respondents associated various modes of dividing paid and unpaid work within families with specific class positions in contemporary Russian society. I analyze this relationship by employing the conceptual framework of gender contracts (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2019; Hirdman, 1996; Rantalaiho, 1997; Sa’ar, 2009). I then discuss how their resulting understandings of middle-class (in) appropriate ways of doing femininity and masculinity in paid and unpaid work domains influenced the actual division of work in their families. I argue that,

when it came to negotiations about gender division of labor within their own families, they held themselves and each other accountable not only to sex category but also to actual or aspirational class category, that is, middle-class. As I also show, in several couples this double accountability was a factor in their comparatively more equal gender division of unpaid work.

Russia is a noteworthy context for studying the relation between class and gender inequality in the division of unpaid work because, due to the relatively recent transition from socialism to capitalism, the processes of class formation are more evident there than in the Western contexts where this type of study is usually carried out. Over the past 30 years, the country has experienced radical social and economic changes that have affected normative expectations of gender (Tartakovskaya, 2012; Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002) and resulted in a complete redrawing of class relations (Gapova, 2002; Iarskaia-Smirnova & Romanov, 2012). Gapova has argued that the processes of class formation have redefined the notions of masculine and feminine in post-Soviet Russia (Gapova, 2002). Rotkirch, Tkach, and Zdravomyslova (2012, p. 130) have also pointed out the emergence in Russia of “home as a significant domain of class structuration and distinction.” Recent qualitative evidence has suggested that Russians’ practices in the domain of unpaid work are becoming increasingly class-differentiated (Lipsova, 2016, 2017; Rotkirch et al., 2012; Utrata, 2011; Zdravomyslova & Tkach, 2016). Ukhova (2020) has also quantitatively shown that more educated and more affluent couples in Russia have a more gender-equal division of domestic labor.

### **Conceptual Framework: Doing Gender, Doing Class, and the Relevance of Gender Contract**

In social interactions, people are held accountable to sex category and thereby “do gender” (West & Zimmerman, 1987, 2009). Accountability could be conceptualized as “a three-part interactional system that produces gender,” which involves “orientation of one’s thoughts, perception, and behavior to the societal ideals and local expectations associated with sex category,” assessment of one’s own and other people’s behavior in relation to these expectations, and holding others responsible for accomplishment of gender through enforcement of interactional consequences for (non-)compliance (Hollander, 2013, p. 9–10). Based on this definition, in the text, I use “accountable to” to refer to people’s orientation to sex category and “accountable for” when I refer to processes of (self-)assessment and enforcement.

The household—where men and women negotiate about and perform housework and care work—remains one of the key arenas for the accomplishment of gender (Risman, 2004, 2018; West & Zimmerman, 1987). Women’s increased participation in the labor market has not radically redrawn the distribution of unpaid work in the household precisely because “gender

still trumps the structural variables of time and economic dependency when it comes to housework and care work” (Risman, 2018, p. 19).

Similar to and along with gender, class is also “done.” Accountability to class category (West & Fenstermaker, 1995) or so-called social class role (“behaviors, tastes, and values that are socially defined as appropriate and expected of individuals of a particular socioeconomic position”) (Yodanis, 2002, p. 325–326) leads people to produce certain representations of themselves. Class is “done” through presentation of symbols (tastes, values, and activities) of specific social class roles. Closely related to the “doing class” approach is Beverley Skeggs’s Bourdieusian analysis of “making class,” in which she conceptualizes class as something that “is not given, but is in continuous production” (Skeggs, 2004, p. 3). Central to accomplishment of class are the processes of establishing boundaries, drawing distinctions, and attributing and claiming respectability (Lamont, 1992; Skeggs, 1997, 2004; Yodanis, 2002).

While processes of “doing gender” have been explored quite extensively as causes of gender inequality in the division of unpaid work (for a recent review, see Geist & Ruppner, 2018), processes of “doing class” have received much less attention. A number of empirical studies over the last years have been concerned with so-called class gradients in the amount of time women and men from different classes spend on housework and childcare (Gupta, Evertsson, Grunow, Nermo, & Sayer, 2010; Heisig, 2011; Schneider & Hastings, 2017; Sullivan, 2010; Sullivan et al., 2014). As these studies have primarily focused on class as a structural location of individual partners, the role of class accountability has largely been neglected.

Moreover, the literature on “doing class,” while compellingly showing that the domestic sphere represents an important site for production of class, has not explicitly addressed the issue of gender inequalities *within* the household. Collins (1992) has argued that everything from cleaning and straightening the house to cooking, physical care, education, and the moral upbringing of children could be considered as realms of class production performed by women. For the working-class women with whom Skeggs (Skeggs, 1997) did her research, home was an important site for displaying respectability. These women were particularly concerned about cleanliness and how it reflected on them. Gregson & Lowe (1995) found that, for the middle-class women they studied, outsourcing of certain housework and care tasks was not only a way to enable them to combine motherhood and work but also a way to “perform” middle-classness.

Given the above, my contribution in this article is to show how the processes of doing class could shape gender inequalities in the division of unpaid work. In order to do this, I will employ the conceptual framework of “gender contract” as my analytical tool. Gender contract is a concept that was initially developed by Scandinavian feminist scholars to refer to “unspoken

rules, mutual obligations, and rights which define the relations between women and men, between genders and generations, and finally between the areas of production and reproduction” in specific socio-historical contexts (Hirdman, 1996; Rantalaaho, 1997, p. 25). In contrast to Carole Pateman’s (Pateman, 1988) “sexual contract,” which is conceptualized as a contract between maintaining men’s rule over women, gender contract is viewed as capturing a *norm* about “what a Man and Woman should do in relation to each other” (Hirdman, 1996, p. 23). Gender contracts, then, could be considered as entailing those very “normative conceptions of appropriate attitudes and activities for particular sex categories” (West & Zimmerman, 1987, p. 134–135) that are at the core of the processes of gender accountability. Yet, the notion of gender contract emphasizes the mutuality of accountability between partners, their agency, and the potential for modification of gendered power relations through negotiation (Hirdman, 1996). In contrast to primarily descriptive terms, such as, for example, “work-family arrangements” (Hook, 2015) and the concept of gender contract, emphasizes the cultural normativity of certain breadwinning/caregiving arrangements (Goldstein-Gidoni, 2019; Sa’ar, 2009).

The main reason I employ the conceptual framework of gender contracts is that they are able to serve as terms of *both* gender and class accountability. As Williams has demonstrated, in the United States, where “the breadwinner-homemaker family has been emblematic of middle-class status since the emergence of the notion of separate spheres,” adherence to traditional gender roles among working-class families is driven by their middle-class aspirations and represents a “class act” (Williams, 2010, p. 157–158). As I will show in the empirical section of this article, adherence to other types of gender contracts, entailing more gender-equal division of both paid and unpaid work, could also be driven by accountability to class category. Finally, it is important to note that the concept of “gender contract” has been widely used by Russian feminist scholars whose work I drew on, and thus it also had a significant heuristic value for this study.

## **Gender Contracts, Class, and Division of Unpaid Work in Russia**

The hegemonic Soviet gender contract of “working mother” implied equal participation of men and women in the labor market combined with women’s overwhelming responsibility for housework and care—which was usually shared between female members of the extended family—and men’s “domestic marginalization” (Ashwin & Lytkina, 2004; Temkina & Rotkirkh, 2002). Temkina & Rotkirkh (2002) have argued that in the post-Soviet period there appeared, alongside the working mother contract, a range of alternative gender contracts entailing different divisions of labor and power in the family. They include the “career-oriented woman” contract (women focus on

professional development; organization of housework and childcare is usually negotiated with relatives and hired domestic and care workers, while men's position in the domestic sphere remains marginal); the "housewife/male breadwinner" contract (man is a dominating agent; he possesses the power and material resources to support motherhood and female sexual attractiveness); the "sponsored woman" contract (man has a similar role as in the housewife/male breadwinner contract, but this relationship could be expected not to include joint residence and shared children).

Despite some diversification of gender contracts, women's overall employment in contemporary Russia remains high (Atencio & Posadas, 2015) while gender inequality in the division of housework (Ashwin & Isupova, 2018) and childcare (Lipasova, 2016, 2017) persists. International comparative research on factors of gender inequality in the division of unpaid work found that theories of time availability and relative resources have lower explanatory power in Russia (Fuwa, 2004). At the same time, as Ashwin and Isupova (2018) have demonstrated that accountability to persisting "traditional" gender ideology, which in the Russian context "implies support for a 'transitional' model in which the man is the breadwinner (highest earner) and the woman is employed and takes primary responsibility for domestic labor" (Ashwin & Isupova, 2018, p. 447) underlies the modes of "doing gender" that perpetuate gender inequality in the domestic sphere. While it is important to note that Ashwin and Isupova (2018) found signs of increasing egalitarianism in Russians' attitudes towards gender division of unpaid work, their analysis did not explicitly focus on class as a potential explanatory variable.

Research employing a class lens on the gender division of unpaid work in Russia has been quite limited, but it offers important avenues for further exploration. When pointing out the diversification of gender contracts that emerged in the post-Soviet period, Temkina & Rotkirch (2002) hypothesized that these contracts would become differentiated by class. They predicted that the contract of working mother would prevail among low-income families, while the contract of housewife/male breadwinner would become common among the upper classes. They also expected that some working mothers with prestigious jobs would embrace the contract of career-oriented woman.

Emerging empirical evidence indicates that practices in the domain of unpaid work in Russia are, indeed, becoming more class-differentiated and could also be considered as realms of class production. Lipasova (2016, 2017), who did research both with urban middle-class fathers and with working-class and "potential middle-class" fathers in the Russian provinces, found that paternal aspirations about and actual involvement in childcare varied between these groups, with only urban middle-class fathers embracing new models of involved parenthood (at least at the attitudinal level). Scholars researching the outsourcing of housework and childcare demonstrated how

these practices are becoming an important source for the construction of middle-class identities (Rotkirch et al., 2012; Zdravomyslova & Tkach, 2016). In her quantitative study of changes in men's relative involvement in housework among heterosexual couples in Russia (and other five Central and Eastern European countries) covering 1994–2012, Ukhova (2020) showed that higher education and household affluence in contemporary Russia are associated with a more gender-equal division of domestic labor; and that the positive effect of income has significantly increased over time. In what follows, I provide further empirical evidence of the association between class and gender division of unpaid work in contemporary Russia and discuss how gender and class accountability underpin this association.

## Data and Method

This article relies on qualitative interview data from 27 partners of dual earner heterosexual couples with co-resident children, and data from structured questionnaires completed after these interviews collected as part of a larger mixed methods study on changes in gender division of unpaid work in post-socialist Russia. I individually interviewed the members of 13 couples plus one woman (whose husband eventually dropped out of the study). I conducted all the interviews in summer 2017. The decision to focus on interviewing couples was determined by my analytical focus on the interactional level.

All interviews were conducted in Saint Petersburg, the second largest city in Russia. The rationale for focusing on Saint Petersburg was a combination of comparatively high levels of economic inequality in the city (Federal Service of State Statistics (Rosstat) (2017) and its peculiar local gender culture. Similarly to Muscovites, Petersburgians express a stronger preference for an egalitarian division of unpaid work within families and place less emphasis on the importance of men being the main breadwinners than people in the rest of Russia (Skoglund, 2021). Being located rather far from the capital, but in close proximity to Western Europe, and having strong historical and cultural ties with the latter, Saint Petersburg's middle classes are characterized by high receptivity to European cultural trends (Avdeeva, 2020). At the same time, the city is also home to the most famous champion of "traditional values" legislation, MP Vitaly Milonov. Thus, in comparison with the rest of the country, Saint Petersburg is a place with relatively salient class inequalities, where the population has also had greater exposure to a competing "Western" discourse of gender equality alongside the discourse of traditional (family) values. As the strengthened association between class and the gender division of unpaid work is a relatively recent phenomenon in Russia (Ukhova, 2020), one might expect that this association would be more tangible in Saint Petersburg, potentially making the city a good site for studying the mechanisms underlying this relation. These specifics of the city's gender culture, however,

should be taken into account when interpreting the findings of this study, as the city population's relatively progressive attitudes about gender-equal sharing of housework and childcare could clearly affect interactional accountability.

I began interviews with a convenience sample recruited through the most widely used social network platform in Russia, [vk.com](https://vk.com). I posted an announcement about the study and asked my friends and acquaintances to share it with their own networks. Using social networks for recruitment was a way to facilitate trust in a context where personal connections are highly important (Ledeneva, 1998). At the later stage of my fieldwork I also used snowball sampling. I rewarded participation in interviews with a gift card for 1,000 RUB (approximately US\$17 USD in 2017) for online purchases. The initial announcement included information about the reward. I took the decision to pay participants primarily on ethical grounds. Asking full-time employed people with children to dedicate 1.5–2 hours of their time to talking about unpaid work, and not reward them for that, seemed ethically dubious to me. While all participants accepted the cards, none appeared to be primarily motivated by financial gain, which was also reflected in the length of our meetings. The interviews lasted, on average, 105 minutes.

Table 1 provides an overview of participants' characteristics. I use pseudonyms. All respondents were relatively secure economically, although none—based on their income and housing situation (reported in the questionnaire)—belonged to the upper classes/elites. There was some variation in participants' educational backgrounds and types of job, but the sample is clearly skewed towards highly educated professionals. The largest variation was in respondents' family backgrounds, with a significant number coming from working-class families who experienced substantial economic hardships during the post-socialist transition when my respondents were children or adolescents. I therefore refer to my respondents' class location as (aspiring) middle class (cf. Rivkin-Fish, 2009). Quantitative analysis of data on time use from the questionnaires showed that seven couples had a significantly more egalitarian gender division of housework than the national average, according to the 2012 wave of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP Research Group, 2016).

I conducted interviews myself in Russian and a freelance assistant transcribed them. I met interviewees in places of their choice, including their flats, offices, and cafes. As a married Russian woman who was born and raised in Saint Petersburg, but later moved abroad for educational and professional reasons, I was perceived by my respondents not only as a cultural insider but also as someone with experience of social mobility that many of them were highly curious about, and some even wanted to reproduce. As recent research on class habitus has suggested, a desire for social mobility represents a key element of the habitus of Russian middle-class youth (Vanke et al.,

Table 1. List of Participants.

Couple	Women	Age	Education	Occupation	Men	Age	Education	Occupation	Number of children (age)	Actual gender contract
1	Maria	36	Higher (PhD)	Psychologist	Victor	43	Higher (PhD)	Surgeon	1 (6)	Dual earner/dual carer
2	Yulia	31	Higher	Foreign airline representative	Andrey	35	Higher	Engineer	1 (2)	Dual earner/dual carer
3	Tamara	42	Higher	Language school founder	dropped out	42	Higher	Economist	2 (21; 11)	Dual earner/dual carer
4	Alexandra	42	Higher	Training school founder	Timur	43	Secondary prof.	Driver	2 (16; 10)	Dual earner/dual carer
5	Evgeniya	30	Higher	Bank manager	Dmitry	38	Higher	Entrepreneur	1 (4)	Dual earner/dual carer/ outsourced housework
6	Zhanna	27	Higher	Sales manager	Ilya	27	Higher	Engineer	1 (0.5)	Dual earner/ unequal carer
7	Veronica	33	Higher	Language teacher	Leonid	36	Higher	IT manager	1 (6)	Dual earner/ unequal carer
8	Marina	33	Higher (PhD)	Researcher	Nikolay	33	Higher (PhD)	Lecturer	1 (4)	Dual earner/dual carer
9	Alla	31	Higher	Nanny	Anatoly	34	Higher	IT sysadmin	1 (9)	Dual earner/ unequal carer

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Couple	Women	Age	Education	Occupation	Men	Age	Education	Occupation	Number of children (age)	Actual gender contract
10	Svetlana	31	Higher	Sales manager	Mikhail	30	Higher	Financial analyst	2 (7; 2)	Dual earner/ outsourced care
11	Anna	39	Higher	Lawyer	Maxim	30	Higher	Engineer	1 (4)	Dual earner/dual carer
12	Alina	36	Higher	Human resources manager	Oleg	42	Higher	IT engineer	2 (11; 5)	Dual earner/ unequal carer
13	Nina	41	Secondary prof.	Health center administrator	Yuri	40	Secondary prof.	Installer	1 (11)	Dual earner/dual carer
14	Diana	37	Higher	Logistics engineer	Konstantin	40	Secondary prof.	Warehouse manager	2 (10; 5)	Dual earner/ unequal carer

2017). Overall, I found that my positionality facilitated the establishment of rapport.

I used the method of problem-centered interview (PCI) (Witzel & Reiter, 2012). I coded and analyzed interviews using a mix of inductive and deductive approaches in several stages, moving from descriptive and topic codes up to analytical codes and themes (Richards, 2015). I started with a small list of theory-driven topic codes to account for how my interviewees themselves mobilized conventional couple level explanations of the gender division of housework and care (e.g., availability of time, “male,” and “female” tasks). I immediately noticed that they also drew on other sorts of explanations, such as level of education, upbringing, or “culture.” In parallel, as I coded up, the theme of “class aspirations” emerged as one of the most loaded. This theme often co-occurred in the narratives with reflections on actual, imagined, and/or aspired modes of dividing labor in and outside of the home. Analysis of these co-occurrences led me to the idea of a typology of “classed gender contracts” (presented in the first part of the empirical section). Analysis of data on conflicts further revealed related themes of “accountability” and “class (in) appropriateness” of certain gendered practices. In the second part of the empirical section, I discuss how processes of gender and class accountability shaped actual gender division of work in my respondents’ families.

### **Classed Gender Contracts**

In this section, I discuss my interviewees’ representations of “classed gender contracts.” I show how they associated class positions in contemporary Russian society with ways of dividing paid and unpaid work within families.

The first time I was confronted with such representation was early on in my fieldwork during the interview with Andrey. Andrey and his wife Yulia shared the care of their son, housework, and household management nearly equally. Toward the end of the interview I asked Andrey if he thought the division of labor in their family corresponded to normative expectations about women’s and men’s roles currently existing in the Russian society (something he had referred to earlier). His answer was: “I think we fit in. It’s 2017 and... There are rich families, middle, and poor. I do not consider us rich, rather middle. I think we are not very different from the families that live in Saint Petersburg”. What was striking for me in Andrey’s answer was the symbolic connection that he established between gender contracts and families’ class positions. In the course of my fieldwork, I became increasingly aware of the existence of these connotative connections.

Differences between the various gender contracts emphasized by my interviewees were not always articulated in directly class-related terms, such as income or education. Sometimes they mobilized symbolic binaries—such as Russia versus West (see Rivkin-Fish, 2009, p. 80 on the importance of

“fantasized Western subject” for construction of middle-class identities in Russia), Soviet versus modern, Petersburg (Piter) and Moscow versus provincial towns and rural areas—to make sense of those differences. The terms that they used, however, clearly implied the existence of some sort of geographical/social/economic boundaries between families adopting different gender contracts. Yet, these boundaries did not simply mark differences. They were profoundly normative and moral; they divided what was considered worthy and respectable from what was not. In what follows, I first discuss the contracts that my interviewees devalued, that is, “working mother,” “housewife/breadwinner,” and “sponsored woman.” I then turn to the contracts they constructed as respectable and moral, that is, “career-oriented woman” and “egalitarian” gender contracts.

### *Lower Class: The Working Mother Contract*

The contract of working mother, the hegemonic gender contract of the Soviet period (Temkina & Rotkirkh, 2002), was a central element in my respondents’ narratives. The descriptions they provided for it were almost unanimous: it included a woman carrying the triple burden of paid work, housework, and childcare (and sometimes also care for other relatives and/or subsistence farming) together with a man completely disengaged from any sort of household activities and frequently not working for pay either. Anna poignantly called this contract “classical matriarchy”—alluding to a marginalized role of men in such households (cf. Ashwin & Lytkina, 2004):

Half is with one foot in Europe and with the other one in Asia or somewhere even deeper. Those who are not in the avant-garde, not in Piter and Moscow [...] there you have classical matriarchy. The woman is dragging everything, and the man is earning. In the best case scenario, he’s earning. (Anna)

All interviewees placed the origins of this contract in the Soviet period, as evidenced by the quotes of Diana and Victor below. The association with the Soviet period had a profoundly negative meaning for my interviewees. It marked this type of contract as unmodern. It was constructed as unmodern also through the narrative mobilization of the symbolic binaries urban/rural, Piter-Moscow/other towns, Europe/Asia, educated/uneducated.

I think that the majority of people live with a sort of Soviet stereotype that the woman is cooking, cleaning, washing and the husband is lying and reading. And if it is so and this is what is being conveyed [to children] in the family, it’s a disaster, because for the woman that’s very difficult. But the people who have gone to the university, etc., they’re thinking... Although you may also have exceptions there, but in general they are more modern, they are ready to take up

more duties, to participate more and bear responsibility. That's in Piter [*St. Petersburg – auth.*]. But if you go somewhere else – that's 100% [sure that you'll encounter] what I described earlier. (Diana)

If you go from Saint Petersburg to Pskov, you get into another country. The way of living there will be completely... Soviet Union, with all its expressions, views, views on the family life, etc., on leisure, on the division of roles in the family, on women's and men's duties. (Victor)

Devaluation of the working mother gender contract as a middle-class distinction strategy itself has roots in the late Soviet period. As [Akhtyrskiy \(2017\)](#) pointed out, among parts of the highly educated intelligentsia class in the Soviet Union, anti-Soviet sentiments were expressed in the rejection of Soviet gender policies. At the time, this rejection resulted in a greater propensity to endorse the housewife/male breadwinner gender contract. As I show in the next section, however, this no longer seems to be the case for the Russian urban middle class that my interviewees represented.

### *Upper Class: The Housewife/Breadwinner Contract*

The housewife/breadwinner gender contract that appeared in the post-Soviet period ([Rotkirch et al., 2007](#); [Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002](#)) was, indeed, an important point of reference for my respondents. They shared basic assumptions about the distribution of paid and unpaid work among couples observing such a contract. It was clearly identified as the contract of the upper classes and perceived as relatively uncommon: “The women who do not work... I can only remember one former classmate, and [she is not working] only because her husband is very rich” (Oleg).

While a small number of respondents evaluated this contract neutrally (“has a right to exist” (Leonid)), most constructed it as problematic for two main reasons. A first set of arguments included depictions of housewives as “women who do not develop in all the senses” (Victor), “limiting themselves” (Zhanna), and potentially “going crazy within four walls” (Andrey). Second, women embracing or aspiring toward such gender contracts were portrayed as immoral consumers: “If you look around, there are very many girly girls who would go to the beauty salon as if to work and sugar daddies with money” (Alina). There was a strong association between the housewife/breadwinner contract and the supported woman contract ([Temkina & Rotkirch, 2002](#)). In several instances, this contract was also constructed as something outdated and unmodern, as a legacy of the late socialist/early post-socialist period when women were structurally forced to engage in this sort of relationship: “[At] the end of the 1980s [...] for many young women the option of getting married and—figuratively speaking—getting a free ride or living ‘behind’ someone

was a survival option” (Victor). Only Evgeniya, who was raised in an affluent family with a stay-at-home mother, saw this arrangement as highly desirable—a view that her dissatisfaction with her current job and her husband’s relatively low income also contributed to.

Men’s role within this contract was, on the contrary, notably less problematized. For both male and female interviewees, men’s ability to meet breadwinning expectations justified their assumed disengagement from housework and/or childcare (cf. [Ashwin & Isupova, 2018](#)). In fact, the situations when such men still did actively engage in those activities roused respondents’ admiration: “I’m genuinely impressed and I very much admire my friends that are... There’s one family where the father... the wife doesn’t work and he does. But they share the night shifts with the baby equally, despite the fact that he works” (Mikhail).

### *Middle Class: From the Career-Oriented Woman to the Egalitarian Gender Contract*

The career-oriented woman gender contract ([Temkina & Rotkirkh, 2002](#)) was also extensively discussed by my respondents. This was not surprising, since many female interviewees identified as career women and all respondents had such women in their social circles. Respondents’ description of this contract in terms of paid and unpaid work division broadly fell into three sub-categories (although they did not use these terms themselves): dual earner/unequal carer; dual earner/outsourced care; dual earner/dual carer.

The key commonality between the three sub-categories was the character of the woman’s paid work. Career women’s engagement in paid work was constructed in almost exclusively positive terms by both male and female interviewees. This also differentiated the career-oriented woman contract from that of the working mother. The images of “independent and well-developed women” (Tamara) that achieve success through paid work they choose to—rather than have to—engage in (“The woman is not a draft horse. She does what she wants.” (Dmitry)) were prominent across women’s and men’s narratives. In many instances, career women were also depicted as morally superior to housewives, precisely because of their paid work.

Career women were, however, described as having different arrangements when it came to housework and childcare. Some of them had dual earner/unequal carer contracts and male partners who did not take any responsibility for things done within the household—although in contrast to lower class men they admittedly earned well—and were dismissively described by my respondents in their narratives as “big boys behind mama’s back” (Anna). Career progression of women under this arrangement was primarily enabled by participation of other—mostly female—members of their extended families in childcare. A modified version of the dual earner/unequal carer

contract was the dual earner/outsourced care contract. Outsourcing was viewed by both female and male interviewees as something that has become more available materially and more acceptable symbolically for middle classes. Yet, under this type of contract the outsourcing of domestic work and care remained women's zone of responsibility. As Tamara described her highly successful entrepreneur friend: "She's a sort of organizer. So, everything that she's outsourcing—she has arranged it herself. She has a nanny, tutors for children, a woman who cleans the flat, and a lot of other things." My interviewees clearly considered the above as middle- and upper-class contracts because of the level of assumed income, types of jobs performed, and consumption patterns (outsourcing, engaging in flat renovations, fitness, etc.) of the people engaged in them.

The emergence of dual earner/unequal carer contract and dual earner/outsourced care contracts as sub-categories of the career-oriented woman gender contract was already predicted in the early 2000s (Temkina & Rotkirkh, 2002). My respondents, however, also talked about another sub-category, which only recently has been identified in sociological literature on Russia (Chernova, 2014). It could be defined as dual earner/dual carer or "egalitarian" (some respondents actually used the latter term). The key features differentiating this sub-type from the aforementioned ones were related to the understanding of men's roles within it. Men in this contract were described first and foremost as involved fathers fully participating in their child's life:

Evgeniya: Now, of course, the century of cool dads has begun. Previously, they sort of steered clear off [the children], and now they are just right on. [...] It's a full-fledged participation in the child's life. Not like "*I'll communicate with him, once he starts talking*", but in full, with washing bottoms, etc. In one of the couples that we know it was the dad that woke up at night to [care for] the child, to rock him, to feed, and so on. So, full-fledged participation. Both as a friend, as an authority, and as a parent [who is] always close.

Interviewer: Why do you think this has happened in contemporary Russia, that such category of dads has appeared?

Evgeniya: This probably has not one single reason. Probably, [because] we have also seen how it's done not in Russia. European dads are a special story. Maybe, it's a sort of generational tiredness, because... How much longer could women pull everything themselves?

They were also praised for their ability to recognize women's equal contribution in the domain of paid work and translate this into both lower demands regarding women's contribution in the domestic sphere and their own increased participation in routine housework tasks. At the same time,

female partners of such men were characterized as having lower male breadwinning expectations.

Among younger [people] – older people don't have this at all – [there are cases] when partners are egalitarian. I see that that is happening, I see it among my acquaintances. Men already see that women have the same rights, that if she earns, then she also gets tired, that she has a right to have time for herself, to go to the gym rather than staying by the cookstove. [...] Now you [also] no longer have [a situation] when the woman expects the man to earn millions, she's ready to help him financially. (Anna)

This egalitarian contract was unequivocally constructed as modern. As the quotes above show, it was attributed to the younger generation and perceived as something “European” (a classic metaphor for modern in Russia (Pilkington, Omel'chenko, Flynn, & Bliudina, 2002)). It also had clear class connotations in the respondents' narratives as a characteristic of the educated (see the quote by Diana in the following section).

## **Gender and Class Accountability**

The above-discussed shared representations of classed gender contracts can be seen to underpin my respondents' understandings of middle-class (in)appropriate ways of “doing gender.” As a result, both in paid and in unpaid work domains, my interviewees held themselves, each other, and others directly involved in their families' reproductive work (primarily grandparents) accountable not only to sex category (West & Zimmerman, 1987) but also to actual or aspired class category (middle-class) (West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002). This double accountability was determinative for the eventual division of both types of work. In Table 1, along with the demographic data, I indicate which of the above-described gender contracts my interviewees' own family arrangements most closely resembled.

Class (aspirations), however, moderated gendered expectations in paid and unpaid work in different ways. In the realm of paid work, class (aspirations) primarily impacted women's accountability. When it came to unpaid work, class played a larger role in moderating expectations towards men's roles.

It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss other relatives' accountability. But, as often is the case in Russia, many of my respondents' parents were indeed involved in childcare provision. As I found out, however, grandparents' class position (their work schedules and contents of their work, their consumption patterns, such as traveling, continuous learning, and/or their attempts to meet new partners) significantly moderated my respondents' expectations and their parents' accountability when it came to negotiations

about childcare sharing (cf. Utrata (2011, 2015) on gender, age, and class accountability among Russian single mothers and their mothers).

### *Holding (Aspiring) Middle-Class Men Accountable as Carers*

Most of my female respondents held their husbands accountable not only as breadwinners but also as carers. Independently of men's actual earnings, they considered a lack of men's involvement in housework not just unfair but also inappropriate for their (aspired) class position. A female partner (Diana) from a mixed-class couple who was deeply dissatisfied with the existing gender division of housework and childcare with her husband (Konstantin) answered my question about how she thought they compared in terms of their gender division of labor with people they knew as follows:

I can say that we are very different from (my) colleagues, because... again, if we return to education... Mainly, of course, people have office jobs. When I tell [about my situation]... nobody usually understands me. So, I don't really like telling my story very much – they don't have such situations where a person does not want to do anything. So, they always sit down and somehow in an educated way, with argumentation [decide] “*I can't manage this timewise, and you can, so you do it*”. That's why it's easier for them – their dads could cook a soup, could bring a child to a doctor. And I always even envy this a bit, because they don't have such a problem that they have to force, to make dramas “*Let it be you who do it today*”, so, it comes naturally to them. Everything is completely different. And actually, if it happens that I have lunch with a male colleague, I could communicate with him absolutely equally – he understands and knows what is happening at his child's school, knows what's going on when the child is ill, which medicines he takes, could call a doctor, could wash a child... And I don't even talk about things like washing the dishes... I communicate with him as if we're equals, he knows everything. And ours [*respondent's husband – auth.*] knows very little. I mean if I tell him “*You go to a doctor today*”, and he [responds] “*What should I say there?*” I tell him “*The child is ill, he has this diagnosis*”. He writes everything down and goes there with a sheet of paper. In principle, he's not interested to get to know things by himself. My colleagues do not have this. Father and mother – they are equal, they're interchangeable and equal. There's no such thing that this should be done by a woman, and this by a man. (Diana)

The above quote illustrates that Diana considers the ability to negotiate about and actual involvement of men in unpaid work as a middle-class marker. Feelings that made her unwilling to share her story with her colleagues could be interpreted as a form of class shame (Skeggs, 1997). Diana sanctioned her husband's behavior with frequent conflicts. At the end of the interview, she

also admitted that she was seriously considering a divorce. A number of other female interviewees felt similarly embarrassed about their husbands' complete disengagement from housework and, especially, childcare.

Husbands' ability to meet their wives' expectations concerning housework and childcare, on the contrary, was a source of pride for the women who were in the relationships characterized by comparatively more equal distribution of unpaid work. Alexandra, a successful entrepreneur who was also in a cross-class marriage and was the main breadwinner in the family, expressed high levels of satisfaction with the current division of unpaid work in their family:

He knows better [than I], when the [parents] meeting is, what [girls] should do for school. He is reading a class blog of our youngest [daughter] and reminds me about things. So, I don't feel like this sort of rabid mama who always knows everything that is happening at her children's school... (Alexandra)

Comparing her own family with a wealthy housewife/breadwinner family of her close relatives, Alexandra emphasized that while a woman in that family "could have rest, because she has this sort of daddy (...) I could have rest, because I have negotiated with my husband-friend. That's democratic". Alexandra considered the gender division of work in their family as something that distinguished them both from the working mother (and marginalized husband) contract of the lower classes and from the housewife/breadwinner contract. It allowed them to claim middle-class status not only materially (through the comparatively high income that Alexandra's business was bringing them) but also symbolically. It was the latter that Diana and her husband Konstantin have continuously failed to achieve, despite his sufficiently high material contribution to the family budget.

In contrast to Diana's husband, most male respondents also held themselves accountable as carers. They actively tried to distance themselves from the images of men associated with the working mother contract. Maxim, who grew up in a remote rural area and told me about having many "infantile" men among his relatives, considered his own equal involvement in housework and childcare a sort of class marker that distinguished him from them. For Maxim, an urban aspiring middle-class man like himself "should be earning money for the main part of the family's budget [through] work, business. But he also should take care of housekeeping. It is his responsibility to make the domestic life of his family comfortable". Maxim and his wife Anna, indeed, both reported nearly equal sharing of childcare, housework, and domestic management.

For most men, greater involvement in housework and, especially, childcare was also a way to distance themselves from their own parents' gender contracts (all of which were essentially Soviet working mother contracts):

I'm not a supporter of the approach "*You need it – you do it*" (...) I've always been irritated by this. My [parental] family is more traditional in this sense. So, my mom always cooked and, since I spent time with her, I understand [how difficult] this sort of woman's work [is]. (Victor)

My father perceived me – I suppose – as something taken for granted. A typical family should have had a child. They brought the child to a kindergarten. Then he grew up. (...) I completely reject the model that I had [in the relationship] with my father during my childhood, i.e. that I was just a necessary element, as it seemed to me. And all the fantasies that I wanted to realize with my father I now transfer to my son. (Dmitry)

Women's and men's expectations of greater men's involvement in routine housework and care were also related to the outsourcing of "male tasks" (flat renovations, repairs, car maintenance, etc.) that has become a common practice in Russian urban centers. In the Soviet period under a shortage economy, these tasks constituted a significant part of men's domestic responsibilities, and some of my interviewees saw it as a justification for their fathers' non-involvement in other types of housework and care. Being ready to outsource (and actually doing it) in the current economic environment was a self-evident choice for most of my interviewees, which itself could be considered a class distinction strategy (Rotkirch et al., 2012). Outsourcing of "male tasks" was perceived as unacceptable only by male interviewees with working-class backgrounds. For them, their ability to perform these tasks constituted an important way of "doing" masculinity. But they were the only ones who still held themselves accountable to sex category in this way.

My respondents' ability to derive respectability from their relatively equal distribution of unpaid work was enabled by the increasing cultural availability of the dual earner/dual carer gender contract. At the interactional level, this increased cultural availability translated into high levels of acceptability ("I cannot name among my acquaintances a person who shies away from domestic responsibilities, someone who would say '*That's not a man's task*'" (Timur)) and sometimes even positive sanctioning (e.g., by kindergarten teachers) of increased men's involvement in housework and childcare.

There was, however, a crucial difference in how my male and female respondents perceived the dual earner/dual carer arrangements. Most women saw it as their ultimate goal, and those who have achieved it derived respectability from it. On the contrary, most men—except Victor, who was a self-proclaimed egalitarian—did not see this kind of distribution of labor as their final desired goal. While equal division of childcare was as desirable for many of them as for women, equal division of housework was just an intermediate strategy. What most men who, in fact, 'shared the load' actually aspired to was a dual earner/dual carer/outsourced housework sort of contract

that for them was the marker of the successful upper classes. As Andrey admitted, in an ideal situation he would prefer “to have a private house, to earn a lot of money and let servants deal with the housework.”

### *Holding (Aspiring) Middle-Class Women Accountable for Their Careers and Sex Appeal*

The second key factor that impacted distribution of unpaid work among my interviewees was that female partners were held accountable not only as homemakers and carers but also as workers. Especially in couples with relatively more equal distribution of unpaid work, men placed strong emphasis on their wives' careers and self-realization while constructing their wives' incomes as symbolically unimportant to them (cf. [Anderson, 2017](#)):

When Zhenya [Evgeniya] starts getting pleasure from her work, when she calls me and says “*I’m proud of myself because I managed to do this and that*” – I feel great. It would be cool, if she’d continue developing in this direction, it would be great. She should become a real professional. But not in order to bring more money to the family, no, but so that she would glow [with enthusiasm] that she is able [to do that], that she’s a professional, that she’s a sort of entity, growing entity. That’s what I would like very much. If she would get two kopecs for that – I don’t give a toss about that. We have never been hungry and we never will, so the financial question doesn’t interest me. (Dmitry)

Both this devaluation of women’s incomes and simultaneous valuation of their careers were part of my male interviewees’ middle-class distinction strategy. They wanted to distance themselves from the images of men who depended on their wives’ incomes, which they associated with the working mother gender contract. At the same time, they also clearly wanted to distinguish their partners from the housewives and “supported women.” Therefore, they held them accountable for professional self-realization that they perceived as a middle-class-appropriate way of doing femininity in the domain of paid work. This finding is corroborated by the results of the 2011 Russian wave of World Values Survey ([Inglehart et al., 2014](#)) which showed that the higher the subjective social class of men, the more likely they were to disagree with the statement that “Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay” (31.9% of upper class men vs. 7.8% of lower class men).

Women in these couples also held themselves accountable as workers, but on slightly different terms. Like their partners, they actively constructed their work as a source of self-realization, but they did not downplay the material importance of their incomes to the same extent that their partners did. They recognized that without their incomes their families would not be able to maintain the same middle-class standard of living. With very few exceptions,

however, there was little disagreement between male and female respondents regarding the importance of woman's paid work.

In addition to professional self-realization, several women in my sample faced their partners' expectations concerning their ability to maintain physical attractiveness. Men never openly spoke about their expectations regarding their partners' appearance, but from women's interviews it became clear that this was a significant factor affecting their relationships. As Anna put it, she was expected "to work, to do housework, to be beautiful and young, to go to fitness, to not get tired, and to look well and young." In recent years, aesthetic labor has become an important aspect of doing middle-class femininity (Porteous, 2017) and my interviewees clearly had to deal with these expectations in their everyday life.

Heightened expectations of (aspiring) middle-class women's professional self-realization, together with heightened demands placed on their physical attractiveness and sex appeal, were unsurprisingly difficult to combine with continued expectations regarding their roles as primary homemakers and carers. This had served as a source of conflict among several of the interviewed couples, and as a consequence of this conflict unpaid work was eventually redistributed. The most extreme conflict had emerged between Svetlana and Mikhail. After a prestigious degree and several years of working in the corporate sector, Svetlana had spent the subsequent few years as a housewife taking care of two children, until her highly successful husband requested a divorce having complained that she had become "too homely" (Mikhail). After Svetlana resumed working, they eventually got back together.

I have always, certainly, felt comfortable with [the idea of] a woman taking care of home. This is what I probably had expected. But with the passage of time, I have become smarter and understood that if a woman would wash, iron, stay with kids, she would, most likely, look worse, she won't be so interesting for me as a person, and so on. So, I have come to the point when I am ready to compromise. That's what it probably is... I have come [the point] that I am ready to have a cleaner, I from time to time say to Svetlana, let's bring out clothes to dry cleaning, let's not have dinner – *"Don't cook, please, for three hours, let's go somewhere and spend time together."* I've also come to understand that it is very important that a woman is interesting for me. My initial attitude was erroneous, yes. (Mikhail)

A possibility to outsource routine housework—which the (aspiring) middle classes in Russia now are expected to at least consider (Rotkirch et al., 2012)—was another important moderating factor of women's accountability in the domestic sphere. As a consequence of their own accountability to the middle-class category, several men did not feel entitled to expect from their partners the performance of potentially outsourceable domestic work.

## Discussion and Conclusions

Answering the call to further investigate the role of changing normative expectations of gender and their relation with class in the domain of unpaid work (Geist & Ruppner, 2018; Sullivan, 2010), I have focused on processes of gender accountability (West & Zimmerman, 1987, 2009) and class accountability (West & Fenstermaker, 1995; Yodanis, 2002) as shaping negotiations about and performance of housework and care among Russian (aspiring) middle-class dual earner heterosexual couples. My analysis allowed me to explore a potential explanatory mechanism for the positive association between class and gender equality in the division of unpaid work, observed both in Russia and internationally. In particular, I showed that my respondents viewed the gender contracts that emerged during Soviet and post-Soviet periods in Russia as profoundly classed. They considered specific ways of doing femininity and masculinity and, relatedly, specific modes of dividing paid and unpaid work as signaling specific social class roles (cf. “class acts” in Williams 2010). In contrast to Williams’ (2010) argument that the traditional gender performance and aspiration to achieve housewife/breadwinner family arrangement is related to middle-class status aspirations, my respondents overwhelmingly associated the dual earner/dual carer and dual earner/dual carer/outsourced housework arrangements with the middle-class status. As a result, they held themselves and each other accountable for doing masculinity and femininity both in paid and unpaid work domains in ways that they considered appropriate for their actual or aspired middle-class role. (Aspiring) middle-class men were accountable not only as breadwinners, but also as carers; while (aspiring) middle-class women, in addition to their caring roles, were accountable for their career and sex appeal. In several cases, this double gender and class accountability was an important factor in a comparatively more gender-equal distribution of unpaid work.

The results of this study suggest that, in research on gender inequality in the division of unpaid work, class should be treated as more than just a socio-demographic variable indicating partners’ structural position. Understanding class *also* as a process and as something that could be signaled and marked through particular gendered practices expands our ability to comprehend the association between class and gender inequality in the domestic domain.

This study also demonstrates why the narrowing of the gender gap in unpaid work among higher classes may not necessarily be a sign of increasing gender egalitarianism. First, as was the case for many of my male interviewees, a more equal gender division of housework could be an intermediate strategy used by those who—due to their class position/aspirations—perceive it as a source of respectability, but are not (yet) able to outsource. In highly unequal and marketized societies like contemporary Russia, where unpaid work is much less valued than paid work (Utrata, 2011, 2015), and the

politicization of the private sphere and the rise of the grassroots feminist movement have only recently begun (Couch, 2020), gender equality in the domestic domain is not likely to be perceived by many as an end goal. Second, a narrow conceptualization of unpaid work may prevent us from seeing how gender inequality in this domain could morph depending on a couple's class (aspirations). Different types of unpaid work have different symbolic value in class production (Collins, 1992). For some of my respondents, as a result of their class accountability, women's ability to perform aesthetic labor was relatively more important than their ability to perform housework, and time for the former was secured at the expense of the latter. Aesthetic labor, however, is usually not accounted for in surveys on the gender division of unpaid work.

This study is only a first step towards a better understanding of how gender and class are done in dual earner families across different countries and of the role that these processes play in the reproduction of and change in gender inequality in the division of unpaid work. To improve our understanding of this mechanism, future qualitative inquiries should focus on those contexts.

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**Study 3: Back to ‘traditional’ family values? Trends in gender ideologies in Russia,  
1994-2012**

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# Back to ‘Traditional’ Family Values? Trends in Gender Ideologies in Russia, 1994–2012

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## Abstract

Previous studies on individual-level gender ideologies in Russia have produced conflicting results, with some suggesting re-traditionalisation and others noting increasing egalitarianism. This research explores changes in the Russian population’s views on gender division of labour between 1994 and 2012, moving beyond unidimensional conceptualisations of gender ideology that juxtapose traditionalism with egalitarianism. The findings evidence highly class-specific gender-ideology trajectories. Only lower classes increased their support for separate spheres. Amongst the more educated and affluent, ‘re-traditionalisation’ instead entailed increased endorsement of both joint breadwinning and gender-essentialist views of women’s caring roles at the expense of support for the housewife/male-breadwinner model and for egalitarianism.

WHILE RUSSIA’S RETURN TO ‘TRADITIONAL FAMILY values’ at the level of political discourse and in actual policymaking is hardly debatable (Makarychev & Medvedev 2015; Sorainen *et al.* 2017), the picture regarding changes in gender ideologies<sup>1</sup> at the individual

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<sup>1</sup>In this article, I draw upon Davis and Greenstein’s (2009, p. 87) definition of gender ideology as ‘individuals’ levels of support for a division of paid work and family responsibilities’. I therefore use the terms ‘gender ideology’ and ‘gender attitudes’ synonymously, as is commonly done in quantitative studies of this type. My use of the term is aligned with Ashwin and Isupova’s (2018) approach. It is important to note, however, that the definition of the term ‘gender ideology’ used in this article is substantially different from the one commonly used in Russian gender studies scholarship to refer to the state’s gender ideology; for example, Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007). The two types of gender ideology are closely related, as macro-level ideology is either incorporated or resisted in individuals’ gender beliefs (Lorber 1994). Later in this article, however, the focus is on individual micro-level ‘ideologies’.

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level appears much less clear. Some researchers have, indeed, noted signs of attitudinal re-traditionalisation in the form of stronger preferences for separate spheres and more essentialist views of gender roles in general.<sup>2</sup> Meanwhile, others have highlighted the development of more egalitarian attitudes towards the gender division of labour, while also noting the persistence of the socialist ideological legacy, whereby joint breadwinning is prized yet women are also considered primarily responsible for care and domestic work (White 2005; Ashwin & Isupova 2018; Gurko 2019). Some researchers have also suggested that the dominant attitudes and preferred modes of gender division of labour may increasingly differ between classes (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002; Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2007) and across generations (White 2005; Gurko 2019; Klüsener *et al.* 2019). Overall, both the direction of change in gender ideologies and their determinants in contemporary Russia remain debated and understudied.

My goal in this article is to address this gap by further testing the argument about the alleged re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies amongst the Russian population. To this end, I provide a quantitative analysis of changes in Russian women's and men's views regarding the ideal way to divide care work and breadwinning in the early postsocialist period (1994–2002) and during the subsequent decade (2002–2012), drawing on three waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles (ISSP Research Group 2016). In contrast to previous quantitative studies on the topic, rather than relying on a unidimensional conceptualisation of gender ideology, I analyse three ideological orientations—separate spheres, egalitarian and ‘traditional (double burden)’—with the last capturing combined beliefs in joint breadwinning and women's primary responsibility for unpaid care and domestic work. I also focus on the effects of education and income on gender ideologies, as well as on the ideological variations across different generations.

I start the article with a review of what we know so far about changes in Russians' attitudes towards gender division of labour, and place this discussion into the wider international scholarly debates about measuring gender ideologies and their determinants. This is followed by a description of the methodology of this study, the presentation of results and the discussion of key findings both in relation to the previous empirical studies in Russia and to broader scholarship of gender attitudes/ideologies.

### *Making sense of change in gender ideologies in Russia*

#### *Inadequacy of traditional/egalitarian framework*

In the international scholarship, gender ideology is most commonly framed as a unidimensional concept ranging from traditional to egalitarian (Kroska 2007; Davis & Greenstein 2009). Traditional ideology refers to a belief in gendered separate spheres in the family and employment domains, with the sphere of earning defined as male, and care and domestic work defined as female. Egalitarianism, on the contrary, reflects beliefs in women's and men's joint responsibility for earning and caring.

<sup>2</sup>For example, Nechaeva (2017), Kosova (2018), Klüsener *et al.* (2019).

Several recent studies, however, have indicated the inadequacy of the unidimensional framework for empirically locating contemporary gender ideologies (Grunow *et al.* 2018; Scarborough *et al.* 2019; Dernberger & Pepin 2020). Looking beyond traditional and egalitarian gender ideologies, researchers working on the United States and other Western countries have identified a number of other—so-called multidimensional—ideologies, characterised by a combination of beliefs in both separate and joint spheres.

Notably, a number of scholars researching gender relations in Russia have argued for quite a while that the unidimensional framework does not capture the full complexity of Russians' attitudes towards the gender division of labour.<sup>3</sup> As Gradskova (2016, p. 74) pertinently pointed out: 'The gender roles, expectations and values of Russian citizens constitute a ... peculiar patchwork. Loud declarations of the importance of family with "traditional" gender roles clash with ideas from 70 years of state socialism on the acceptability of women's work for wages outside the home'. Relatedly, Ashwin and Isupova argued that: 'In the post-Soviet context, "traditional" implies support for a ... model in which the man is the breadwinner (highest earner) and the woman is employed and takes primary responsibility for domestic labour. Separate spheres are the preserve of a wealthy minority' (Ashwin & Isupova 2018, p. 447). Further on in the text I therefore use 'traditional (double burden)' in quotation marks to refer to one of the categories of my dependent variable, to indicate that I am adopting Ashwin and Isupova's (2018) definition.<sup>4</sup> I use traditional without quotation marks to refer to the separate spheres ideology.

All the quantitative analyses concerned with the transformation of gender attitudes in Russia identified during the literature review for this article still relied, however, on the unidimensional conceptualisations of gender ideology that juxtapose traditionalism with egalitarianism (Motiejunaite & Kravchenko 2008; Lezhnina 2013; Nechaeva 2017; Kosova 2018; Klüsener *et al.* 2019). While these studies have provided important insights into the trends and determinants of gender egalitarianism and traditionalism in Russia, they have failed to account for the seemingly contradictory views on men's and women's roles in the family that most of the Russian population actually still holds. The current study addresses this gap by focusing on three ideologies, namely, separate spheres, egalitarian and 'traditional (double burden)'.

#### *Macro-level context and the direction of ideological change at the individual level*

The most prevalent gender ideology in late socialist Russia entailed an expectation that a man should be the highest earner, while a woman should work but also take primary responsibility for care and domestic work (Kay 2002; Temkina & Rotkirch 2002; Ashwin & Isupova 2018). At the macro level, this ideology was supported by universal employment and a substantial gender wage gap (Ashwin & Isupova 2018). It was further reinforced by the Communist Party's proclamations of women's 'right' to contribute to

<sup>3</sup>For recent discussions, see Gradskova (2016), Ashwin and Isupova (2018).

<sup>4</sup>See also Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) for a discussion of different understandings of 'tradition' in the interpretation of women's and men's roles in postsocialist Russia.

national production, combined later with a renewed emphasis on women's domestic and care responsibilities triggered by concerns about falling fertility in the 1970s (Kay 2002). This ideology was at the core of the so-called 'working mother' gender contract (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002)<sup>5</sup> and underpinned Soviet women's infamous 'double burden' of paid work and care (Lapidus 1978).

In the postsocialist period, changes at the macro level of political discourse and policies have been conceptualised as 'neo-traditionalist' (Watson 1993; Zdravomyslova & Temkina 2007). Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) proposed to differentiate between 'neoliberal gender traditionalism' and 'neo-statist traditionalism' as two key macro-level ideological frameworks. The former entails a combination of contradictory beliefs in, on the one hand, gender equality and women's right to choose (whether to pursue a career, become a housewife or do both); and on the other hand, in 'natural' differences between sexes that predestine women to become mothers and carers. Neo-statist traditionalism constructs women as a special category of citizens in need of paternalist social policies due to their demographic function: reproducing the nation. In addition, since the early 2010s, the discourse of 'traditional family values', emphasising the importance of heterosexual and fecund marriage based on the provision of unpaid care, has become central to the government's conservative political agenda (Sorainen *et al.* 2017; Ukhova 2018).

Research on changes in gender ideologies at the individual level, however, has provided quite contradictory results. Researchers have relied on two substantially different approaches, each of which produced a somewhat different picture. The first approach has been informed by a combination of evolutionary modernisation theory (Inglehart & Norris 2003) and arguments about the postsocialist neo-traditionalist turn discussed above. Mostly relying on large-scale survey data, these studies juxtaposed attitudinal liberalisation with re-traditionalisation, employing the unidimensional conceptualisation of gender ideology.<sup>6</sup> For example, using the 1994 and 2002 waves of ISSP, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko explored changes in support for the male-breadwinner family model *vis-à-vis* the egalitarian family model and showed that 'Russian people on average became slightly more liberal' (Motiejunaite & Kravchenko 2008, p. 45). More recent studies employing this approach have rather unequivocally suggested, however, that after some liberalising tendencies in the 1990s and early 2000s, Russians' gender attitudes became more traditional in the late 2000s to early 2010s (Nechaeva 2017; Kosova 2018; Klüsener *et al.* 2019).

The second approach has focused on the pluralisation and complexity of gender ideologies in the postsocialist period.<sup>7</sup> Usually relying on qualitative interview/focus-group data or

<sup>5</sup>The concept of a 'gender contract' was initially developed by Scandinavian feminist scholars—and later widely adopted in Russian gender studies—to refer to 'unspoken rules, mutual obligations and rights which define the relations between women and men, between genders and generations, and finally between the areas of production and reproduction' in specific socio-historical contexts (Hirdman 1996; Rantalaio 1997, p. 25). This concept is thus closely related to the concept of gender ideology, as used in this article. The contract of 'working mother' implied equal participation of men and women in the labour market combined with women's primary responsibility for care and domestic work, usually shared with other female members of the household.

<sup>6</sup>For example, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008), Lezhnina (2013), Nechaeva (2017), Kosova (2018), Klüsener *et al.* (2019).

<sup>7</sup>For example, Temkina and Rotkirch (2002), White (2005), Ashwin and Isupova (2018), Gurko (2019).

highly specific surveys, these studies have provided detailed accounts of evolving gender ideologies. This scholarship has paid particular attention to the persistence and morphing of the Soviet ideological legacy that is difficult to locate on the unidimensional attitudinal vector. For example, Temkina and Rotkirch (2002) have argued that, although ‘working mother’ remains the most dominant gender contract in Russia, a range of alternative contracts implying a different gender division of labour inside and outside of the home are also gaining legitimacy, including the ‘career-oriented woman’ contract, the ‘housewife/male breadwinner’ contract and the ‘sponsored woman’ contract.<sup>8</sup> Anne White’s study of Voronezh women students’ gender-role attitudes carried out in the early 2000s suggested that the majority did not endorse the idea of women’s ‘return to the hearth’ and were, instead interested in building ‘careers’; furthermore, nearly half of White’s sample did not see motherhood as an essential role for women (White 2005). In their longitudinal qualitative study, aimed to explain the persistence of a highly unequal gender division of domestic labour in contemporary Russia, Ashwin and Isupova (2018) pointed out the persistence of Soviet-style ‘traditional’ gender ideology, but also noted the shifts away from it, towards egalitarianism, in parts of their sample. Gurko (2019), in her research with male and female university students in Stavropol and Moscow, found signs of increasing support for an egalitarian gender division of labour amongst both women and men, as well as a low endorsement of essentialist views on parenthood. She also pointed out that, while some students preferred professionally orientated egalitarian partnerships, others opted for family-orientated—but still egalitarian—models. Importantly, scholars working within the second approach have also drawn attention to the importance of analysing differences in gender ideologies amongst different social groups, including classes and generations (see more on this in the following section).

Due to the qualitative nature of data used in the second type of studies, their authors avoid drawing conclusions about general societal trends. However—at least to the extent that we could compare findings from large-scale surveys with those from smaller-scale surveys and qualitative studies—the two above-described approaches seem to suggest quite contradictory pictures of the direction of ideological change. My aim in this article is to bring these two bodies of scholarship into conversation, to gain a better understanding of the trends in gender ideologies in Russia, and to answer the questions of whether, and how, we can speak of the re-traditionalisation of gender attitudes in the 2000s without relying on the unidimensional conceptualisation of gender ideology.

#### *Socio-demographic determinants of gender ideologies in Russia*

Individual-level determinants of gender-role attitudes have been widely researched in various contexts. The effects of gender, education, income and cohort on gender ideology—which my

<sup>8</sup>In the ‘career-oriented woman’ contract, women focus on professional development and the organisation of housework and childcare is usually negotiated with relatives and hired domestic and care workers. In the ‘housewife/male breadwinner’ contract, man is a dominating agent; he possesses the power and material resources to support motherhood and female sexual attractiveness. In the ‘sponsored woman’ contract, the man has a similar role as in the housewife/male breadwinner contract, but this relationship does not generally include joint residence and shared children (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002).

study focuses on—are well documented in international research. Those identifying as women, having higher education and belonging to younger cohorts usually hold more egalitarian views on gender division of labour.<sup>9</sup> Having a middle—as opposed to low or high—income has also been shown to be associated with stronger endorsement of egalitarianism (Seguino 2007).

In Russia, however, the role of various determinants of gender ideologies remains quite unclear, as most studies on the topic either focus on general societal trends or are not comparative in their design. Notably, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008, p. 45), using ISSP data from 1994 and 2002, showed that, most commonly, analysed determinants had quite low explanatory power in Russia in the early postsocialist period. The same study, however, suggested that by 2002, Russians' gender attitudes became 'somewhat more predictable', with older, married, religious people without higher education expressing greater support for the male-breadwinner family model.

In terms of gender differences, while Motijunaite and Kravchenko (2008) using ISSP data did not find them to be significant, Fodor and Balogh using EUREQUAL data showed that Russian women tended to hold more liberal views than men (Fodor & Balogh 2010). In a smaller-scale study of students that compared data from 1978 and 2018, Gurko (2019) suggested that the role of gender had decreased over time, as young women and men converged towards greater endorsement of egalitarianism in the family sphere. Nechaeva (2017) found that, between 1999 and 2007, female students embraced more egalitarian views more quickly than male students, and thus the effect of gender as a determinant increased. She observed a return to more traditional views of gender roles between 2007 and 2014, and found that this return was actually faster amongst women, which resulted in decreased gender differences in attitudes.

Class has been indicated as a perhaps increasingly important determinant of Russians' gender ideologies.<sup>10</sup> As Temkina and Rotkirch (2002) and Zdravomyslova and Temkina (2007) have suggested, class stratification processes in the postsocialist period have been related to the differentiation of family models and gender contracts. Indeed, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008) showed that, while education was not a significant predictor of gender attitudes in 1994, by 2002 people with higher education were significantly less likely to endorse the male-breadwinner family model as opposed to the egalitarian model. So far, however, there have been no further studies on the changing role of education and/or income as determinants of gender-role attitudes in Russia.

Finally, cohort effects on gender ideologies that have been quite extensively researched elsewhere (Inglehart & Norris 2003; Cotter *et al.* 2011; Scarborough *et al.* 2019) have received almost no attention in the scholarship on Russia. In a recent comprehensive study on generations in Russia (Radaev 2019), the issue of gender attitudes was not even touched upon. Only Klüsener *et al.* (2019), in their quantitative study of a recent 'baby boom' in Belarus and Russia, tentatively suggested that one of the explanations behind this phenomenon could be that Russian and Belarusian millennials hold more conservative views

<sup>9</sup>For an overview, see Davis and Greenstein (2009), Chatillon *et al.* (2018).

<sup>10</sup>In the qualitative literature that I relied on for selecting class as a variable for my model, class is understood as a process rather than a fixed category. For a discussion, see, for example, Rotkirch *et al.* (2012). As it is challenging to operationalise class as a process in a statistical model, I chose to focus on education and income as proxies of class, following the approach of Seguino (2007) and Cooke (2011), amongst others.

on gender division of labour than previous generations. They have not, however, extensively theorised what could explain this conservative turn amongst millennials in these countries. This lack of analytical focus on potential generational differences in terms of gender ideologies is particularly surprising, given that people from different cohorts experienced the rupture of established gender expectations brought about by the economic collapse of the 1990s and the (initial) rejection of the Soviet gender ideology at different stages of their life course. While those belonging to older cohorts had to renegotiate actual gender roles within their families and/or deal with conflicts stemming from their inability to do so (Kay 2002; Ashwin 2006), those from younger cohorts initially had the role of observers. As has been shown in the case of post-Soviet Lithuania, however, those transformations have profoundly affected younger women's perceptions of desirable and potentially available gendered work–family arrangements (Reiter 2008, 2010). Notably, contrary to Klüsener *et al.*'s (2019) findings, in mid-2000s Lithuania the male-breadwinner model—which had turned out to be economically unfeasible for most post-Soviet families—occupied a relatively marginal position in 'imagined' adulthoods of young women (Reiter 2010).

In this study, using multinomial logistic regression, I not only track the historical trajectory of support for the three analysed gender ideologies, but also examine which socio-demographic characteristics influenced individuals' propensity to endorse each of them. This allows me to test whether, and how, the effects of gender and class on gender ideologies have changed over time. Focusing on birth cohorts also allows me to determine whether Russian millennials favour the separate spheres ideology more than previous generations did.

#### *Method*

This article is based on data from the 1994, 2002 and 2012 waves of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) on Family and Changing Gender Roles, in which Russia participated. The ISSP is a repeated cross-sectional survey drawing nationally representative samples of people aged 18 and over. It allows for the analysis of changes in attitudes towards gender division of labour over time, with a core set of attitudinal questions included in all waves. Income variable was the largest source of missing data (26%). In order to preserve cases with missing data, I used the multiple imputation procedure in SPSS 26, following best practices in family studies (Johnson & Young 2011). Twenty-five datasets were imputed and used for the analysis. Pooled across years, the non-weighted analytical sample size was 5,321.

#### *Dependent variable: gender ideology*

My dependent variable is called 'gender ideology'. It is a nominal variable that captures the three ideologies discussed above: separate spheres, egalitarian and 'traditional (double burden)'. Building on Ashwin and Isupova's (2018) approach, I created this variable based on people's level of agreement with the following two statements:

- (1) Both the man and the woman should contribute to household income; and
  - (2) A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.
- Possible answers varied from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree'.

TABLE 1  
DISTRIBUTION OF ANSWERS TO ITEMS USED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, COUNTS (%), POOLED SAMPLE, \* 1994–2012 (N=5,321)

		1. Both the man and the woman should contribute to household income				
		Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree/nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
2. A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family.	Strongly agree	527 (9.9%)	372 (7.0%)	185 (3.5%)	241 (4.5%)	45 (0.8%)
	Agree	368 (6.9%)	1021 (19.2%)	299 (5.6%)	190 (3.6%)	16 (0.3%)
	Neither agree/nor disagree	260 (4.9%)	587 (11.0%)	189 (3.6%)	40 (0.8%)	10 (0.2%)
	Disagree	322 (6.0%)	446 (8.4%)	49 (0.9%)	44 (0.8%)	7 (0.1%)
	Strongly disagree	73 (1.4%)	11 (0.2%)	6 (0.1%)	6 (0.1%)	7 (0.1%)

Notes: Percentages may not add up to 100, due to rounding up. \* Tables with distribution of answers in each individual wave are not presented for brevity but are available on request. Table 2 provides further details on changes in prevalence of different ideologies over times.

It is important to note that the item on shared breadwinning is frequently not included in unidimensional indices of gender egalitarianism constructed based on ISSP data.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, as my own exploratory analysis showed, inclusion of this item into the indices along with other items normally used in their construction radically reduces the reliability of the resulting scale. However, as Ashwin and Isupova (2018) argued, and as the frequency analysis presented also clearly suggests (see Table 1), in the Russian case this question captures an important dimension of attitudes towards gender division of labour.

In order to code the dependent variable, I first cross-tabulated answers to the two questions (see Table 1). In line with Ashwin and Isupova's findings (2018), a majority of people in all years agreed with both statements—a clear indication of the persistence of 'traditional (double burden)' ideology in Russian society. As Table 1 also shows, however, there was a small, but still substantial, number of people with 'more coherent' views, namely, clear egalitarians and clear traditionalists.

Based on the frequency analysis of answers, I coded those who (strongly) agreed with statement 1 and (strongly) disagreed with statement 2 as endorsing 'egalitarian' ideology (vertically shaded cells in Table 1). Those who (strongly) disagreed with statement 1 and (strongly) agreed with statement 2 were coded as endorsing 'separate spheres' ideology (diagonally shaded cells in Table 1). Those who did not (strongly) disagree either with statement 1 or with statement 2 were coded as endorsing 'traditional (double burden)' ideology (grey cells in Table 1).

The decision to include those with neutral answers in the latter category was taken based on the analysis of the bivariate distribution of the two variables. As Table 1 illustrates, the distribution has one clear peak located in the cell 'agree/agree'. This suggests that this ideology is hegemonic and those with neutral answers could, therefore, be assumed to be more likely to endorse rather than oppose it.

Those located in the lower right corner of Table 1, which represented 3.1% of the pooled sample, had attitudes that placed them outside of the three ideological categories; namely,

<sup>11</sup>For example, Motiejunaite and Kravchenko (2008), Treas and Tai (2016).

they opposed shared breadwinning but were also against separate spheres. I first coded them as a separate ‘inconsistent’ category. But having run the models first including them as a separate category and then as missing—which yielded essentially similar results—I opted to exclude them from further analysis.

#### *Independent variables and analytical approach*

I used ‘year’ dummies to analyse changes in the likelihood of endorsing each type of gender ideology over time. ‘Household income’ was coded as a set of three dummy variables, namely, bottom 20%, middle 60% and top 20% of the household-size equivalised income distribution. I calculated household equivalised income by dividing household income as reported in the ISSP by the square root of the household size. Respondents’ ‘level of education’ was also coded as a set of three dummy variables—low, medium and high—corresponding to ISCED 2011 categories 0–2, 3–4 and 5–6 respectively. I first used local coding for the Russia-specific education variable, which then was translated into the international coding scheme ISCED 2011. To account for cohort effects, but also to understand generational differences in gender ideologies, I used a set of five ‘generations’ dummy variables. I drew on Radaev’s (2019) classification and coded those born in or before 1938 as the ‘mobilisation’ generation. Those born between 1939 and 1946 were coded as the ‘thaw’ generation, followed by the ‘stagnation’ generation born between 1947 and 1967; those born between 1968 and 1981 were coded as the ‘reform’ generation and the 1982–2000 cohort as ‘millennials’.

I also controlled for a number of other established determinants of gender ideology (Davis & Greenstein 2009). I coded respondents’ ‘labour market status’ as a dummy variable differentiating between those working for wages and those who were not. ‘Marital status’ was also coded as a dummy variable, with those married or living with partners coded as married, and all others as not married. Respondents’ ‘religiosity’ was also coded as a dummy, based on a question about whether the respondent belonged to any religion. Unfortunately, a related question on religious service attendance was not included in all the waves, so it was not possible to account for this potentially important aspect of religiosity. As at least 90% of respondents in all years had working mothers, to ensure large enough cell counts, I dropped this covariate in the final analysis. Data on urban/rural residence and parenthood could not be included as they were not available in all the waves.

As gender ideology is conceptualised as a nominal variable, I estimated a series of multinomial logistic regression models. I pooled the data for all years and respondents and regressed the dependent variable on time variables (year dummies), class characteristics (education and household income dummies), interactions of class characteristics with time variables, generational dummies and a set of control variables described above to account for compositional changes in the samples over time, as well as for alternative, individual-level explanations. Taking into account that gender is considered an important predictor of gender-role attitudes, I also included a gender dummy, as well as interactions of gender with all the other variables. All variables were entered into the models simultaneously. To simplify the presentation of the results, I then ran the same model separately for men and women. In what follows, I present the results from the latter step of the analysis, indicating the coefficients for which the gender differences were statistically significant in the pooled model (see Table 2).

TABLE 2  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Proportions								
	1994				2012				
	Total N = 1,998	Women N = 1,272	Men N = 726	Total N = 1,798	Women N = 1,103	Men N = 695	Total N = 1,525	Women N = 978	Men N = 547
'Traditional (double burden)' ideology	0.69	0.67	0.71	0.72	0.70	0.74	0.75	0.73	0.80
Separate spheres ideology	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.06
Egalitarian ideology	0.15	0.17	0.12	0.17	0.19	0.14	0.16	0.18	0.12
Inconsistent attitudes/missing	0.04	0.05	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
Income									
Low income/bottom income quintile	0.20	0.25	0.13	0.20	0.23	0.15	0.20	0.23	0.15
Medium income	0.60	0.58	0.61	0.60	0.59	0.61	0.60	0.61	0.58
High income/top income quintile	0.20	0.17	0.26	0.20	0.18	0.24	0.20	0.16	0.27
Education									
Low level of education	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.13	0.13	0.13
Medium level of education	0.66	0.68	0.62	0.56	0.55	0.58	0.62	0.60	0.64
Higher education	0.12	0.10	0.16	0.20	0.20	0.18	0.25	0.27	0.23
Generation									
'Mobilisation'	0.20	0.22	0.16	0.21	0.24	0.16	0.11	0.11	0.09
'Thaw'	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.08	0.10	0.06
'Stagnation'	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.39	0.37	0.42	0.37	0.37	0.35
'Reform'	0.19	0.17	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.24	0.22	0.23	0.22
'Millennials'	-	-	-	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.22	0.19	0.28
Married (0 = no; 1 = yes)	0.69	0.66	0.75	0.53	0.47	0.62	0.47	0.42	0.55
Working for wages (0 = no; 1 = yes)	0.68	0.63	0.77	0.56	0.48	0.67	0.54	0.51	0.60
Religious (0 = no; 1 = yes)	0.55	0.66	0.36	0.76	0.81	0.68	0.87	0.90	0.81

Note: Pooled statistics based on 25 imputed samples.

TABLE 3  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Year (ref. category: 1994)</i>						
2002	2.82*	1.70	1.21	1.50	0.43	1.16
2012	4.24*	1.29	1.03	1.23	0.24*	0.72
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level of education	3.39***	2.67*	2.45**	1.97 <sup>+</sup>	0.34**	0.73
Higher education	4.55***	3.92**	1.14	3.46**	0.54	0.88
Medium level education*2002	0.24** <sup>‡</sup>	0.95	0.98	0.57	4.06** <sup>†</sup>	0.60
Higher education*2002	0.22** <sup>‡</sup>	1.00	0.96	0.45	4.33* <sup>†</sup>	0.45
Medium level education*2012	0.20**	0.32 <sup>+</sup>	1.68	0.67	8.27***	2.13
Higher education*2012	0.22*	0.29 <sup>+</sup>	1.05	0.36 <sup>+</sup>	4.68*	1.23
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.45	1.02	1.41 <sup>+</sup> <sup>‡</sup>	0.69	0.97	0.68
High income	1.83 <sup>+</sup>	1.67	1.42 <sup>‡</sup>	0.61	0.78	0.36 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2002	0.68	0.48	0.40	1.21	1.14	2.54
High income*2002	0.72	0.38	0.91	1.69	1.32	4.44 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2012	0.34*	0.67	0.56 <sup>+</sup>	1.36	1.64	2.03
High income*2012	0.15**	0.22 <sup>+</sup>	0.44 <sup>+</sup>	0.99	2.96	4.46
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.13	0.72	0.85	0.86	0.75	1.19
Stagnation generation	1.39	0.97	0.85	0.73	0.61 <sup>+</sup>	0.75
Reform generation	1.63* <sup>†</sup>	0.70	0.92	0.79	0.57*	1.13
Millennials	1.52	1.38	1.08	0.65	0.71	0.47
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.05	1.06	1.11	0.97	1.06	0.91
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	0.99	0.83	0.72** <sup>‡</sup>	1.04	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	1.25
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	0.99	1.01	0.72**	0.87	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	0.86
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.032***	0.076***	0.243***	0.167***	7.668***	2.181

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.061 (women's model). Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.063 (men's model). <sup>†</sup><sup>‡</sup>Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (<sup>†</sup>) or at  $p < 0.1$  (<sup>‡</sup>) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from a pooled model (not shown).

### Results

The results of the regression analysis are presented in Table 3. To facilitate the interpretation of the regression results, in Figure 1 the key time- and class-related findings are presented visually using predicted probabilities. Although the statistical power to detect significant effects is limited by the small number of cases in some subgroups, the emerging picture of changes and the class-specific character of those changes are quite clear.

'Traditional (double burden)' remained by far the most prevalent ideology amongst men and women of all classes throughout the analysed period. However, there were important class differences in trends of support for it. In 1994 more educated and more affluent




FIGURE 1. PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF SUPPORTING VARIOUS GENDER IDEOLOGIES FOR MEN AND WOMEN FROM DIFFERENT CLASSES, 1994–2012

Note: Predicted probabilities were calculated on the basis of a pooled model that included year and gender dummies, as well as interaction terms for gender with all other predictors. Predictions are for married, non-religious, employed individuals belonging to the 'stagnation' generation.

women and men were significantly less likely to embrace this ideology than women and men from lower classes. By 2012, however, the class gradient was no longer observed. This class convergence was related primarily to an increased likelihood of endorsing this ideology amongst more educated and affluent women and men; and, to a smaller extent, to a slightly decreased appeal of this mode of gender division of labour for lower-class women.

As for the separate spheres ideology, the regression results show that behind the overall trend of decreasing support, as reflected in the descriptive statistics, there were idiosyncratic class processes. The likelihood of endorsing this ideology decreased only amongst more educated and affluent women and men. Notably, while in 1994 both higher levels of education and higher household income were important predictors of support for separate spheres for both genders, by 2012 this was no longer the case. Amongst less educated women, on the other hand, the likelihood of supporting this ideology slightly increased over time.

Finally, in relation to egalitarianism, the descriptive statistics suggested that, following some increase in support for this during the first postsocialist decade, in the 2000s there was a roll-back. Again, multivariate analysis showed that this was a trend characteristic of higher classes only. While the likelihood of supporting this ideology remained almost unchanged amongst lower classes, amongst highly educated and affluent women and men it first significantly increased between 1994 and 2002, and then sharply decreased during the following decade. It is important to note, however, that even in 2012, women from higher classes were significantly more likely to support egalitarianism than either similarly educated and affluent men, or men and women from lower classes.

Analysis of generational coefficients provided further insights into potential directions of change. Overall, generational differences in the likelihood of support for each of the ideologies were rather minor. Amongst men, millennials were the most likely to endorse separate spheres, and they had a significantly higher likelihood of supporting this ideology than the ‘thaw’ and ‘reform’ generation men. Amongst women, by contrast, it was the ‘reform’ generation that turned out to be the strongest supporters of this ideology.<sup>12</sup>

Analysis of control variables suggested that marital status had no effect on gender ideologies. Not working for wages was associated with lower likelihood of supporting egalitarianism, but only amongst women. Identifying as religious was also associated with lower likelihood of supporting egalitarianism, but only amongst women was the association statistically significant.

#### *Discussion and conclusions*

This article has aimed to determine to what extent we can speak about the re-traditionalisation of gender ideologies in Russia in the 2000s; whether and how the effects of gender and class as their determinants have changed over time; and whether Russian millennials could be considered more traditionalist than the previous generations. The analysis has shown that in the 2000s one could, indeed, observe a sort of re-traditionalisation of attitudes towards the

<sup>12</sup>A pooled model with year\*generation interactions (not shown; available from the author on request) confirmed that millennial women had consistently low likelihood of supporting the separate spheres ideology in 2002–2012. A more puzzling and concerning finding in terms of possible future changes concerned the trends of support for the other two ideologies amongst women of this birth cohort. In 2002, millennial women expressed significantly stronger support than women of other generations for egalitarian ideology. It was also much stronger than the likelihood of endorsing this ideology amongst the ‘reform’ generation of women back in 1994 (when they were at approximately the same stage of their life course). However, between 2002 and 2012, the support for egalitarianism amongst millennial women fell substantially, while their endorsement of ‘traditional (double burden)’ ideology increased.

gender division of labour. However, the processes were very class specific. Furthermore, this re-traditionalisation did not primarily entail the strengthening of the separate spheres ideology, as is usually implied in the quantitative studies relying on the unidimensional framework (Nechaeva 2017; Kosova 2018; Klüsener *et al.* 2019). Amongst highly educated and affluent women and men, we witnessed a continuing increase in support for the ‘traditional (double burden)’ ideology, combined with a complete abandonment of the separate sphere ideal. Both trends, however, were already visible in the 1990s. What was different in the 2000s was the substantially decreased likelihood of support for egalitarianism amongst this class. Amongst lower-class women and men, attitudes were more stable in the period I studied, although the appeal of separate spheres to this class was on a slightly upward trend in both decades.

As a result of these idiosyncratic processes, contrary to my theoretical expectation about the increased effect of class on gender ideologies during the postsocialist period (Temkina & Rotkirch 2002), in 2012, class differences appeared to be at a historical low. While in 1994 the endorsement of separate spheres was clearly a prerogative of higher-educated and more affluent women and men, this ideology had completely lost its appeal amongst this group by the end of the analysed period.<sup>13</sup> Relatedly, while the ‘traditional (double burden)’ ideology had significantly less support amongst higher-class women and men in 1994, by 2012 they were overwhelmingly sympathetic to it. Only in levels of support for the egalitarian ideology did class gradients—which were always observed amongst women only—remain significant even in 2012.

However, we should not interpret this seemingly attitudinal convergence as an indication that class does not have an effect on gender ideologies in contemporary Russia. First, the findings show that the trends in endorsement of all the three analysed ideologies were highly class specific. Therefore, despite the convergence in 2012, it is reasonable to assume that the class gradients could have increased again in the subsequent years not covered by this study, if the trends have continued. Second, the renewed support for women’s employment amongst higher classes should be distinguished from the lingering support for it amongst lower classes. While the latter suggests attitudinal path dependency, the former could rather be interpreted as a response to rising economic inequality, as has been shown in studies elsewhere (Pepin & Cotter 2018). More educated and affluent Russians are becoming increasingly aware that women’s incomes are essential for maintaining families’ (upper-)middle-class positions, and are no longer toying with the idea of the housewife/breadwinner family model that may have appealed to them as being very middle-class back in the 1990s.

In terms of gender differences, it is notable that the overall trends amongst men and women with comparable levels of education and income were rather similar. And it is hardly possible, based on these data, to speak about gender convergence or divergence, as suggested by other studies (Nechaeva 2017; Gurko 2019). Echoing the findings by Fodor and Balogh (2010), it is, however, important to point out that women from higher classes remain by far the strongest supporters of egalitarianism in Russia.

<sup>13</sup>See also, Ashwin and Isupova (2018), who pointed out the diminished support for separate spheres at the aggregate level.

Finally, my findings regarding generational differences suggest that the argument that Russian millennials favour a separate spheres ideology more than previous generations (Klüsener *et al.* 2019) is applicable to men only. Further studies will be needed to understand the mechanism underlying the moderating role of gender in this relation. It is reasonable to assume, though, that the formative experiences of this generation during the 1990s—including the inability of many of the millennials' fathers to live up to breadwinner expectations; their mothers often having to become main breadwinners, while still being considered primarily responsible for care and domestic work; and the family conflicts and breakdowns caused by the above (Kay 2002; Ashwin 2006)—have had a differential impact on young men's and women's attitudes.

Key limitations of this study stem from the nature of the data used for the analysis. First, this study does not cover the period after 2012, when Russia's 'conservative turn' significantly accelerated (Makarychev & Medvedev 2015). Echoing the argument brought forward by Makarychev and Medvedev (2015), I suggest that it is unlikely that these developments have affected the Russian public's attitudes towards women's employment and breadwinning. However, essentialist views on women's primary responsibility for care work could have strengthened even further in this period. It will, therefore, be important to repeat the sort of analysis presented in this article when the next round of the ISSP Family and Gender Roles survey planned for 2022 becomes available. Second, due to the relatively small sample sizes in each wave, it was beyond the scope of this study to identify further possible variations in ideologies. Further studies on larger samples will be needed, in order to provide a potentially more complex picture of the multitude of gender ideologies in contemporary Russia. For example, it might be worth exploring quantitatively how the ideology of 'intensive parenting' (or rather, mothering)—which entails a combination of beliefs in gender equality in breadwinning and caring with a notion that young children suffer when mothers work (Grunow *et al.* 2018)—has transformed in the postsocialist period. Qualitative studies suggest that this ideology might be strengthening in Russia (Isupova 2018). Thirdly, as often is the case with surveys, the ISSP sample did not include high and ultra-high net worth respondents. Therefore, the findings of this study should be regarded as descriptive of changes amongst middle and lower classes only. The findings of an interview-based study of Russian elites (Schimpfössl 2018, p. 134) suggest that, even amongst that group, the separate spheres ideology is no longer prevalent, as people generally feel that women should work outside the home and 'pursue their own thing'. At the same time, Schimpfössl also highlighted the development of a sort of Western-style bourgeois masculinity amongst Russian elites, premised on the idea that 'good fathers provide but are also concerned about maintaining a warm and loving relationship with their children' (Schimpfössl 2018, pp. 127–28). The latter would suggest the increasing prevalence of egalitarian attitudes in this class. Testing this hypothesis is, unfortunately, not possible with the available data.

This article fills two currently existing gaps in the scholarship on Russia. It provides quantitative evidence on the direction of change in multiple gender ideologies. It also brings centre-stage the issues of class and generation, which have been notably absent from the empirical quantitative studies of the topic.

In terms of its wider theoretical contributions, this study lends further support to the argument about the multidimensionality of gender ideologies (Grunow *et al.* 2018). My

findings highlight how social group identities such as gender, class and generation could interact to shape individuals' gender ideologies and how the influence of these factors could change over time, something we still know relatively little about (Chatillon *et al.* 2018).

In conclusion, what do my findings reveal about the direction of possible change in gender relations in contemporary Russia? On the one hand, the sort of ideological re-traditionalisation amongst more educated and affluent men and women identified in this article is concerning, taking into account that behavioural social changes could be expected to emanate from the upper social strata (Bourdieu 1984). On the other hand, the fact that a significant proportion of highly educated and affluent women still favours egalitarianism, and that millennial women (in contrast to millennial men) do not show any increased interest in the return to separate spheres, may be a positive sign. Taking into account the increasing relative size of this group of women in the general population and their increasing political awareness and activism on gender issues (Couch 2020), this implies that progressive change in gender relations in Russian families is being already demanded at the micro level. Whether these changes will result in macro-level transformations remains to be seen.

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## Appendix

TABLE A1  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER IDEOLOGY IN 1994, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	3.33***	3.00**	1.28	2.23*	0.38*	0.74
Higher education	4.29***	4.33**	2.73***	4.09**	0.65	0.94
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.43	1.06	1.50 <sup>† ‡</sup>	0.73 <sup>‡</sup>	1.05	0.68
High income	1.85 <sup>†</sup>	1.85	1.70 <sup>† ‡</sup>	0.67 <sup>‡</sup>	0.92	0.36 <sup>†</sup>
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.34	0.73	1.06	0.80	0.79	1.10
Stagnation generation	1.72	1.04	1.23	0.77	0.71	0.74
Reform generation	1.25	0.60	0.67	0.74	0.54	1.24
Millennials	–	–	–	–	–	–
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.05	0.97	1.21	1.04	1.15	1.07
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	1.05	1.11	1.26	1.56	1.21	1.41
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	0.91	1.14	0.81	0.88	0.89	0.77
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.03***	0.06***	0.13***	0.12***	4.20*	2.05

Notes: <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.066 (women's model). Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.073 (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (†) or at  $p < 0.1$  (‡) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from the year-specific pooled model for men and women (not shown).

TABLE A2  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY IN 2002, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	0.89 <sup>‡</sup>	2.68* <sup>‡</sup>	1.36	0.98	1.52 <sup>†</sup>	0.37 <sup>+ †</sup>
Higher education	1.11 <sup>†</sup>	4.36*** <sup>a</sup>	2.91*** <sup>‡</sup>	1.30 <sup>‡</sup>	2.61* <sup>†</sup>	0.30 <sup>+ †</sup>
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	0.98	0.50 <sup>+</sup>	1.02	0.87	1.04	1.72
High income	1.26	0.66	1.20	1.01	0.95	1.52
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.14	0.83	0.76	1.11	0.67	1.34
Stagnation generation	0.98	1.13	0.54*	0.78	0.56	0.69
Reform generation	2.10 <sup>+</sup>	0.95	0.72	0.63	0.34*	0.67
Millennials	2.03	2.22	2.94*** <sup>†</sup>	0.68 <sup>†</sup>	1.45	0.31
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.10	0.95	0.96	1.13	0.87	1.19
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	0.87	1.01	0.53**	0.69	0.61	0.68
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	1.36	1.36	0.67 <sup>+ ‡</sup>	1.15 <sup>‡</sup>	0.52 <sup>+</sup>	0.85
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.07***	0.06***	0.40*	0.24*	5.72*	3.98

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R2 = 0.082 (women's model). Nagelkerke R2 = 0.047 (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (†) or at  $p < 0.1$  (‡) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from the year-specific pooled model for men and women (not shown).

TABLE A3  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY IN 2012, ODDS RATIOS

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	0.75	0.72	1.79 <sup>†</sup>	1.35	2.39 <sup>†</sup>	1.88
Higher education	1.21	1.00	2.34*	1.31	1.94	1.31
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	0.50 <sup>†</sup>	0.71	0.80	0.89	1.59	1.25
High income	0.30 <sup>†</sup>	0.37	0.63	0.60	2.11	1.62
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	0.76	1.00	1.14	0.65	1.50	0.65
Stagnation generation	1.32	0.75	1.01	0.54	0.77	0.71
Reform generation	2.32	0.68	1.28	0.82	0.55	1.19
Millennials	1.62	0.93	0.85	0.61	0.52	0.65
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.17	1.70	1.26	0.74	1.08	0.43
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	1.69 <sup>†</sup>	0.44 <sup>†</sup>	0.58* <sup>‡</sup>	1.19 <sup>‡</sup>	0.35** <sup>†</sup>	2.73 <sup>†</sup> <sup>†</sup>
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	1.20	0.35*	0.61 <sup>†</sup>	0.82	0.51	1.50
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.07**	0.38	0.27*	0.36	4.04	0.96

Notes: <sup>†</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R2 = 0.061 (women's model). Nagelkerke R2 = 0.072 (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (<sup>†</sup>) or at  $p < 0.1$  (<sup>‡</sup>) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from the year-specific pooled model for men and women (not shown).

TABLE A4  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY, ODDS RATIOS, POOLED YEARS 1994–2012

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Year (ref. category: 1994)</i>						
2002	2.82*	1.70	1.21	1.50	0.43	1.16
2012	4.24*	1.29	1.03	1.23	0.24*	0.72
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	3.39***	2.67*	2.45**	1.97 <sup>+</sup>	0.34**	0.73
Higher education	4.55***	3.92**	1.14	3.46**	0.54	0.88
Medium level education*2002	0.24** <sup>‡</sup>	0.95	0.98	0.57	4.06** <sup>†</sup>	0.60
Higher education*2002	0.22** <sup>‡</sup>	1.00	0.96	0.45	4.33* <sup>†</sup>	0.45
Medium level education*2012	0.20**	0.32 <sup>+</sup>	1.68	0.67	8.27***	2.13
Higher education*2012	0.22*	0.29 <sup>+</sup>	1.05	0.36 <sup>+</sup>	4.68*	1.23
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.45	1.02	1.41 <sup>+</sup> <sup>‡</sup>	0.69	0.97	0.68
High income	1.83 <sup>+</sup>	1.67	1.42 <sup>‡</sup>	0.61	0.78	0.36 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2002	0.68	0.48	0.40	1.21	1.14	2.54
High income*2002	0.72	0.38	0.91	1.69	1.32	4.44 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2012	0.34*	0.67	0.56 <sup>+</sup>	1.36	1.64	2.03
High income*2012	0.15**	0.22 <sup>+</sup>	0.44 <sup>+</sup>	0.99	2.96	4.46
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.13	0.72	0.85	0.86	0.75	1.19
Stagnation generation	1.39	0.97	0.85	0.73	0.61 <sup>+</sup>	0.75
Reform generation	1.63* <sup>†</sup>	0.70	0.92	0.79	0.57*	1.13
Millennials	1.52	1.38	1.08	0.65	0.71	0.47
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.05	1.06	1.11	0.97	1.06	0.91
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	0.99	0.83	0.72** <sup>‡</sup>	1.04	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	1.25
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	0.99	1.01	0.72**	0.87	0.73 <sup>+</sup>	0.86
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.032***	0.076***	0.243***	0.167***	7.668***	2.181

Notes: <sup>+</sup> $p < 0.1$ ; \* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ . Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.061 (women's model). Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 0.063 (men's model). <sup>†‡</sup> Difference between the coefficients for men and women significant at  $p < 0.05$  level (<sup>†</sup>) or at  $p < 0.1$  (<sup>‡</sup>) based on interaction terms for gender and the given predictor from a pooled model (not shown).

TABLE A5  
ESTIMATES OF MULTINOMIAL LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL PREDICTING GENDER  
IDEOLOGY, ODDS RATIOS, POOLED YEARS 1994–2012

	Separate spheres vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs 'traditional (double burden)'		Egalitarian vs separate spheres	
	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men
<i>Year (ref. category: 1994)</i>						
2002	2.75 <sup>+</sup>	1.08	0.96	1.11	0.35 <sup>+</sup>	1.02
2012	5.05*	1.42	0.82	1.26	0.16*	0.89
<i>Education (ref. category: Low level of education)</i>						
Medium level education	3.41***	2.85*	1.24	2.09 <sup>+</sup>	0.36*	0.73
Higher education	4.34***	3.91**	2.54**	3.65**	0.58	0.93
Medium level education*2002	0.27**	0.91	1.16	0.51	4.34**	0.55
Higher education*2002	0.27*	1.06	1.25	0.40 <sup>+</sup>	4.71*	0.38
Medium level education*2012	0.21**	0.29	1.48	0.69	6.97**	2.37
Higher education*2012	0.25*	0.28	0.96	0.36	3.87 <sup>+</sup>	1.29
<i>Household income (ref. category: Low income)</i>						
Medium income	1.45	1.03	1.43 <sup>+</sup>	0.69	0.99	0.67
High income	1.90*	1.76	1.49	0.62	0.79	0.35 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2002	0.35	0.48	0.88	1.26	1.28	2.65
High income*2002	0.50	0.36	0.75	1.70	1.10	4.47 <sup>+</sup>
Medium income*2012	0.34*	0.66	0.56 <sup>+</sup>	1.32	1.67	2.00
High income*2012	0.15**	0.21	0.44 <sup>+</sup>	0.94	3.01	4.44
<i>Generation (ref. category: Mobilisation generation)</i>						
Thaw generation	1.38	0.63	0.75	0.64	0.54	1.01
Stagnation generation	1.80 <sup>+</sup>	0.91	0.81	0.61	0.45*	0.67
Reform generation	1.25	0.52	0.57 <sup>+</sup>	0.68	0.46 <sup>+</sup>	1.31
Millennials	2.10	1.91	3.27***	0.87	1.56	0.46
Thaw generation*2002	0.85	1.22	1.10	1.94	1.29	0.80
Stagnation generation*2002	0.62	1.13	0.88	1.65	1.43	1.46
Reform generation*2002	1.82	1.58	1.59	1.26	0.88	1.59
Millennials*2002	–	–	–	–	–	–
Thaw generation*2012	0.55	1.41	1.50	1.02	2.74	0.72
Stagnation generation*2012	0.65	1.18	1.36	0.87	2.10	0.74
Reform generation*2012	1.33	2.15	2.55*	1.15	1.92	0.53
Millennials*2012	0.61	0.75	0.29*	0.60	0.48	0.80
<i>Marital status (ref. category: Married)</i>						
Not married/no partner	1.11	1.08	1.13	0.98	1.02	0.90
<i>Employment (ref. category: Working for wages)</i>						
Not working for wages	1.09	0.86	0.73*	1.05	0.68*	1.23
<i>Religiosity (ref. category: Not religious)</i>						
Religious	1.01	1.00	0.73**	0.87	0.72 <sup>+</sup>	0.87
Baseline odds (exponentiated constant)	0.026***	0.080***	0.248***	0.183***	9.412***	2.300

Notes: <sup>+</sup>p<0.1; \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001. Nagelkerke R2 = 0.072 (women's model). Nagelkerke R2 = 0.069 (men's model).





